A question of loyalty : The French Communist Party, 1976-81 by Halsne, Elise Engesland
ELISE ENGESLAND HALSNE 
 
 
A question of loyalty 
The French Communist Party, 1976-81 – How a party’s quest for 
democracy and ideological independence could lead to its support of 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Masteroppgave i historie 
Høst 2011 
Institutt for arkeologi, konservering og historie 
Universitetet i Oslo 
 
 
 
ii 
 
 
 
 
Til pappa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
Contents 
 
 
Acknowledgments ...................................................................................................................... v 
List of abbreviations .................................................................................................................. vi 
Chapter 1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1 
Theory ..................................................................................................................................... 6 
Sources and literature ............................................................................................................. 9 
Chapter 2. Towards democratic change? ................................................................................. 14 
The 22
nd
 Congress of the PCF .............................................................................................. 14 
Chapter 3. Hesitantly towards Europe – the PCF and Eurocommunism ................................. 20 
The 1976 conference of European communist parties ......................................................... 22 
How the PCF saw Eurocommunism ..................................................................................... 24 
Theories on Eurocommunism ............................................................................................... 28 
Chapter 4. Away from Moscow – and back again ................................................................... 34 
The PCF and the quest for recognition of divergence .......................................................... 34 
PCF-CPSU relations deteriorate ........................................................................................... 34 
The apple of discord - the PCF’s wish for ideological independence .................................. 37 
A game of brinkmanship – the PCF fights back ................................................................... 40 
A change of Soviet tactics – and an improvement in PCF-CPSU relations ......................... 43 
The origins of the conflict – and the reasons for its end ....................................................... 44 
Truce ..................................................................................................................................... 47 
Chapter 5. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan ....................................................................... 48 
The invasion ......................................................................................................................... 48 
A defiant people – understanding the history of the Afghans .............................................. 49 
Soviet-Afghan relations, 1978-1979 ..................................................................................... 51 
Soviet’s rocky path to invasion ............................................................................................ 53 
The reaction of the PCF ........................................................................................................ 55 
The Politburo .................................................................................................................... 55 
The Secretariat .................................................................................................................. 59 
The Central Committee ..................................................................................................... 60 
The reaction of France – and of the world ............................................................................ 62 
Chapter 6. The PCF, 1980-81 – the Aftermath of Afghanistan ............................................... 65 
Bittersweet success – the communiqué that disappeared ..................................................... 65 
Problems – the French reaction to the PCF’s decision ......................................................... 66 
The PCF and the Eurocommunists, 1980-81 ........................................................................ 70 
Support and self-defence – the PCF mobilizes the press ...................................................... 72 
The PCF between ideological considerations and political loyalty ...................................... 75 
PCF-CPSU relations, 1980-81 .............................................................................................. 81 
In from the cold – the PCF’s return to government .............................................................. 84 
Attempt at catharsis – Marchais’ speech to the Central Committee ..................................... 85 
Chapter 7. The PCF, 1980-81 – Stalinism in practice .............................................................. 89 
The Stalinist system – democratic centralism ................................................................... 89 
Stalinism in practice – the Fiszbin Affair ......................................................................... 92 
Stalinist rule – the authority of the one – and the few ...................................................... 96 
Marxist-Leninist theory and the cult of Stalin .................................................................. 99 
Chapter 8. Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 102 
iv 
 
Appendix I. Georges Marchais’ speech to the Central Committee, 25/26.06.81 – excerpts . 109 
I. a - French transcription ................................................................................................... 109 
I. b - English translation ..................................................................................................... 110 
Appendix II. List of persons ................................................................................................... 112 
Sources ................................................................................................................................... 114 
Unpublished archival material ............................................................................................ 114 
Printed media ...................................................................................................................... 114 
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................... 114 
Other ....................................................................................................................................... 116 
Internet ................................................................................................................................ 116 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
For help, encouragement and inspiration, I would like to thank professor Øystein Sørensen, 
my supervisor, for his advice; the staff at the Departmental archives in Seine Saint-Denis for 
their generous assistance; Tore Flåtten, my cousin, for support; friends for their tips and good 
company – and finally my mum, for being my mum.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
 
List of abbreviations 
 
CCCP – Commission central de contrôle politique – the Central Commission of Political 
Control. Section of the French Communist Party – the PCF. 
CCP – The Chinese Communist Party. 
CFDT – Confédération française démocratique du travail – France’s largest workers’ union. 
Cominform – Communist Information Bureau, Comintern’s successor. Founded 1947, 
dissolved 1956. 
Comintern – The (Third) Communist International, founded 1919 – dissolved 1943. 
CPSU – The Communist Party of the Soviet Union.  
KGB – Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti – the Committee for State Security, the Soviet 
intelligence agency. 
MRG – Mouvement des radicaux aux gauche – Movement of the Left Radicals, French 
political organization, predecessor to the current PRG – Parti radical de gauche.  
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
PCE – Partido Comunista de España – the Spanish Communist Party. 
PCF – Parti communist français – the French Communist Party. 
PCI – Partito Comunista Italiano – the Italian Communist Party. 
PCUS – Parti communiste de l’Union Soviétique – the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 
PDPA – People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan. 
PS – Parti socialiste – the French Socialist Party. 
UN – United Nations. 
USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics – the Soviet Union. 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
“L’utopie n’a pas de passé, seulement un avenir”1 
“Utopia does not have a past, only a future” 
 
In early January, 1980, the French Communist Party – the PCF – decided to support the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that had taken place in late December, 1979. This thesis is an 
attempt to explain why the PCF made this decision. Such a starting point presupposes that the 
decision was not an inevitable course of action, and that there were indications that the PCF 
could have chosen differently. I will examine the decision made by the PCF by analyzing the 
PCF’s ideological evolution and political loyalties in the years leading up to the invasion, 
beginning in 1976, and the aftermath of the invasion, 1980-1981. My focus will be on the 
PCF’s international relations, i.e. its relations with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
– the CPSU – and its relations with other European communist parties, more precisely its 
participation in the 1970s democratization efforts of European communism known as 
Eurocommunism. I will also attempt to demonstrate how the organizational structures of the 
PCF – evidence of its power hierarchy and the practical expressions of its decision-making 
processes – are key elements in understanding how the PCF’s relations with the international 
communist movement unfolded. I will also look into the consequences of the PCF’s decision, 
and what these effects may reveal about the party itself.  
 
This thesis seeks to answer one, plain question: Why did the PCF support the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan? This question prompts several more; was it as simple as many believed at the 
time, that the PCF did what it was told by the Soviet Union, even if it had negative 
consequences for the PCF? That the bond between them was so strong, and the PCF’s 
allegiance to the CPSU so unconditional, that the PCF despite wishes to break free from the 
Soviet hold proved incapable to do so? Was there a genuine attachment to the Eurocommunist 
project or in the very least its principles, which helped the PCF gradually turn towards the 
liberal Europe? Had the PCF really moved away from the CPSU, with the support of the 
Afghan invasion being a slight relapse, an honest mistake? Or is the picture more complex? 
Furthermore, I wished to analyze the political and ideological loyalties that formed PCF 
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policy before and after the invasion, to find out first, in what situation the PCF found itself in 
when the invasion took place, and secondly, how the PCF’s subsequent support of the 
invasion affect the party. Based on these questions I formulated my main thesis question: how 
did the PCF’s international loyalties and the party’s own hierarchal structures contribute to 
the PCF’s decision to support the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and how did this decision 
affect the PCF?  
 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan caused widespread anger and disapproval in diplomatic 
and military circles worldwide. Violent reactions to the invasion manifested themselves in 
Western media and politicians the world over began discussing economic and political 
sanctions against the Soviet Union. The invasion has later been interpreted as the event 
marking the end of the détente, the era of careful optimism in which Soviet-US relations had 
improved and important arms concessions had been made on both sides. The invasion was to 
have great consequences also for the international communist movement, of which the Soviet 
Union was the leader, and the PCF in particular would feel great effects of the invasion. 
 
The PCF had traditionally been one of the Western communist parties closest to that of the 
Soviet Union, the CPSU. Only once in its history had it publically criticized a foreign political 
decision made by the Soviet Union – when it opposed the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia 
in 1968
2
 – and when faced with the choice of supporting or condemning the invasion of 
Afghanistan, the PCF chose to stand by its old Soviet ally. It was a controversial decision, and 
the PCF was subjected to heavy criticisms as a consequence of it. It lost votes and its 
popularity sunk to an all-time low. I wanted to find out why the PCF made a decision that 
ultimately served no purpose but to damage the party. Naturally, I had to narrow the field of 
my analysis. I decided to focus on the years immediately prior to the invasion, beginning in 
1976, and ending my analysis in 1981. In 1976, the PCF held a party conference that came to 
be regarded widely as a turning point in the party's approach to traditional Marxist doctrine as 
it was interpreted by the CPSU, thus providing me with a good starting point for my analysis. 
In 1981, the PCF was invited to join François Mitterrand's socialist government after having 
been in opposition since 1947. The PCF's ascent to government came at the end of a long year 
in which the French communists had experienced political isolation, structural radicalization 
and a steady decline in popularity. I conclude my analysis of these years in PCF history with 
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an analysis of the speech PCF General Secretary Georges Marchais gave to the PCF Central 
Committee in June, 1981, in which he denounced his party’s conduct at the time of the 
Afghanistan invasion and regretted the PCF’s weakness when faced with the might of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 
 
1976-1981 were eventful years for the PCF, both with regards to domestic politics and its 
international relations, and many different approaches could have yielded satisfactory 
analyses of my chosen topic. However, because the invasion of Afghanistan was a foreign 
event, unrelated to the PCF but by the party’s close ties to the Soviet Union, and because these 
ties were structural – the PCF was in essence still a Stalinist party organization – as well as 
political – the two parties had been allies since the founding of the Comintern in 1919 – I 
chose to emphasize two factors I believe are key to understanding the decision the PCF made. 
The first is the PCF's international commitments and loyalties. The PCF always stayed true to 
the basic Marxist principle of internationalism. It was always of a deeply internationalist 
nature, and the history of the PCF is intimately connected with that of the international 
communist movement. Founded in 1920 when the French socialist movement split over the 
great polemic following the Third International’s adoption of the controversial “Twenty-one 
Conditions,” the PCF was dedicated to the Comintern until the latter was dissolved in 1943, 
obeying its increasingly Stalinist orders and conforming to the Stalinist party system. After the 
Second World War, the PCF repeated its loyalty to the Soviet Union, this time to the 
Cominform – the Comintern’s less radiant successor – until this organization, too, was 
dissolved in 1956. All the while the PCF remained unconditionally loyal to the idea of 
proletarian internationalism – to international solidarity with the communist parties of the 
world. After the break between the Soviet Union and China, effectively dividing the 
communist world into two blocs, the PCF remained by the Soviets’ side where it had always 
had its place. This did not change after the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. 
 
However, only a few years previously, by the mid-1970s, there were indications that the PCF-
CPSU relationship was not as harmonious as it had once been. The PCF began voicing its 
concern, publically, over emerging evidence indicating serious human rights breaches in the 
Soviet Union and other socialist states. Answering both to the needs of the party to adapt to 
the liberal French society in order to maintain its momentum, and to new impulses from the 
European communist movement – known as Eurocommunism – the PCF gradually began to 
4 
 
want for greater ideological independence vis-à-vis the CPSU. The latter, ever in fear of 
factionalism and perhaps also of losing the PCF to the social democrats, reacted strongly to 
what it perceived was a French communist rebellion against the Soviets. In turn, the PCF 
would use its renewed relations with the European communist parties as leverage in its 
ongoing conflict with the CPSU, exploiting the Soviets’ fear of losing its position in the world 
movement. 
 
Eurocommunism is defined as two distinctive phenomena, both of which point to a process of 
gradual reformation and liberalization of European – and world – communism. 
Eurocommunism – a phrase originally coined by journalists – was a political cooperation 
primarily involving Western European communist parties and spearheaded by the Italian and 
Spanish communist parties – the PCI, and the PCE, respectively. Promoting a more liberal 
approach to traditional Marxist thought, as well as political pluralism – i.e. acknowledging the 
many-party political system of Europe’s capitalist democracies – this cooperation sought to 
rejuvenate communism by lessening the Soviet influence of the international movement. This 
Soviet influence, both in terms of the Stalinist legacy of party structure and the Soviet Union’s 
political control of the international movement, lies at the heart of the second definition of the 
Eurocommunist phenomenon. Several contemporary observers and, later, historians, 
interpreted Eurocommunism as the inevitable development of world communism – as the 
process of de-Stalinization.
3
 Rather than interpreting Eurocommunism as a progressive stage 
in the evolution of communism, it was seen as a reaction to the Stalinist structures that had 
crippled the international movement since its earliest days.   
 
The second key factor in my analysis is an understanding of the PCF's party structures – 
Stalinist in origin, and, in many instances, still Stalinist in practical application – these 
structures greatly influenced the party's decision-making processes. I have therefore included 
a chapter on the various manifestations of these essentially undemocratic structures – the 
party's tradition for secrecy, its dedication to the principle of democratic centralism, its rigid 
treatment of dissidents challenging party unity, and the personal authority and power of the 
top leaders – all of which serve to give an insight into how the PCF made its decisions, and 
who within the party influenced those decisions. 
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In working on my thesis, focusing on the PCF's organizational structures and its international 
commitments, I quickly established that I had to differentiate between two very important 
terms; between ideology and politics in a communist context. The ideological foundations of 
communist thought was the raison d’être of the PCF, and the Marxist-Leninist doctrines 
interpreting party rule and envisaging revolutionary struggle formed the basis of a practical 
application of these communist principles. The PCF was meant to follow them, justify its 
actions by their validity and let its policies be guided by them. Loyalty to the communist 
ideology and obedience to its interpretation by Marx and his ideological successors ensured 
the legitimacy of PCF policy. There was a very real moral dimension to communism, which 
left the PCF more vulnerable to criticisms, should the party make a decision that ran contrary 
to the French public’s sense of justice. Ideology, therefore, is a term used in this thesis as the 
guiding principles behind the PCF’s decisions, and it was precisely these principles that the 
PCF sought to soften. The PCF wished to interpret these principles itself, adapting them to 
French reality, and to do so without the interference of other communist parties. It sought 
ideological independence, whether it was from the CPSU or the communist parties of Western 
Europe.   
 
Politics, on the other hand, is a party’s actual decisions and actions, not the motivations 
behind them. The PCF, like other parties, made decisions that were political rather than 
ideological, decisions that suited a specific situation, or answered to the party’s current 
interests – decisions that could, and occasionally did, violate communist principles. These 
decisions were not promoted by communist considerations – the decision came first, and the 
appropriate communist sentence employed to justify the decision, came second. My argument 
is that one must see the alliance between the PCF and the CPSU in light of it being a political 
bond between two parties with mutual interests and sharing a common enemy – not unlike a 
military alliance between two countries.  
 
My emphasis on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is directly linked to the consequences it 
proved to have for the PCF. Several historians, most notably French historians Robrieux, 
Courtois and Lazar, argue that the PCF’s decision to support the invasion marked the 
beginning of the final decline of the PCF as a significant party in French politics.
4
 Arguments 
supporting this theory are found mainly by analyzing the party’s actions following the 
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invasion and its responses to the heavy criticisms levelled at it. The PCF lost support and its 
popularity sunk – it reacted by building a wall between itself and the French public, media, 
and other political parties, as well as alienating itself from the Eurocommunist collaboration. 
This contributed to a radicalization of the party itself – and surrounded by enemies it 
withdrew to the safety of its oppositional, illiberal past.  
Theory 
Several theories seek to put the PCF’s decision into a historical context, based on the party’s 
ideological evolution in the years leading up to the invasion of Afghanistan. The two main 
theories argue either that the PCF’s stance on the Afghanistan issue signified a break with the 
foregoing years’ apparent move away from the ideological influence of the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union, or, that the decision was a confirmation that the PCF saw its natural 
place to be in the Soviet fold, and that it had always belonged there. Contemporary observers, 
such as Stiefbold and Ross, analyzing the PCF’s policies in the 1970s, concluded that the PCF 
was making a decisive, albeit modest and gradual, move away from Moscow.
5
 This theory 
considered that the PCF was genuinely impacted by or in the very least inspired by the ideas 
of the Eurocommunist project. The prevailing theory, however, has supported the latter idea; 
that the PCF remained loyal until the fall of the Soviet Union. Whatever the changes towards 
democracy the PCF proposed, these did not in any profound way affect the solid relationship 
between the PCF and its Soviet sister party. This theory, supported by historians Courtois, 
Lazar, and Tiersky amongst others, regard the tensions between the CPSU and the PCF in the 
late 1970s as an attempt on the part of the French communists to assert their independence 
vis-à-vis the Soviets, coinciding with a temporary strengthening of the party in France.
6
 
Courtois and Lazar argue in a same vein that when the tide turned, and the position of the PCF 
weakened domestically, as the party did after the election failures in 1978, the Soviet hold 
over the party strengthened. This would allow the Soviets to influence the PCF to a greater 
extent in the last couple of years leading up to the invasion of Afghanistan.
7
 
 
However, so far as my research has led me to believe, these conclusions only take into 
account the general relationship between the PCF and the CPSU, and see this relationship as a 
solid entity. I would argue that in analyzing this rather complex relationship, one must differ 
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between an ideological bond and a political one, as I have defined these terms above. There is 
very little to suggest that the PCF was anything but loyal to the Soviet political alliance, but 
my findings do suggest that the PCF’s wish to become more ideologically independent from 
the CPSU was genuine. As a political ally, the Soviet Union could count on the PCF, but 
ideologically, the PCF was subjected to very different impulses from society and politics than 
the CPSU, and it belonged to a very different political system. That would of course influence 
ideology. The two theories, therefore, are not mutually exclusive; rather they serve to 
illustrate the complexity of the PCF’s evolution during the late 1970s. Both must be 
incorporated in an analysis. I will argue that the PCF had no wish to break its political alliance 
with the CPSU, but wanted to free itself from the Soviets’ ideological hold, an argument that 
echoes that of Lazar in his Le communisme une passion française, in which he reaches the 
same conclusion.
8
 
 
The PCF’s attitude towards Eurocommunism has also been an object of study. The PCF 
seemed, at first, willing to join the Eurocommunist collaboration. The PCF’s decisions at the 
party’s 22nd Congress in 1976, where the PCF rejected the principle of “the dictatorship of the 
proletariat” and promoted the radical new idea of “socialism in French colours” seemed to be 
in tune with the ideas of the Eurocommunists. Contemporary observers, such as Stiefbold and 
Ross, regarded the PCF as a genuine Eurocommunist party, with Ross declaring that the PCF 
had, in fact, converted to Eurocommunism.
9
 There is, however, a remarkable lack of 
enthusiasm over this issue in the party’s own documents, and the general theory today is that 
the PCF’s part in the Eurocommunist project was never more than a mere flirtation, and that 
the PCF never felt dedicated to it. The conflict with the CPSU pushed the PCF closer to the 
Eurocommunist parties, and the PCF in turn used its relations with the Eurocommunists to put 
pressure on the Soviet comrades – the Eurocommunist project was, I will argue, used by the 
PCF as a means to force a result in its conflict with CPSU. The PCF’s Eurocommunist efforts, 
therefore, were connected to the PCF’s wish for ideological independence from the CPSU. I 
found, especially in reading the documents belonging to the PCF’s top leadership, a clear 
unwillingness to enter into any international cooperation involving any kind of strong political 
and/or ideological commitment.  
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However, the PCF never tired of repeating its ardent loyalty to the principle of international 
solidarity – its ties to the CPSU and its friendships with other European communist parties 
will testify to this claim. Politically, representing a communist party in an imperialist and 
capitalist world, the PCF would always stand alongside its communist comrades and support 
class struggle beyond France’s borders. But the PCF equally expressed its disapproval of any 
kind of commitment that would limit a party’s own independence and freedom of action. The 
word independence is key here. The PCF championed party independence – in this situation 
interpreted as ideological independence – from its communist brethren. That was not the same 
as abandoning the principle of international solidarity. The theories on the CPSU-PCF conflict 
are echoed in the PCF’s stance on Eurocommunism. The PCF simply did not see itself at 
home in the liberal, anti-Soviet world hailed by the Italian Communist Party, 
Eurocommunism’s greatest advocate. Led by a “Stalinist”, as Rubinstein claimed,10 and being 
the closest party to the Soviet Union, as claimed by Stiefbold,
11
 the PCF’s fling with 
Eurocommunism coincided with its relationship with the CPSU being at its most troubled, 
and the PCF could simply have used the Eurocommunist collaboration to put on an act of 
defiance, to assert its independence vis-à-vis Moscow.  
 
This leads to the last, important element in my thesis; the party organization of the PCF itself. 
In analyzing the invisible, but no less real structures of a party that still defined its policy and 
methods by predominantly Stalinist rhetoric and principles, I came to recognize the 
importance of properly understanding the influences of individuals and the all-importance of 
the PCF leadership. There is general consensus on the issue of the structural Stalinism of the 
PCF amongst historians. The PCF was a profoundly undemocratic party, promoting a strong 
emphasis on traditional Marxist-Leninist – and Stalinist – principles such as party unity, 
democratic centralism and the commitment to an ideological justification of all policy. The 
last chapter of my thesis outlines these structures, also in relation to specific events, as an 
attempt to clarify and systemize the traditions of party rule as they appear in my thesis. Here, I 
have relied on, amongst others, Robrieux’ descriptions of PCF leader Marchais and of the 
party’s decision-making processes, as well as Tiersky’s arguments on the PCF leadership – as 
well as his theory on what he calls “ordinary Stalinism.”12 This theory suggests that while the 
purges, the deaths and the destruction of “high Stalinism” – i.e. the Stalinism of Stalin’s own 
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day – had disappeared by the late 1970s, it had been replaced by “ordinary Stalinism,” in 
which the goal was the same; “monolithic unity.”13 This form of communism, being illiberal 
by nature, also proved practically immune to change.  
 
Many of these theories can be challenged for presenting too simplistic an explanation of the 
CPSU-PCF conflict and its consequences. I will also argue that the theories on the PCF-
Eurocommunist relationship offer too easy an explanation for the PCF’s hesitant approach to 
Eurocommunism, and the latter’s subsequent failure. There are several reasons for this. Some 
of the theories were outlined in the Soviet era, while world communism was still a very real 
phenomenon. The challenge of finding recent, relevant literature on these subjects can in part 
also be attributed to the natural waning of any new theoretical debates on the PCF, as the fall 
of the Soviet Union rendered them anachronistic over night. Before the PCF opened its 
archives to the public in 2005, it was difficult to ascertain the considerations and judgments 
made by the PCF leadership before publishing its decisions. This explains to a certain extent 
why historical theories until recently have only generally outlined PCF motivations and 
political decisions. As for the Afghanistan issue, many works on the development and 
progress of the PCF were simply written before the invasion took place. Further, there does 
not seem to be much interest in the PCF’s stance on Afghanistan – viewed in connection with 
the PCF-CPSU relationship many undoubtedly found the PCF’s decision self-explanatory. 
However, this is a matter in which I believe access to the party’s own files can prove essential 
to make the picture more interesting and complete. And as with all closed worlds – we must 
agree the PCF leadership was such a world – there is a great difference between how the PCF 
was perceived, and how the PCF leaders perceived themselves. I wanted to find out how these 
men – and the occasional woman – regarded their relationship with the CPSU and their 
position in the European communist movement. This would ultimately influence their 
decision on Afghanistan, too. To this end, the PCF archives proved extremely useful.   
Sources and literature 
In attempting to find an answer to my thesis questions, I decided to use mainly the PCF’s own 
documents – and relying on secondary literature to provide me with historical context and an 
outlining of historical theory on the subject. In relying heavily on the PCF’s own documents, 
as they are available in the party’s archives in Seine Saint-Denis, Paris, I had to subject 
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myself to the judgments and evaluations made by those whose job it was – and is – to screen 
documents before making them available to the public. Censorship has been applied, 
especially with regards to documents belonging to the party leadership – and correspondence 
with the Soviets. Very shrewd political considerations are at the basis of the selection of 
documents. Documents that make the Party look modern, brave and socially responsible have 
been made a priority. Documents regarding internal affairs are more difficult to find. It is also 
difficult to ascertain the true nature of the PCF-CPSU relationship, except when it was 
deteriorating. I had no problems finding letters and leadership debates indicating the PCF’s 
strong disapproval of CPSU’s conduct in the instances where such disapproval was expressed. 
Documents debating the conflict with the CPSU in 1977-78 were therefore very easy to trace, 
find, and read. Documents outlining election campaigns and plans for foreign visits, however, 
as well as a great deal of personal correspondence were usually only referred to, if mentioned 
at all. Several documents have been altered; paragraphs, words or names have been omitted, 
some very apparently so, using cut and paste techniques. Many documents that one must 
assume exist have not been submitted to the archives, such as reports on meetings that took 
place, but whose discussions have not been published. Many reports, letters or handwritten 
notes are kept out of the archives; they are only referred to directly or indirectly in other 
documents. Many controversial issues, such as references to the much famed “Moscow 
money,” were non-existent from the files. There were also a few gaping holes in the records, 
the biggest inconvenience to my own work being the omission from the archives of all 
Politburo documents between September and December, 1980.  
 
The most positive aspect of these documents is that they were never meant for anyone outside 
the PCF, indeed outside its leadership. They therefore represent a clear, true view of the party 
and the world – seen through the eyes of devout communists. No euphemisms have been 
used, and the dedication is absolute. The documents, their wording and phrasing, are steeped 
in old-school communist rhetoric – an idealistic language comprising romantic elements of 
class struggle and grand visions of the power inherent in the masses. The sources are one-
sided, naturally, but to understand why the PCF did what it did, believed what it came to 
believe, one must see the world from its leaders’ point of view, and try to trace the 
motivations and beliefs guiding their decision-making processes. The documents are also the 
written expressions of communist leaders who may have misunderstood, been misled in or 
wrongly convinced of many things – as well as being occasionally misleading themselves. It 
11 
 
has been a challenge to find the facts in such instances, and here, I have sought the aid of 
secondary literature insofar as it could provide clarification. The documents also give insight 
into the structures, rules, traditions and customs of the PCF, clarifying its decisions and 
putting its decisions into a more comprehensible context.  
 
The communist press also became important sources for my thesis. In reading the PCF’s 
newspapers, in particular L’Humanité – the party daily – and L’Humanité Dimanche, its 
Sunday edition, I sought to understand how the PCF’s decisions were translated to the rank-
and-file of the party, and the general public. This proved especially useful when analyzing the 
PCF’s response to the heavy criticisms levelled at it in the months following the invasion of 
Afghanistan in December, 1979. It was also interesting to examine how the PCF mobilized its 
press and how it simplified complex political issues in presenting them to the readers. It also 
gave an insight into how much the readers were allowed to know, and what the PCF 
leadership preferred remained undisclosed. This strengthened my understanding of the PCF’s 
methods of party unity and democratic centralism in a democratic country. Finally, I have also 
used secondary literature relevant to the subject as a source for historical context, 
clarifications of historical events, and to “fill in the blanks” in the not infrequent instances 
when the PCF’s own documents provided me with very little information on specific events.  
 
As the historiography on this subject is predominantly limited to more general topics – 
Eurocommunism, the PCF-CPSU relationship, and the party structures – all of which are the 
important elements of my thesis – I had to form my own hypotheses based on these more 
general theories when discussing the specific issue of the PCF and Afghanistan. In analyzing 
the consequences of the PCF’s fateful decision, two conclusions have been drawn from the 
experience the PCF went through, both relating to the long-term repercussions the decision 
had for the party. Firstly, as is stated most clearly by Robrieux; the Afghanistan issue and the 
radicalization the PCF went through in this time, marked the beginning of the end for the 
party as an influential factor in French politics.
14
 Courtois and Lazar also describe the late 
1970s and early 1980s as the beginning of the decline and downfall of the PCF.
15
 Tiersky, in a 
similar vein, stresses the Stalinist nature of the PCF, as do Rubinstein and Ouimet. Tiersky, in 
his Ordinary Stalinism, argues that the Stalinist system of the PCF effectively prevented the 
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party from reforming, or changing to the extent necessary for it to survive as a major party.
16
 
However, as the contemporary works of Ross and Stiefbold demonstrate, there were weighty 
arguments to support a real, ideological change in the PCF, which added to the tensions 
between the PCF and its communist allies.
17
 Finally, Mandel and also Ross play down the 
significance of Eurocommunism as an independent phenomenon, declaring it instead to be the 
practical and slow-moving realization of de-Stalinization.
18
 This would suggest that the PCF's 
problem vis-à-vis Eurocommunism was precisely its anti-Stalinism, running contrary to the 
rigid, monolithic nature of the PCF. These theories – constituting very different approaches to 
the subject-matter – have provided me with further insight into a very secretive party. My 
own hypothesis incorporates elements from all these theories. 
 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a foreign event in which the PCF had no part. 
However, it involved its oldest political and ideological ally, a country and a party to whom 
the PCF was historically tied and extremely committed. In my analysis, therefore, an 
understanding of the PCF-CPSU relationship is paramount. I will argue that this relationship 
was politically solid – the loyalties and historical bonds between the two parties were never in 
danger of being severed.  In this vein, an analysis of the party’s structures is important, as it 
illustrates the inclination towards an undemocratic decision-making process in which personal 
authority was essential to party rule. I will argue that the power and actions of Georges 
Marchais contributed greatly to the PCF’s problems in 1980, as his response to the invasion of 
Afghanistan did not echo the more careful approach adopted by the rest of the leadership.  
 
However, the phenomenon of Eurocommunism, as it was defined and described by 
contemporary communists and later by historians, must also be included. It constituted the 
realization of liberal communism in a post-Stalinist world, and challenged the PCF 
ideologically in a time when it was drawn between its bond to Moscow and a profound need 
for change. Eurocommunist ideas were echoed in the PCF’s own expressed desire for true 
democracy. These ideas contributed to the newfound defiance with which the PCF put 
forward its wishes for ideological change to the Soviets.  It was hailed as an ideological 
triumph when the CPSU in 1980 officially, for the first time, acknowledged the existence of 
ideological differences – divergence – between two communist parties. The differentiation 
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between the ideological aspect of PCF policy and its realpolitik is the essential part of my 
thesis, and of the understanding of the PCF’s actions in this period. The tradition of the PCF 
to always explain its decisions ideologically, however, clouded this differentiation to outsiders 
and to the French public.  
 
Overall, my thesis focuses on the international aspect of the PCF. The PCF defined itself as an 
internationalist party, dedicated to the Marxist principles of international solidarity and 
proletarian internationalism. Therefore, I have chosen not to include domestic political 
considerations in my analysis, even if the PCF’s relationship in particular with the Socialist 
Party – the PS – will have had an impact on the PCF’s ideological considerations and political 
motivations in the late 1970s. I have merely included a few references to the PS in connection 
with the Common Program, the cooperative efforts between the two parties, whose breakup in 
1977 contributed to the radicalization of the PCF. Furthermore, the collaboration with the PS 
can serve to illustrate how the PCF did make a few, moderate steps towards what may be 
called a more pragmatic form of socialism in this time. However, my focus remains on the 
international nature of the PCF, its loyalties to the international communist movement, and 
the Stalinist structures of the PCF, pulling it in a direction sometimes contrary to – sometimes 
in line with – the party’s own wishes and commitments.  
 
To conclude, I present my hypothesis. It is quite simple, as was the question that initially 
spurred me on to choose this topic: the PCF’s decision to support the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan was a purely political decision. Though it was later justified in ideological terms 
– using arguments from Marxist-Leninism – the decision was in reality not ideologically 
motivated, it was an expression of realpolitik. Ideologically, the PCF had sought to achieve 
independence from the CPSU, and succeeded in it by 1980. The Eurocommunist project was 
used by the PCF to this effect. Politically, however, its own party apparatus – still steeped in 
lingering Stalinism – prevented it from escaping from an alliance that the PCF, paradoxically, 
did not wish to break up.  
 
 
 
14 
 
Chapter 2. Towards democratic change?  
 
“Nous avons repris à la bourgeoisie la patrie, maintenant la liberté” 
“We have taken back the fatherland from the bourgeoisie, now for the liberty”19 
The 22nd Congress of the PCF 
The years leading up to 1976 were marked by a freer flow of information reaching Western 
citizens. The most freezing years of the Cold War was over – and people gradually started 
talking about it in the past tense. In the 1970s, the Soviet Union entered a phase of political 
and economic stagnation, as well as feeling the effects of a grave social crisis. Soviet 
President Brezhnev, though a tough leader who saw no need for change, began talks with the 
United States on the arms race and nuclear weapons programmes. In the meantime, the truth 
about the oppressive Soviet system – as it had been continued even after Stalin’s death – 
became known in the West. The PCF was faced with a difficult challenge of explaining its 
ever resilient support of a country so clearly at odds with its own ideological ideal – 
especially at a time when the PCF itself was changing.  
 
On the eve of the PCF’s 22nd Party Congress, to be held in early 1976, the PCF showed signs 
of wanting to ease the strict adherence to traditional Leninist doctrine. The PCF was, by any 
standard, a large party and a force to reckon with in French politics. In 1976 it had over half a 
million members, three years later that figure had risen to 700.000. In such a conservative 
society as the French, the PCF could easily promote itself not only to the working class, but 
also to students, intellectuals, members of the peace and anti-fascist movements, and to 
women. It was held in great esteem by many former Résistance combatants, and for the 
greater part of the post-war years it represented the only viable option to people who wanted 
to vote socialist. Speaking for a large and highly diverse electorate, the PCF sought to 
challenge the teachings of a system that seemed in increasing need of reform and 
modernization. There was no talk of a break, neither with the CPSU nor Marxist-Leninist 
thought, merely a necessary change of direction.  
 
The PCF’s 22nd Party Congress opened on 4 February, 1976, in Paris. It lasted five days, and 
it was a triumph. 88 Communist parties and various national movements had been present. 
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The Politburo noted with satisfaction that the Congress had, unusually, been given massive 
media attention, and that the rank-and-file of the Party seemed very pleased with the 
Congress’ conclusions and decisions. Millions of people all over France now saw the PCF in 
a new and very different light.
20
 The 22
nd
 Congress represented a refreshingly new take on 
Communist doctrine; by discarding the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat and vowing 
to fight for a socialisme aux couleurs françaises”21 – the PCF took a not altogether 
unexpected turn away from the conservative Marxist-Leninist doctrines preached by the 
Soviets and towards Europe, and, in the party’s own words, towards a “democratic change.” 
    
Preparations for the 22
nd
 Party Congress of the PCF had begun months in advance. Indications 
that an ideological change was brewing becomes evident when reading the reports put before 
the Politburo and the Central Committee on the matter of topics to be discussed at the 
Congress. Jean Kanapa, member of the Politburo and one of the Party’s leading lights and 
theorists, declared that the most important issues were “the democratic path to socialism (…) 
and questions relating to the dictatorship of the proletariat.”22 The Politburo declared that 
“...our position is principal; the link between socialism and democracy has a universal 
worth.”23 Furthermore, as was stated in a Politburo meeting later in the month, the 
preparations for the Congress had shown that throughout the Party members and cadres were 
discussing the matters at hand, and that the regional and local committees were near 
unanimously in favour of abandoning the notion of the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
However, Kanapa stressed the importance of continuing to promote the PCF as a 
revolutionary party; it had not given up on the struggle. There also seemed to be those 
amongst the rank-and-file who wished that the leadership should reassure the party of “our 
attachment to proletarian internationalism and of our appreciation of the Soviet Union’s 
role.”24  
    
The 22 January Politburo meeting addressed another problem that one hoped the Congress 
would help to alleviate. There were, “even amongst those who are in favour of abandoning the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, a certain lack of confidence in the masses, a certain 
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underestimation of the necessity of the Party to conquer the great masses, including the large 
masses of workers.”25 This suggests that the PCF was influenced by a certain degree of elitist 
thinking – a class concept, clearly, but paradoxically also in keeping with the Leninist 
principle of the Party’s role as the avant-garde of the revolution. The PCF declared many 
times their special dedication to be precisely such a party, and saw it as one of the 
fundamental tasks of any Communist party. It was, however, hoped that the upcoming debates 
would contribute to a further assimilation of “la politique du parti” – the cadres – and “la 
masse du parti” – the members and the electorate.26 In addition to overcoming any internal 
tensions, the PCF would be discussing the possibly greatest shake-up of its own ideology in 
its history.  
  
The 22
nd
 Congress was an ideological revolution. It took a bold step towards ideological 
independence first by acknowledging and approving the idea of there being many ways to 
socialism. This was not new thinking; it was rather the PCF that had finally come to terms 
with the truth in it. The idea had been introduced in 1948, after Marshal Tito had pulled 
Yugoslavia out of the Cominform and the International Communist movement in 1948. It had 
then been used by the Soviet Union, disguised as a valid doctrine but no doubt a ploy to 
conceal any display of division within the movement. Yugoslavia was not easily forgiven by 
the Soviets, and the latter would later strike down hard on any factionalist tendencies in 
parties within their reach. The experiences of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in ’68 
would suggest that “factionalism” in this matter meant any significant ideological or 
otherwise political move away from the Moscow line. It also meant a move away from 
traditional Marxist-Leninist thought, of which the CPSU was the chief ideologist and maker 
of doctrine. To conclude, it had since the origins of the International movement been stated 
and believed that the principles of revolutionary struggle were universal, independent of 
national traditions and cultural inclinations. It was therefore an emphatic step in a new 
direction when the PCF declared that socialism should be built in “French colours” – le 
socialisme aux couleurs français.  
    
Socialism in French colours was the French way to socialism. It would take into consideration 
the French national identity, seeking to build socialism according to French traditions, beliefs 
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and values. France was a country of modern industry and technology, a capitalist state ruled 
over by the bourgeois classes that perpetuated social injustices and formed bi- and multilateral 
alliances which the communists feared in the long run would weaken the nation’s military and 
economic strengths. But France was also a country of intelligent, educated people, a strong 
working class and an influential agricultural sector. The French is a people conscious of its 
history and deeply steeped in a republican and secular tradition. It has rebelled against unjust 
rulers more than once. France was, therefore, always judged to have a great revolutionary 
potential, but any profound social or political change would have to be quintessentially 
French in origins and expressions. The Congress realized this, acknowledged it, and made it 
doctrine.  
 
The second motion settled upon by the Congress to form a basis for the continuing ideological 
struggle was le changement démocratique – “the democratic change.” It was a recognition, 
some would say long overdue, of a political system in which change was possible, but 
encouraged by obeying the rules rather than break them and make new ones. The French were 
deeply committed to democracy; understandable, since they had experienced their fair share 
of both anarchy and tyranny, even within living memory. Though the PCF never relinquished 
its revolutionary responsibility, or its revolutionary rhetoric, it understood to play the political 
game within the boundaries of a democratic framework. To the PCF, democracy was an 
essential part of socialism, and the definition of democracy – i.e. rule of the people – applied 
to socialism as well.
27
 Furthermore, the PCF saw it as vital that it should fight for a true 
French democracy, as it did not exist yet. Democracy dedicated itself to the eradication of 
social injustices, poverty and corruption, not to enrich the already wealthy and care for the 
exploitative elements in society. The PCF saw itself as, in effect, “…the only party that 
dedicates itself to the democratic and revolutionary change in society.”28 
 
As a consequence of the PCF’s stance on democracy, the dictatorship of the proletariat was 
voted out and to the scrapheap of history. The ousting of the dictatorship of the proletariat as 
one of the guiding principles for Communist doctrine was, however, perhaps the least 
revolutionary move made by the 22
nd
 Congress. The Soviets, for example, were not 
impressed, and Boris Ponomarev, member of the CPSU’s Central Committee, pointed out that 
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the dictatorship of the proletariat had disappeared from ideological discussions several years 
previously, and that it had been replaced in the new Soviet Constitution; “…it [the Soviet 
Union] is the State of the entire people. Thus it is clear that the dictatorship of the proletariat 
is not eternal.”29 Neither was the PCF the first party to abandon the idea – the British 
communist party had dispensed with it first, as early as 1951, apparently at the personal 
advice of Stalin.
30
 Other parties followed suit shortly after. Therefore one can assume that the 
PCF ran no risk – as indeed the pre-Congressional meetings had indicated – of offending 
anyone in the international communist movement, or within the party itself, by abolishing 
what had always been considered one of the founding pillars of Marxist-Leninist thought. 
Furthermore, it may also be worth noting Rubinstein’s comments on the ideological changes 
made by the 22
nd
 Congress. He pointed out that getting rid of the phrase “dictatorship of the 
proletariat” was a “convenience, to avoid alienating groups to whom the term means “fascist” 
or “Stalinist.” Far from losing his understanding of ideology, he concluded that this 
“adaptation to reality is pure Leninism, and Moscow can live with it…”31 
  
However, it seemed to have been important to the PCF to formally lay to rest this particular 
ghost, even though it had not been part of PCF’s practical policy for many years. The 22nd 
Congress did little more than respond to the strong ideological currents of the day, but the 
symbolic value of the Congress’ decisions was not lost on the French, and taking into 
consideration the uncompromising nature of political debate in France it naturally caused 
sensation. 
 
A consequence of the 22
nd
 Congress’ decisions seemed also to be the definite, final 
denunciation of Stalinism, the greatest single ideological problem facing the PCF when it 
started cleaning out the skeletons from its closet. Though it had already been denounced 
officially and publically by the PCF on several occasions, undead structural and ideological 
remnants of Stalinism haunted the Party like the ghost of Christmas past. First due to Stalin’s 
undisputed position in communist mythology, secondly because the bureaucratic structures 
that Stalin had built his regime on, echoed in every communist party in Europe. It was 
difficult to give up on processes, ideas and methods that had taken decades to consolidate, 
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intimately connected as they were with the PCF’s core identity and principles on ideological 
struggle. Furthermore, opponents in French politics and media were not prepared to let the 
PCF forget the sins of its fathers. “Stalinism” became a one-word accusation that implied a 
whole range of other accusations, all of them designed to question the PCF’s right to express 
itself within a democratic framework. Especially at times when controversial issues were 
debated, the accusation resurfaced. Finally, there were aspects of Stalinism that the PCF still 
wished to keep, because these aspects were seen to be Marxist-Leninist in origin. Though 
originally that might be true, they had since been altered by Stalin’s ideological influence to 
such an extent that they had become part of Stalinist doctrine. Perhaps the best example was 
the principle of democratic centralism – one of Lenin’s most important contributions to the 
revolutionary struggle, and soon corrupted by his successors. As will be demonstrated later, 
the PCF had no wish to rid itself of this vital element of communist debate. 
 
The decisions made by the PCF during the 22
nd
 Congress, in addition to being – one must 
suppose – in keeping with the wishes and convictions of the party itself, brought the party 
more in alignment with its political partners as of 1972, the Socialist Party – the PS – as well 
as the Eurocommunists. The PCF approached this new line of communist thought cautiously. 
The modest expressions of forming new and stronger relations beyond fraternal solidarity 
with other European communist parties – independent of the CPSU – were seen as a move 
away from Moscow, and it was to challenge the ideological and political loyalties of the PCF. 
It was also to initiate a new era in the PCF-CPSU relationship. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
Chapter 3. Hesitantly towards Europe – the PCF and 
Eurocommunism 
 
Towards the middle of the 1970s, there were signs that the PCF was beginning to question the 
social and economic realities of the Soviet Union, and gradually criticisms appeared, public 
displays of criticism directed at the injustices suffered by individuals at the hands of Soviet 
agents. These criticisms, however cautious and modest they may have been expressed, still 
convinced contemporaries that the PCF had reached a crossroads in its relationship with the 
CPSU, and in turn was looking to the democratic proposals set forth by Western European 
communists, as well as seemingly embracing the democratic possibilities inherent in a change 
of communist thought. The PCF entered a period of attempted democratization – both of its 
principles and its policies. At the same time the PCF joined, alongside other European 
communist parties, in the collaboration known as “Eurocommunism.”  
 
According to Rubinstein, Eurocommunism “came of age” in November, 1975, when PCF 
leader Marchais and PCI leader Enrico Berlinguer issued a joint statement in which was 
incorporated many of the elements that would gradually become the ideological core of 
Eurocommunism.
32
 The Eurocommunist collaboration was a genuine attempt at forging 
stronger ties between the communist parties of Western and Southern Europe, parties who – 
amongst themselves –shared much more common ground, both socially and culturally, than 
any of them did with the CPSU. It can also be argued that it was an attempt at saving what 
little ideological integrity communism had left – by redirecting its focal point to healthier 
foundations than the bureaucratic, stagnant colossus that was the Soviet Union, and by 
merging the democratic traditions of Europe with the  most modern and positive aspects of 
Marxist doctrine. The Eurocommunists were also inspired and influenced by the social 
currents of the day, such as the women’s rights and peace movements. The intention was that 
Eurocommunism should be entirely independent from Moscow directives – although the 
solidarity with the CPSU should remain. Of course, the declaration was somewhat more 
diplomatic in wording – and thereby proving a valid point; “…these governments would (...) 
observe a strict independence vis-à-vis any bloc or any hegemonic country, whatever the 
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sort.”33  This also meant that the CPSU should be treated like any other Communist party, not 
better, not worse. There should be no “first among equals.”  
 
The ideals that lay at the foundations of Eurocommunism, of which the principle of several 
paths to socialism was one, were not new. Inspiration was drawn from as different sources as 
the Austromarxist school and early Italian communists, of whom the legendary Antonio 
Gramsci became the Eurocommunists’ foremost theorist. The Italian Communist party – il 
Partito Comunista Italiano, the PCI – had always been a independent party, both politically 
and ideologically, and had been forced to seek out the Soviet Union for protection only after 
the tide turned against the European communists in the aftermath of the Second World War - 
even during the difficult and illegal years under Mussolini’s fascist rule had the PCI managed 
without them. However, this alliance was of short duration – and when the Soviets marched 
into Budapest in 1956, the PCI reacted violently against the Soviet Union. The PCI was not 
afraid of openly criticizing Soviet policy – under the leadership of Enrico Berlinguer, the PCI 
was known for its uncompromising stance on imperialism in all disguises and it was a primus 
motor in the European peace movement. The Spanish Communist party – el Partido 
Comunista de España, the PCE – was the second great advocate for Eurocommunism. Led by 
Santiago Carrillo, the party regained some momentum after the death of Spain’s general 
Franco, under whose long rule the PCE had been outlawed. Carrillo wrote the book outlining 
the basic principles of Eurocommunism; Eurocommunism and the State, published in 1977. It 
would be the closest thing Eurocommunism came to a political manifesto. Alongside the 
“greats” – the PCI, PCE and for the time being also the PCF – stood the communist parties of 
Finland, Great Britain, the Netherlands and others.  
 
The leaders of the communist parties of Italy, France and Spain met in Madrid on 2 March, 
1977. Marchais had met with both his colleagues on previous occasions, but never with them 
both at once. He travelled to Rome several times to see Berlinguer, and Marchais was 
generous enough to hail their meeting of autumn 1975 as “historic.”34 The following year, 
Berlinguer also joined Marchais at a party rally in Paris in 1976. This meeting was scheduled 
for 3 June, and on 26 May, L’Humanité published an optimistic article by Politburo member 
Gaston Plissonnier in which he hailed the historical significance of the meeting, and he 
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reminded the readers of the long traditions of solidarity between the two parties.
35
 Carrillo had 
met with Marchais in Paris on his way back to Spain after his many years in exile. It was 
during this visit, held in August 1976, that Carrillo promised to invite Marchais and 
Berlinguer to the PCE’s first international meeting in Madrid.36 The leaders published joint 
statements, promises of friendship and cooperation were exchanged, and in France the PCF 
held solidarity meetings – many were held in support of the PCE when it still struggled to be 
accepted as a legal party in Spain. The PCF reports on the meetings between the party leaders 
were generally positive, yet not over-enthusiastic – on the encounter between Marchais and 
Berlinguer in October 1978, the Politburo remarked; “…it [the meeting] contributes to 
strengthen the bonds of friendship and of cooperation between our two parties, and confirmed 
a common view on a great number of issues.”37 It was not immediately a good sign that the 
PCF chose to point out that the two parties had much in common. However, the PCF had 
always declared its unstinting and unshakeable loyalty to proletarian internationalism and the 
fraternal solidarity of the communist parties in the international movement, and the party 
repeated several times its vow to never do anything that could jeopardize this solidarity. 
Therefore, the PCF took their international responsibilities seriously, and looked forward to 
and prepared meticulously for the conference of European Communist parties that was to be 
held in East Berlin in the summer of 1976.  
The 1976 conference of European communist parties 
There are indications that the PCF did not expect much from the conference before it opened. 
The conference itself was a gathering of communist parties from both sides of the Iron 
Curtain, which put natural strains on the debate and the possibilities of reaching common 
ground. Kanapa, who presented an evaluation of the conference to the Central Committee in 
June, 1976, was not impressed. The conference had taken more than two years to plan, and 
though the PCF hoped for concrete results, more cooperation and higher efficiency in the 
common social struggle so that the parties could put their avant-garde role to good use, the 
preparations for the conference were not ideal. The document to be put forward at the 
conference – constituting the declarations and commitments of the movement – had, after 
many meetings and much debate, been reduced to a compromise of vague wording and no 
real promise. “From meeting to meeting, its contents did not cease to deteriorate…” There 
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was no mention of imperialism being responsible for neo-colonialism and the threats to world 
peace, no mention of proletarian internationalism, no recognition of the avant-garde role of 
the communist parties; the document was a shallow analysis of the European situation. 
Especially the lack of any reference to proletarian internationalism was disappointing to the 
PCF. Kanapa pointed out that it was certainly not the PCF’s fault that this term was left out of 
the final document – the party had done its best to support and defend it. All in all, the PCF 
could only lament that “…despite our objections and our proposals for changes, essential 
ideas continued to be left out of the project.” But, as the report pointed out, there was nothing 
in the proposed document the PCF did not agree with, and it was therefore proposed that the 
PCF should participate at the conference. With an air of resignation it was furthermore 
suggested that, “…independently of its judgment on the document, our Party makes no 
objection to whatever is adopted by the Conference.” 38 
 
The conference, initiated by the PCI and the Polish Communist Party, did however reveal a 
profound resonance between the PCF and the participating Western European parties. It was 
Kanapa, probably unwittingly, who touched upon this issue – one of Eurocommunism’s core 
arguments – in his report on the conference. In expressing his dismay at the unimpressive 
outcome of the conference, he differentiated between two very different groups of communist 
parties: “...[O]n every decisive point,” he lamented, “the representatives of all the communist 
parties of the socialist countries (...) chose to agree not on the ground of combat, but on that of 
weakness, [and] of abandonment.” His astonishment had been all the greater as he concluded 
that “...furthermore, this orientation provoked both concern and confusion in the 
representatives of numerous sister parties from capitalist countries, that most often shared our 
points of view and appreciated our propositions.”  
 
In summing up the conference, the Politburo noted with satisfaction that the PCF delegation 
had given its views on the “anachronistic character” of conferences of this sort (the report 
gives no further explanation), and declared itself in favour of new forms of inter-party 
relations.
 
Ouimet cites an unnamed French delegate as having said, at the close of the 
conference: “…conferences like this one do not appear to us to correspond any longer to the 
needs of our time. Since any elaboration of a strategy common to all our parties is henceforth 
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absolutely ruled out, it seems opportune to seek new forms of collective encounters…”39The 
delegation had presented the new PCF policy as defined by the 22
nd
 Congress, and there had 
been a great interest in these new ideas. Ever watchful, the Politburo concluded that it must 
“...always keep well guard of the equilibrium in our statements: between the independence of 
each party and the internationalist solidarity.” 40  
How the PCF saw Eurocommunism 
It would seem appropriate here to discuss what the PCF’s stand on Eurocommunism really 
was. How they saw their fellow European communists, and how they judged the European 
communist cooperative efforts over these short years. First, it is worth noting that the term 
itself was never quite approved of by the PCF. Marchais, for example, believed it to be almost 
a discriminatory term, as it ruled out non-European communist parties who might be seen as 
part of the movement.
41
 It has also later been subjected to criticism. Ross disliked it because 
he saw Eurocommunism as a more national approach to communist thought, in which 
communist parties sought to adapt its policies to what Ross called “national peculiarities.”42 
The term Eurocommunism, then, would imply conformity and uniformity where none was 
meant. This argument is strengthened by a statement made by Giorgio Napolitano, one of the 
PCI leaders, in 1977; “…our choice of total solidarity with the socialist world resulted in 
casting a shadow on our prospects for the advance of socialism in Italy. It gave rise to the 
suspicion that those prospects were substantially similar to the type of socialist society (…) 
existing in the Soviet Union (…) this suspicion was costly; it slowed and limited the 
development of our influence and our policy of alliances.”43 Courtois and Lazar pointed out 
that the term was invented by journalists, indicating that the name was somewhat 
sensationalist, and lacking in precision.
44
 However, as Carrillo called his book 
Eurocommunism and the State, one can safely assume that the name was accepted by the 
Eurocommunists themselves, and that the PCF’s reluctance to approve of it was simply an 
expression of the party’s refusal to accept what might be seen as excluding sister parties – 
unacceptable if one stood by the principle of international solidarity. 
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Secondly, one must distinguish between “Eurocommunism” and “international solidarity” as 
these concepts were defined by the PCF. Marchais made it very clear what Eurocommunism 
was not: “…this is not about a new centre! We have left, for good, any international 
federation.
45
 We act in complete independence, that which does not exclude solidarity.”46 As 
for the commitment to the Eurocommunist collaboration, the PCF stated that it was 
“…opposed to any limitation of its sovereignty.” The party declared that “…the old 
Internationalism (…) was a historical remnant destined to disappear.”47 Commitment to the 
international communist solidarity, however; “…this great tradition that runs like a red thread 
through our [the PCF’s] history,”48 remained undimmed. It was party independence within the 
movement the PCF championed. That becomes clear when analyzing the Politburo’s 
conclusions on the conference of European communist parties in July, 1976: “…The 
conference ratified a new aspect of the communist movement in asserting that there may be 
differences, divergences without this affecting the relations between the parties. It 
reconfirmed the independence of the parties, the absence of a joint strategy.”49  
 
Whether or not the PCF was sceptical to Eurocommunism because it appeared to be 
disregarding the CPSU and its role in the international movement seems less important than 
the battle fought by the PCF to keep the communist parties independent. The most radical 
consequence of this battle was the party’s apparent break with important ideological 
alignments, too – as the term “socialism in French colours” implied. The wish for party 
independence was at this time echoed also in the PCF relations with the CPSU, with regards 
to the struggle for recognition of divergences between the two parties.
50
 It can be concluded, 
therefore, that the PCF was fighting an ideological two-front war, where both opponents 
represented very different solutions to challenges faced by the international movement – but 
who were, paradoxically, strangely alike in approach – though not in methods. On one side 
stood the Eurocommunists, with whom the PCF shared its liberal values, on the other side the 
CPSU, with whom the PCF had shared almost everything else since the beginning of the 
Soviet era. Both asked for the PCF’s loyalty – but the PCF was no longer prepared to pledge it 
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unconditionally, fearing that it must then give up its independence along with it. The PCF 
clearly saw Eurocommunism as a potential challenge to its own political and ideological 
independence, and for a large party with vast domestic interests in France, such a limitation of 
sovereignty would only serve to hinder the PCF in executing its own policies.  
 
The PCF seemed to have come to the conclusion – consciously or unconsciously – that it did 
not need an international communist organization, such as a smaller, more vulnerable party 
might. A fair assumption, as the PCF stood well on its own. This contributes further to the 
idea that the PCF simply did not see the need for Eurocommunism at all, as the solidarity 
between the European communist parties was a fait accompli, expressed and respected by all, 
in the spirit of communist internationalism. International solidarity lay at the foundations of 
the PCF and every communist party. A true communist should be an internationalist – that 
was the most basic Marxist idea. Despite being hesitant to the idea of Eurocommunism, the 
PCF was not going back on its commitment to international solidarity – nor calling into 
question the party’s long and proud tradition of fraternal friendship with communist parties 
and regimes the world over. International solidarity then, was an ideal, a principle at the basis 
of a communist party’s work and foreign policy. The Eurocommunist project sought 
commitment, demanding dedication reminiscent of former days’ communist collaboration, 
and outlining greater ideological uniformity.      
 
After the European communist conference in East Berlin, the summer and early autumn of 
1976 continued in a vein of international solidarity, with the PCF having meetings with 
Spanish communists congratulating them on their forthcoming return to Spain, and meetings 
demonstrating the PCF’ solidarity with the PCE. Furthermore, the PCF sought to publish a 
joint statement with other European communist parties in which they protested against 
Israel’s war in Lebanon. And then, in September, the Politburo declared that important 
differences need not affect normal relations between two communist parties, so it decided to 
send condolences on behalf of the whole party to the Central Committee of the Chinese 
communist party – the occasion was Chairman Mao’s death on 9 September.51 This was at a 
time when the PCF’s relationship with the CPSU was deteriorating, and the relationship with 
the PCE and the PCI was at its best. It is important to note, however, that the PCF-PCI 
relationship was always a fragile constellation. The two parties were almost as different from 
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one another as two communist parties could be, this naturally contributed to practical political 
problems – as the two parties would find it difficult to reach an agreement. Furthermore, they 
were rivals for the position as leader of the Eurocommunist movement.   
 
There seemed to be an almost openly arrogant attitude being displayed by the PCF in its 
dedication to international solidarity. It proclaimed to be true to the friendship with its fellow 
European sister parties, and at the same time put itself forward as the most loyal champion of 
the First Socialist Country – its difficulties with the CPSU were being put down to Soviet 
ignorance and prejudice, as the French criticisms were genuine heartfelt concern that was 
being deliberately misunderstood. Furthermore, the PCF was willing to overlook grave 
differences and stretch out a hand to China, a fellow Socialist country – and it also expressed 
a wish to maintain good relations with the Japanese Communists, shunned by the Chinese and 
arrogantly left out of the Eurocommunist movement by sheer geographical position alone. 
The PCF was above all bickering and petty ideological disputes. The PCF’s perhaps greatest 
mistake was to believe itself blameless – always – in any disagreement or misunderstanding 
that might arise. However, the PCF did find it very difficult to be understood when it wanted 
to differentiate the two most important ideological approaches to the communist movement – 
namely, international solidarity and party independence. Politically, the PCF would side with 
its communist allies – it would never leave the Soviet Union to fend for itself, and it would 
never go back on its dedication to Western, liberal values (insofar as they were acceptable to 
communist doctrine). Ideologically, however, the PCF wished to be free from all interference, 
from fellow communists and non-communists alike.  
 
The Eurocommunists did not meet with the PCF’s criteria in this matter, and the CPSU kept 
refusing to acknowledge the existence of any differences of ideology. Gradually, the PCF 
distanced itself from the Eurocommunist cooperation, and as for its relationship with the 
CPSU, it had, by the end of 1977, transcended into a game of brinkmanship. It seems safe to 
conclude that the PCF in this time was, in demonstrating its dedication to socialism in French 
colours, seeking a third path to socialism. Not the path of the Soviet Union, and not that of the 
Eurocommunists. A path of international solidarity, but without the commitments that were 
come to be seen more and more as burdens, rather than expressions of mutual support and 
well-meant help. It became increasingly clear that the PCF managed well on its own, and in 
domestic matters also preferred to be alone. 
28 
 
Theories on Eurocommunism 
Observers and analysts who wrote about Eurocommunism as a contemporary phenomenon, 
came to very different conclusions than historians who studied it later. First, there seems to be 
two different definitions of what Eurocommunism represented in the international communist 
movement. In The Politics of Eurocommunism, published in 1980, George Ross pointed out in 
his article “The PCF and the end of the Bolshevik dream” that Eurocommunism was really 
“…part of the vast process of change involving the left everywhere in the world – that of de-
Stalinization.” He argued that Eurocommunism, therefore, far from being a “new” 
phenomenon, i.e. a child of the 1970s, it formed part of a larger and much older process – 
Eurocommunism could trace its roots back to the gradual changes made to the international 
communist movement following the death of Stalin.
52
 Ross’ argument seems to discard 
Eurocommunism as an idea based on liberal and Marxist principles, claiming it instead to be  
part of communism’s natural – and inevitable? – development. Made simple, his argument 
runs something like this; the personal authority of Stalin assured his complete control over 
both the Soviet Union and the foreign communist parties loyal to Moscow. His influence 
extended to the realms of both ideology and structure, and his rule was an exceptional brutal 
one. Stalin, however, would not live forever, and it was inevitable that his death would trigger 
some form of reaction within the communist community. Stalin’s legacy was heavy and its 
survival assured by the system he had created. It would take many years for any real change 
to manifest itself. Willingness to change would necessarily come from parties belonging to 
free, democratic nations.  
 
It is difficult to argue with Ross’ basic idea, but his definition of Eurocommunism appears to 
be too general. In following his argument, the negative task of reforming a communist party 
away from its Stalinist past is equalled by the positive task of associating that same party with 
a new and more liberal form of communism. Seeing as to wash one’s hands of a dead tyrant is 
not the same as laying the foundations for democracy, Ross’ argument is too simplistic. And 
as the project of Eurocommunism was promoted mainly by the PCI, the most social-
democratically inclined of the European communist parties, and whose ties with the Soviet 
Union had been very loose since 1956, his argument is also easily gainsaid. Furthermore, it 
must be noted that Ross declared that the PCF, in its “conversion to Eurocommunism,” has 
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made reality of Eurocommunism, “in its specially tailored French variant.”53 Ross – 
completely disregarding the European communist collaboration that Eurocommunism is today 
defined by – saw the ideological changes made by the PCF during the course of the 1970s as 
the definite proof of the party’s “conversion,” as spelled out in no uncertain terms by the party 
itself at the 22
nd
 PCF Congress in 1976. Ross’ argument, however, is not very different in 
essence from the argument outlined by Ernest Mandel, in his From Stalinism to 
Eurocommunism, published in 1979. Mandel also stated that the problems faced by the 
communist movement in the 1970s were Stalin’s legacy, what he called the “bitter fruits of 
socialism in one country.”54 He argued that “…the gradual emergence of the phenomenon of 
Eurocommunism (…) is inextricably linked to the progressive crisis of Stalinism”55 – 
promptly declaring “that the real ideological progenitor of Eurocommunism is Joseph Stalin 
himself.”56 
 
Ross, and to a certain extent Mandel, focused on the PCF’s ideological changes and wish for 
such a change. This wish was real, as will be argued in the following chapter, and the need for 
change was equally recognized by the PCF leaders. However, it was not ideology that 
prevented the PCF from rejuvenating its policies and regaining its footing in a post-Stalinist 
world. As will be discussed in chapter 7, it was the Stalinist structures, so incorporated in the 
PCF’s party organization, which proved to be the most important obstacle to the PCF’s 
attempts at introducing real, democratic change. As Ross put it: “Promoting democracy (…) 
was the road to socialism. Unfortunately for the PCF (…) this important change of direction 
occurred mainly in the realm of high principles.”57  
 
Courtois and Lazar made the argument that the PCF’s relations with the Eurocommunist 
parties and its relations with the CPSU were two sides of the same coin. As one relationship 
weakened, the other strengthened, and vice versa. Rather than being an expression of 
ideological reform, Eurocommunism was a political collaboration that coincided with a 
predominantly ideological conflict between the PCF and the CPSU. When the 
Eurocommunist project appeared fruitful, the PCF took the opportunity to assert its position 
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vis-à-vis the Soviets, and when cracks appeared in the Eurocommunist fabric, the PCF sought 
refuge in the Soviet fold.
58
 Courtois and Lazar also pointed out that the PCF at this time 
“redefined its place in the international communist movement.”59 The PCF established or re-
established its relations with communist parties not necessarily belonging to the 
Eurocommunist fold, such as the Japanese and the British Communist Parties, with whom the 
PCF had meetings in the spring of 1976. Its many meetings with the PCI – its frère ennemi, 
the brother and enemy – were covered widely and enthusiastically by the French communist 
press.
60
 It was clear that the PCF was sincere in its attempts to improve its relations with its 
longest and most tenacious opponent in the communist movement – however sceptical it may 
have been to the potential successes of these attempts. The PCF on the whole enjoyed new-
found importance in the international communist movement following its expressed intention 
of participating in the Eurocommunist collaboration. Courtois and Lazar describe how the 
PCF used the numerous communist conferences held in Western Europe to assert its position 
in the movement.
61
  
 
The PCF championed many of the same ideals as the Eurocommunists, most notably 
democratic change but also the belief that there were many paths to socialism – and not one 
model to be employed by everyone – an idea that ran contrary to the principles always 
promoted by the Soviet Union. At the same time, the PCF did, in its approach to the PCI, 
acknowledge and apparently also accept great differences between the two parties. Their 
relations remained harmonious throughout 1976 and ’77, despite disagreeing on many key 
questions – such as membership in the NATO, policy on the European Common Market and 
the possibility of entering into broader political alliances with social democratic and even 
bourgeois parties. The PCI remained positive to these issues, whereas the PCF stayed 
sceptical to them, as it also did to the PCI’s continued criticisms of the Soviet Union.62  One 
important point, however, on which the PCF and the Eurocommunists did share a common 
view, was that of the détente. Mandel points out that a vital part of the Eurocommunist 
moderate approach to traditional communist ideology was based on the assumption that the 
bipolar world order – and consequently the détente efforts – could be jeopardized by the 
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promotion of armed resistance against the capitalist countries of Western Europe. The 
Americans would simply launch a nuclear attack.
63
 This somewhat crude analysis does reveal 
the extreme conditions in which the Eurocommunists sought to reform an ideology that 
defined one half of the global terror balance. As peace activists – pacifism being at the heart 
of Marxism – the PCF would fully support any movement promoting continued peaceful 
relations between the two superpowers. However, even its strong commitment to the détente 
efforts did not prevent the PCF from supporting an invasion that put them at risk; an invasion 
later seen as the very event that marked the end of détente. Ultimately, this is a good 
illustration of precisely the lack of courage the PCF required should it stand firmly by its 
ideological convictions when faced with a controversial political decision. In the end, political 
considerations triumphed over the democratic ideology of the Eurocommunists.    
 
This is echoed in Tiersky’s argument. He attributed the failure of the PCF to keep to the 
Eurocommunist efforts to the “panicky” reaction of the PCF leadership after the disastrous 
election results in 1978.
64
 This would strengthen the argument that there were, within the 
party leadership, elements that when faced with a crisis preferred to turn inward, mount a 
radicalizing defence against the ideals they had hailed to no avail – and then gradually begin 
the return journey to a mindset and to comrades whose predictability seemed to be the basis of 
their appeal.   
 
Several historians have argued that the PCF pulled out of the Eurocommunist project well 
before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Courtois and Lazar describe a speech made by 
Marchais at the PCF’s 23rd Congress in May, 1979, in which he hailed the positive results 
yielded by the socialist societies the world over, as the definite exit of the PCF from the 
Eurocommunist project.
65
 This speech was made as the relations between the PCF and the 
CPSU gradually began to improve, and, following Courtois and Lazar’s own argument, this 
led to a natural reorientation on the PCF’s part towards Moscow. Other analysts, such as 
Rubinstein, revealed a somewhat cynical view of Eurocommunism’s potential to change the 
important alliances of world communism. Whilst recognizing the Eurocommunists’ efforts to 
enter “into the political mainstreams of their respective countries” – by adopting the principles 
of political pluralism and the respect for Western, civil liberties – he also argued that the 
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Eurocommunists divided along the old alliance lines, and that the Soviets, therefore, had little 
to fear from a potential new Western communist bloc in opposition to Moscow.
66
 Rubinstein 
believed there were several kinds of Eurocommunists: “…the Cunhal-Marchais breed of 
Eurocommunist and the self-styled democratic/libertarian Berlinguer-Carrillo breed.”67 The 
“polycentrism” created by the disagreements existing between such different types of 
communist leaders was of little concern to Moscow, Rubinstein claims, as it did not endanger 
Soviet foreign political goals in Europe.
68
 Indeed, one should suppose that divisions within 
the Eurocommunist movement would have been regarded as a good thing from a Moscow 
point of view – as a strong, united bloc of Eurocommunist parties challenging Soviet authority 
could have presented the CPSU with serious problems. 
 
Rubinstein seemed here to adopt a more pragmatic stance on the Eurocommunist 
collaboration than would normally be regarded as acceptable to devout communists. In 
writing his analysis in 1981, he clearly still saw Eurocommunism as a valid, political 
phenomenon, thus suggesting that he follows Ross’ argument that Eurocommunism equals 
efforts at liberalization of a post-Stalinist international movement. However, as contemporary 
observers believed – the “Eurocommunist challenge to Moscow” had passed by 1980, when 
“Marchais reverted to uncritical endorsement of Soviet policy on virtually all issues.”69 I put 
forth the argument here that the Afghanistan issue was by far the most important of these. Had 
the PCF openly condemned the invasion, it is possible – indeed plausible – that other 
examples of “realignment” might have been overlooked, or played down. As the invasion of 
Afghanistan ran contrary to so many basic principles heralded by Eurocommunism, the 
former became a yardstick for the PCF’s commitment to the latter. The PCF was subsequently 
found wanting.  
 
The PCF never admitted to have broken from the Eurocommunists. And this is important to 
note, because it reveals the PCF’s unwillingness to either admit that the project was a failure, 
or that the PCF itself could not conform to the criteria laid out by the majority of the 
participating parties, most notably the PCI. The former was simply not an option; the latter 
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would be an indirect admission that the PCF was effectively an obstacle to the potential 
efficiency and vitality of the project itself. This was neither understood nor accepted by the 
PCF’s leaders. Whatever the real motives for entering into a European collaboration, 
however, and regardless of how sincere the PCF was with regards to binding themselves to it; 
the PCF seemed towards the late 1970s to be moving away from the CPSU, and consequently 
from the Soviet Union. Moscow didn’t take long to react.  
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Chapter 4. Away from Moscow – and back again 
 
“Le Parti communiste français est la fille aînée de l’Eglise soviétique” 
”The French communist party is the eldest daughter of the Soviet church”70 
The PCF and the quest for recognition of divergence 
The PCF and the CPSU were bound together by strong historical and ideological ties. They 
shared information, news, thoughts and beliefs, their leaders formed strong friendships and 
they had – most of the time – been great supporters of each other’s efforts. The PCF was a 
valiant warrior for the First Socialist Country, and had always been its most loyal advocate in 
France. But towards the end of 1975, there were indications of a deterioration in the two 
parties’ mutual understanding.  
PCF-CPSU relations deteriorate 
Both Stiefbold and Robrieux argue that a gradual shift in PCF alignments had taken place 
over the course of several years – and that “the watershed year” had been 1968, when the PCF 
led by Waldeck Rochet had taken a firm stand against the Soviet intervention in 
Czechoslovakia.
71
 Furthermore, the 1970s brought with them new revelations regarding the 
human rights’ situation in the Soviet Union, damaging the country’s image in the eyes of the 
world. The 1975 Nobel Peace prize was awarded to Andrei Sakharov – Russian physicist and 
political activist. The PCF was disappointed that the Soviet authorities refused to let Sakharov 
receive the award in person, and made its disappointment public.
72
 In December the same 
year, French television broadcast a documentary on forced labour camps in the Soviet Union. 
The Politburo voiced its concern, expressing its dedication to the liberty of man, and 
considered it “…right to disapprove of the practices (oppression motivated by political 
disagreements) which, in the Soviet Union, are contrary to the decisions of the CPSU’s 20th 
Congress.”73   
 
In repeating the PCF’s focus on human rights and the fundamental freedoms, it may also be 
seen as symbolic that 1975 was the year that saw the death of Jacques Duclos, one of the 
PCF’s greatest leaders – second only to the legendary Maurice Thorez – and one of the 
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party’s fiercest pro-Russians. Though Duclos was not an old man when he died, his ideology 
belonged to a bygone era. His passing seemed an appropriate end to the PCF’s Stalinist age. 
 
Although the PCF had expressed no wish to denounce its solidarity with the CPSU,
74
 the 22
nd
 
Congress saw a torrent of criticism directed at the Soviet Union – emphasis being on its lack 
of democracy and on its general weaknesses – by a junior member of the party leadership, 
acting, no doubt, with Marchais’ knowledge and approval. Henri Malberg was consequently 
promoted to full member of the Central Committee. The criticism was heard by the CPSU’s 
representative at the congress, Andrei Kirilenko, leading member of the CPSU Central 
Committee and one of Brezhnev’s closest advisors. The following month, when the 25th 
CPSU Congress met, the French delegation was not accompanied by Marchais. This was a 
definite snub, Robrieux concludes, as it was a well established tradition that the French 
general secretary was present.
75
  
 
In April, the Politburo decided that it must; “…Help the Party to well understand that there 
are serious divergences, that there is a battle of ideas. We do not go back on our analysis or on 
our line. But, at the same time, we do not want an escalation.”76 The statement touched upon 
several core aspects of the PCF-CPSU conflict. Most important was the Politburo’s 
mentioning of the sensitive issue of divergence. Divergence was in a communist context seen 
as ideological differences, and as such was not recognized. The principle of party unity was 
the beginning and end of communist struggle, both within the movement and the individual 
parties. The CPSU, chief ideologist of the movement, would not accept divergence - it was 
seen as factionalism and as undermining the communist efforts. The PCF would spend much 
of its time in the following three years trying to convince the CPSU that an acknowledgment 
of divergences was desperately needed in order to fully recognize party independence as well 
as stabilizing party relations.  
 
The relationship worsened. In January, 1977, the Politburo repeated; “Any eventual political 
meeting (in particular with the CPSU) must have as a prerequisite the public recognition of 
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divergence.”77 The following month, the CPSU voiced its concern to the PCF regarding the 
meeting in Madrid between Marchais, Carrillo and Berlinguer;  
 
We find it normal that three parties meet. But (…) we cannot but be alarmed: It is worked on a Eurocommunist 
charter which will be marked by criticism of the USSR and signify a diversion of principle between our parties. 
(…) If this is true, the French comrades understand well that this is a grave matter, which could be a step towards 
a split. (…) We hope that the PCF finds the means to avoid this and the consequences that will follow.78 
 
A badly concealed threat, the message also revealed real worry within the CPSU – the use of 
the word “split” should confirm it. It is noteworthy that the word never appeared in the PCF’s 
own documents on the PCF-CPSU relations. A word that did turn up, however, if only a few 
times, was rupture, “break.” Whereas “split” was ideological, “break” was political – and 
final – as well as ideological and therefore much more serious. In retrospect, when it becomes 
clear that the PCF had no real wish to break with the CPSU, it can be interpreted as an attempt 
to be bold; by using uncompromising language it ventured to show the CPSU that the PCF did 
not let itself be intimidated. In March, this became evident as the conflict turned into near 
full-on war. 
 
On 18 March a letter was sent from the CPSU to the PCF. After having discussed the letter in 
the Politburo, it was decided to make its contents known to the Central Committee. The letter 
expressed the CPSU’s concern over the PCF breaking with the traditions of good relations 
between communist parties. It disapproved of the PCF having directed public criticism against 
the Soviets, questioning the democratic nature of socialism and the human rights situation in 
the Soviet Union. It reminded the PCF that millions of people had died for the very system the 
French were now criticizing, and it pointed out that the PCF’s actions could only damage the 
socialist cause, and benefit the enemies of the international movement. The CPSU proclaimed 
itself very patient, but the PCF leaders had been abusing and testing this patience, and the 
CPSU hoped that the PCF would take action and stay loyal to the principles that guided them 
both. It concluded, not without scorn, that though the PCF spoke highly of “mutual solidarity” 
it was clear that the PCF thought itself exempt from such behaviour.
79
 The letter, whose 
transcription counted 26 pages, was read out loud to the members of the Central Committee 
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on 1 April – and it caused outrage. The Politburo, having discussed the letter on a meeting 
two days earlier, had branded it “…an attempt at split which provokes indignation” and “an 
attempt at intimidation.” This was the result of the CPSU not accepting the PCF’s 
independence, or the ideas set forth at the 22
nd
 Congress. However, concluded the Politburo, it 
would “…not go to a break with the CPSU or with any other communist party.”80 The Central 
Committee was less forthcoming. It concluded; “…it [the CPSU] continues to consider that 
the touchstone of the internationalist solidarity is the unconditionality of the CPSU.” Jean 
Kanapa fumed; “The letter basically says to the Central Committee (…): You have unworthy 
leaders, you have leaders who treat your own Party badly, who lead your Party down a path 
contrary to the interests of French workers – take action against them, fight them, change 
direction.” He called it a “scandalous move, without precedent...” It was clear that the authors 
of this letters knew the PCF very badly.
81
 With this conclusion Kanapa, probably unwittingly, 
touched upon the essence of the conflict.  
The apple of discord - the PCF’s wish for ideological independence 
Marchais summed up the letter in this way; “The Soviets in their letter tell us: you have 
changed; and we answer: yes, we have changed, because we had to.”82 Change was what the 
PCF sought, necessary democratic and ideological change. And though the CPSU was always 
firmly declared against change, the PCF’s commitment to its own way to socialism was 
deemed by themselves to be good for the party, and good for the international movement. It 
could perhaps be seen as bordering to disobedience vis-à-vis the Soviets, but a small 
ideological concession on the CPSU’s part – namely, recognizing divergence – would remove 
the tension, and thereby the conflict. Politically, the CPSU was never in any grave danger of 
losing one of its oldest allies, but it failed to see it. When the PCF declared that it had never 
been disloyal to the CPSU, it meant it. When it claimed to be dedicated to international 
solidarity, that was true, too. When the PCF leaders reacted so violently to the CPSU’s 
aggressiveness, it seemed to be because they were genuinely puzzled and hurt by the 
accusation stemming from Moscow questioning their fidelity and their commitment to the 
socialist cause. This argument follows that of Lazar.
83
 Even during the darkest moments of 
the PCF-CPSU relationship, the PCF never ceased to defend the Soviet Union in French 
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media and against imperialism. Even when the PCF criticised in one moment, it defended in 
the next. This may have been the result of a double standard, as argued by Stiefbold, but it 
may also have been a natural – though not necessarily a logical – consequence of the 
paradoxical nature of the PCF-CPSU relationship. Stiefbold argued that the PCF believed 
itself free to criticize the CPSU and the Soviet Union because it meant well – whereas 
criticism emanating from other sources was quickly dismissed as anti-Soviet and anti-
Communist. Stiefbold saw it as a double standard; “…only criticism of the USSR by those 
whose fundamental loyalty is above question (that is, the PCF itself) is permissible.”84   
 
To the PCF, the Soviet Union was the First Socialist Country and as such beyond reproach. It 
was not, however, beyond criticism. Stiefbold’s double standard argument may be correct and 
still offer a little too easy an explanation. The PCF had, or rather believed itself to have, great 
knowledge of Soviet matters – especially in domestic affairs, which were usually grimly 
described in Western, i.e. bourgeois, media. The PCF did not criticize as much as voicing a 
concern, and these concerns were based on knowledge instead of prejudice and with the intent 
of doing well, not to damage. However, several aspects of the letter of 18 March – as well as 
many of the reactions to it – showed that the PCF was willing to take a fight with the CPSU – 
publically if need be; “…after the 22nd Congress we entered into a new phase in our relations 
with the CPSU, a phase characterized by conflict, struggles and public struggles. (…) The 
PCF will manifest, in all circumstances, including with regards to the CPSU, a complete 
independence of judgment and action.”85 In its response to the CPSU, delivered on 4 April to 
Stepan Chervonenko, Soviet ambassador to France, the PCF called the accusations 
“intolerable” but also stated that there had never been a break in solidarity with the CPSU, 
and “…the existence of divergences between our two Parties weakens in no manner our 
willingness to entertain with the CPSU solid relations of fraternal friendship..”86 The PCF 
fought to persuade the CPSU to acknowledge the existence of divergence – so judging by the 
effort it put into the process, it was clear that the PCF wished to end the conflict, wished for 
the Soviet Union to pay heed to the PCF’s concerns and wished for a return to normal – i.e. 
good – relations.  
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It proved very difficult to enter into dialogue with the CPSU – the reason being the specific 
issues on which the two parties disagreed. The main issue was liberty – basic rights for the 
collective as well as for the individual. Liberty was in its turn intimately connected with true 
democracy – and democracy was the essence of socialism. This had been established at the 
22
nd
 Congress, and the PCF – emboldened by its decisions, sought to reassert its view on 
these matters. There was no need to seek out a confrontational line with Moscow; stories and 
revelations from the Soviet Union describing human rights breaches had frequently reached 
Western media in later years, and the PCF gradually began to react differently to these stories 
than before. It had – publically as well as during debates within the party leadership – begun 
to worry about the overall situation in the socialist countries.
87
 The 18 March letter proved 
that the CPSU was keenly aware of the PCF’s criticisms. But, as the letter made very clear; 
the Soviet Union guaranteed the liberties of its people. Anti-Soviet individuals simply did not 
exist anymore in the Union; they had belonged to groups now “liquidated.” Prominent 
dissidents, such as Solzhenitsyn, were described as “monarchists” and therefore counter-
revolutionaries. Furthermore, the CPSU did not believe in freedom as an indivisible principle, 
since complete economic freedom, for example, led to capitalism.
88
 The PCF response to this 
attitude was clear and to the point; “…there exists between our two Parties a profound 
divergence in democratic questions, and in particular regarding individual and collective 
freedom. Your letter confirms it.”89  
 
A message from the CPSU sent through the Soviet embassy in May, 1977, did not help, 
either.
90
 Although the wording was less confrontational than in the previous message from the 
CPSU, the intent was clear; the CPSU sought to insult the PCF by asking whether the PCF 
had changed its mind on nuclear arms. The occasion was an ongoing debate in France on the 
national defence systems – of which the nuclear weapons programme was an important part. 
The PCF judged this as an intolerable interference in what was a party matter only, and added 
it to the list of issues in which the CPSU had meddled in its affairs. A new low was hit at 
about the same time, when Marchais could inform the Central Committee of a meeting he had 
had with Jean Vincent – leader of the Swiss Labour Party. Upon hearing about this meeting, 
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the CPSU had sent a delegation to the Switzerland, launching a “veritable smear campaign” 
against the PCF.
91
  
A game of brinkmanship – the PCF fights back 
The PCF fought back. When the CPSU asked the PCF to join it in a condemnation of the 
Chinese Communist Party (the CCP) on 9 September - the day of the first anniversary of 
Mao’s death – the PCF refused. And the wording was cheeky, as well as being a clear and 
serious message to the Soviets; “…it is totally out of the question that the PCF should 
associate itself in any kind of condemnation or collective attack at any kind of communist 
Party. (…) …a condemnation would only serve to aggravate the current relations with the 
Chinese Communist Party and the situation in the global communist movement.”92 This 
would imply a radical change of tune – both the CPSU and PCF had treated the CCP as 
persona non grata ever since the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s – so most likely it was 
worded thus to act as a statement to the Soviets, a threat, almost; overly arrogant in tune to 
make sure the message got through to them. There is an almost condescending tone in much 
of the PCF-CPSU correspondence in this period – stemming from the French side, as the 
example above shows. The PCF clearly thought itself above the entire conflict – it struggled 
to understand where the conflict came from, and why the CPSU refused to the see the French 
side of it. The PCF had therefore decided to be “the bigger person” and fought back the 
CPSU’s accusations by demonstrating its solidarity to all things communist, even declared 
enemies of the Soviet Union. The PCF reacted with anger and scorn at the CPSU’s claims, 
and retaliated by acting the saint, innocently condemned.  
 
The boldness in the PCF’s replies could also be a result of a newfound freedom. In the event 
of a full scale war with the CPSU, the latter had few sanctions to level at the PCF in order to 
keep it in the Soviet fold. The CPSU could threaten to “disown” the PCF, with the political 
ramifications it entailed. The PCF would lose its position in the international movement and 
remain forever a pariah. More serious would be the economic consequences – the CPSU 
could cut off its financial support to the PCF – a loss that would be felt for a while, as the PCF 
had received this kind of aid since its earliest beginnings. Still, it is safe to assume that the 
PCF given some time would recover tolerably from such a blow. The CPSU could also try to 
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use the carrot instead of the stick – by increasing its money transfers to the PCF. Or it could 
simply agree to the PCF’s wishes. Though it would immediately be interpreted as giving in to 
pressure – a scandalous act by the CPSU! – it would satisfy the PCF and give the latter an 
incentive to go back to business as usual. The PCF could not dictate CPSU policy. But, as the 
CPSU did not want to lose the PCF, it proved possible to negotiate with it. And as a free party 
in a free country, far away from the Iron Curtain, the leaders of the PCF could safely state its 
terms – however disagreeable they seemed to the Soviets – with little or no danger to 
themselves.  
 
In November, 1977, the PCF proved that it could repeat its claims and stand its ground in face 
of the mighty members of the CPSU Central Committee. The PCF had been invited to give its 
position on the problems between the two parties. A meeting was held on 5 November 
between Paul Laurent - member of the PCF Politburo and Central Committee – which 
represented the PCF, and Andrei Kirilenko and Boris Ponomarev – both members of the 
CPSU Central Committee – which represented Soviet interests.93 Laurent spoke for a long 
time, defending the PCF. He pointed out that it was time to put into practice the principle of 
party independence, and that the international movement had changed. A debate was needed. 
Instead of elaborating on the matter, Laurent started on another topic, a veritable minefield. 
He talked about the situation regarding dissidents and ideological opponents in the Soviet 
Union. Laurent’s proposal was to fight dissidents with peaceful means in a political and 
ideological struggle, to target the dissidents’ opinions and convictions rather than their 
persons and families. Laurent pointed out that the CPSU had all the means of such a struggle, 
and he also commented on the Soviets’ claim that anti-Soviet elements did not exist in the 
Soviet Union by saying; “…it is inconceivable that everyone in the USSR thinks communist.” 
With regards to divergences Laurent stated, as the PCF had done several times already; “… 
[they] exist between us. It is a fact. One must admit it and one must discuss it.”  
 
Kirilenko’s response to Laurent’s long monologue was to give one himself. He was objective 
and calm – but made it clear that the PCF had misunderstood several important issues. What 
the PCF saw as interference was, according to the CPSU, simply meant as friendly advice – 
advice that one was allowed to give as a sister party in the international movement. The CPSU 
did not close its eyes for differences, but Kirilenko felt that any Marxist-Leninist should strive 
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to achieve unity and agreement. The PCF, therefore, had taken the wrong approach. He 
concluded that the PCF had taken “…a step backwards and not towards cooperation.” It 
would seem that Kirilenko did not want to discuss the issues addressed by Laurent, so instead 
he gently tried to persuade the PCF that its methods were wrong. Kirilenko’s response had 
hardly been a step in the right direction, although he didn’t take the confrontational line with 
his French comrade. And the mood only worsened when the word was given to Boris 
Ponomarev. Far from showing willingness to debate where his colleague had not, Ponomarev 
went to full-frontal assault on the PCF.  
 
It soon became clear that Ponomarev spoke for the Soviet Union in his answer to Laurent, not 
as a representative of the CPSU. He accused the PCF of interfering in CPSU affairs, rather 
than the other way around; by criticising the Soviet Union for the whole world to hear, and by 
not allowing the Soviets to defend themselves. He also found it very disappointing that the 
PCF saw fit to criticize a sister party, but not the Chinese communists – despite the miserable 
track record they could present with regards to their human rights violations! Finally, he was 
outraged that instead of condemning the Chinese mass oppression, the PCF chose to send “an 
emotional message” to the CCP upon Mao’s death. Whatever the PCF sought to achieve in its 
relations with the CPSU by sending this message to the CCP, it was clear that it had worked. 
The CPSU was provoked. The meeting was concluded without anyone being any the wiser. 
One agreed to try to solve the issues, but it was left to another time.
94
  
 
1978 proved to be the year where the power balance gradually began to shift, from the CPSU 
to the PCF. The PCF had taken the moral high ground in its conflict with the Soviets, and 
every accusation hurled at the PCF, every dismissal by the CPSU to discuss issues deemed 
important by the PCF, and every attempt at avoiding certain subject served to convince the 
PCF even more that it was right in these matters and that the fault lay with the Soviets. An 
example of this is a meeting held in July, when Soviet ambassador Chervonenko invited 
Maxime Gremetz and another senior member of the PCF leadership to the Soviet embassy in 
Paris. The occasion was a story of two dissidents whose fates had enraged Western media. 
The ambassador defended the Soviets’ actions in this matter for over an hour, but the two 
French comrades were not convinced. The report on the event concluded, not without 
satisfaction, that “…it appears to us that our motion and its contents produced a shock. That 
                                                          
94
 Above citations from transcription of meeting PCF-CPSU, 05.11.77. Fonds Plissonnier, I.  
43 
 
confirms its correctness.”95 The Soviets, therefore, were not to assume to everything should 
happen on their terms. To illustrate this is the PCF’s reaction to a proposal from President 
Brezhnev to meet with Marchais at some time during his official visit to France in late June, 
1977. The Politburo remarked that; “…this meeting, if it takes place, cannot be concluded 
except with a communiqué acknowledging divergences” and that it should be taken into 
consideration that the CPSU was waging a campaign against both the Party and its 
leadership.
96
 The meeting was never mentioned again in any PCF documents. Snubbing one 
of the most powerful men in the world thus, was a bold statement indeed.  
A change of Soviet tactics – and an improvement in PCF-CPSU relations  
Finally, it seemed to dawn on the CPSU that mere threats alone would not entice the PCF to 
change its mind. The CPSU, therefore, changed its approach to the PCF. During his official 
visit to France in October 1978, Soviet Foreign Secretary Andrei Gromyko met with Charles 
Fiterman, member of the PCF Politburo. Again, Marchais didn’t meet with the high-ranking 
politician himself. However, it soon became clear that something had changed since the 
parties’ last encounter. Fiterman noted that Gromyko’s speech “…was formulated to be 
agreeable to us” and that the latter had avoided the most difficult issues. Human rights were 
hardly mentioned, and the atmosphere was good. Gromyko repeated several times his 
conviction that the two parties would overcome their differences – he was not a “fatalist”, he 
said – and he was convinced that in time relations would mend. This consequently prompted 
Fiterman to be more forthcoming – and in his statement on divergences he pointed out that 
although they existed, there was plenty of time to set things right. On the short term, they 
were “insurmountable” he declared, and had therefore simply to be lived with. He did not 
enter into a debate with Gromyko, and the two men parted on the friendliest of terms. 
 
One thing can be deduced from the meeting and was closely linked to the CPSU’s apparent 
decision to replace the stick with the carrot in its dealings with the PCF. Gromyko spoke a 
great deal about China – and he was merciless in his description of the Chinese communists. 
He lamented the fact that “…the politics of several States are poisoned by bacteria: the 
attraction to China.” It was the only time during his speech that he seemed genuinely angry.97 
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Gromyko’s attitude is a clear indication that there was real fear in the CPSU that it might 
actually lose the benefit of the PCF’s strict anti-Chinese stance. There was no love lost 
between the CPSU and the CCP, and that made it easier for the PCF to use its relations with 
the CCP for its own ends. As stated above, nothing suggests that the CCP had anything to do 
with this conflict at all, but the CPSU could not afford to bet on that. In retrospect, a change 
of alignment from Moscow to Beijing seemed much more unlikely than a clean break with 
Moscow – but again, the PCF could exploit the CPSU’s fear of precisely such a scenario. If 
the goal of this little game of divide and conquer was to be taken seriously by the CPSU, the 
PCF had succeeded.  
The origins of the conflict – and the reasons for its end 
The origins of the conflict were the new emphasis on democratic change as a path to 
socialism heralded by the PCF and made into official doctrine on the 22
nd
 Congress. In these 
matters the interests of the PCF and of the CPSU collided, and it proved extremely difficult to 
reach a compromise. The one way of achieving it, by declaring the existence of divergence 
valid between two communist sister parties, would mean a break with the fundamental 
Marxist-Leninist principle of party unity and unity within the international movement. The 
conflict itself, however, revealed that the PCF did not want to break with the CPSU, and that 
the CPSU did not want to lose the PCF. Their objectives were different, but their overall goal 
was the same. And as the conflict turned into an ideological stalemate the PCF pushed for 
divergence to be acknowledged and accepted. It became an ever-repeating mantra in the 
party’s relations with the CPSU – it was declared every time the two parties met or the 
conflict was discussed in PCF documents. It became almost an obsession with the PCF. 
Moreover, the PCF leadership seemed to enjoy this newfound power. Convinced that they 
were right, the PCF’s leaders grew more courageous in their correspondence with the CPSU, 
and less compromising in their proposals. This ideological game of brinkmanship eventually 
paid off. Lazar sums up the PCF’s aim in this manner;  
“Truth be told, the PCF does not want under any circumstances to break with the USSR and its system of 
allegiance that it strives to maintain. On the contrary. It consistently assures it of its full and total solidarity, of its 
belonging to the same world, of the pursuit of similar objectives, of its participation in the same values and of its 
struggle against identical enemies. The PCF simply wants to recalibrate the established relationship with the 
CPSU, to defend its freedom of decision and to adapt itself to the new conditions of political struggle in France 
45 
 
so as to consolidate its place as the first party of the left (...) Said differently, it seeks to redefine the nature of the 
existing relations in the communist family, not divorce it, even less to destroy it.”98   
 
If relations with the CPSU gradually improved during the course of 1978 – as something 
resembling an understanding emerged between the two parties – then domestically, 1978 
proved to be a veritable annus horribilis for the PCF. The National Assembly election results 
from March were far worse than anticipated, with the PCF getting only 17, 5 % of the votes, 
winning 86 seats out of a total 491. Though this result was better than that of the previous 
election in 1973, when the PCF won only 73 seats out of 490, and a vast deal better than that 
of the upcoming election of 1981 when the Party received a mere 8,9 % of the votes, the 
législatives of ’78 marked a negative turning point of a different nature. In ’73 the PS had 
stood in the elections together with the Mouvement aux radicaux de gauche, the MRG – the 
Left Radicals. The alliance won 102 seats. However, in ’78 the PS stood alone, having gained 
considerable ground over the past few years. The party went on to win 113 seats, taking 23 % 
of the votes. For the first time in history, the PS was bigger than the PCF.  
 
After the break-up of the Union of the Left and the abandonment of the Common Program in 
1977, the PCF became vastly more isolated in the French political community. The PCF and 
the PS took it in turns to accuse each other of being responsible for the Common Program’s 
failure, and gradually the PS joined the other parties in their general disapproval of the PCF’s 
perceived Stalinist tendencies.
99
 By 1978, it was difficult to see that the two parties had ever 
been friends. The PCF felt betrayed by the PS, and declared that it would not be used by the 
PS as a steppingstone to sole government.
100
 The Politburo stated that the PS had “turned 
right” and betrayed the French working classes.101 The irony of many of these statements was 
that they were true. The PS knew that in order to win votes, it had to steal them from the PCF. 
It soon became clear that the PS’ goal was indeed to rule alone. 
 
Paradoxically, as the union crumbled under the feet of its signatories, the PCF declared its 
dedication to it as emphatically as before. And now the PCF also adhered – to a much more 
conscious degree – to the idea of the union – perhaps evoking memories of the Popular Front 
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of the 1930s. The PCF pointed out that the strategy laid out on the 22
nd
 Congress – that of a 
French way to socialism – implied “that a great political alliance must be realized.” Moreover 
that “…the union policy is to us a policy of principle. It is an essential and permanent 
component of political strategy.”102 How ironic, then, that a union seemed out of reach for the 
PCF at home, whereas abroad the Party sought endlessly to free itself from commitments that 
limited its independence.   
 
In early 1979, Gaston Plissonnier gave an interview with the leftist magazine La Marseillaise. 
In it, he repeated the claim that the PCF had done everything to make the PS come back to the 
Union of the Left and he put the blame for the break solely on the PS. He went on to deny that 
the PCF in any way was “isolated” or “in decline” – as some commentators had suggested. On 
the contrary, the PCF counted 700.000 members – the highest number since the communists 
were thrown out of government in 1947.
103
 The interview reveals that the break with the PS 
and the MRG had – once again – radicalized the PCF. The defensive stand taken by the PCF 
was an expression of and would enhance the undemocratic traditions in the PCF in the time to 
come. Also, events taking place within the leadership put strains on the Party and contributed 
to the radicalization.
104
 In addition to the domestic situation, international events would draw 
the PCF closer to the CPSU yet again. In February, the Party expressed concern over the 
recent Chinese aggression against Vietnam. The Politburo made it abundantly clear that such 
aggression by a socialist state against another socialist state was “extremely serious” and that 
the PCF would protest in the strongest terms.
105
  
 
Robrieux and others have also argued that the death of Jean Kanapa in September, 1978,
106
 
contributed to the gradual move back towards the CPSU.
107
 Kanapa had acted both as one of  
Marchais’ closest advisors and as an authority on the communist bloc – having spent years in 
Eastern Europe after the Second World War, he knew the culture well and spoke Russian 
fluently. His allegiance, however, belonged to the party, and upon his death the Central 
Committee wrote of his “…crucial part (…) in the development of the international solidarity 
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of the communist Parties of equality of rights and full respect of the independence of each.”108 
Nobody was more provoked than Kanapa by the 18 March letter from the CPSU. With him, a 
strong voice arguing party independence from Moscow had silenced.  
Truce 
At some point during the summer or early autumn, 1979, an official visit by a delegation from 
the PCF to the Soviet Union was finally decided upon. Most of the autumn of 1979 was then 
spent preparing for the meeting – a top level meeting headed by Marchais and Brezhnev, 
respectively. The preparations went on for months, with party officials meeting up several 
times, usually in Moscow. The preparations were kept secret, they are hardly mentioned in the 
Politburo files, and it was as late as October, 1979 that the Politburo decided to inform the 
Central Committee of the details of them – à un moment donné – at a given time, but not 
yet.
109
 The meeting was extremely important, and Marchais later recalled it as the most high-
level meeting ever held between the two parties.
110
 It was to be concluded with the publishing 
of a joint PCF-CPSU communiqué, the first such statement in eight years. The official PCF 
documents say nothing of which issues were debated during the planning of the visit, but in 
early December, the PCF could declare victory. The CPSU had finally accepted that the 
existence of divergence between the two parties was to be acknowledged in the 
communiqué.
111
 At the Central Committee’s last meeting of the year, André Lajoinie’s report 
could also note with satisfaction that “…The conclusion, after years of efforts, of treaties on 
disarmament between the Soviet Union and the United States, as well as the proposals for 
peace, recently made by Leonid BREZHNEV, have permitted us to hope for new progress 
towards détente and peace.”112 It was not until the 19 December that the PCF delegation of the 
five members who were to travel to Moscow was put together. It consisted of four men – 
including Marchais and Maxime Gremetz – and one woman. The visit was scheduled for 7 to 
12 January, 1980. The final preparations were made, but before the delegation could leave for 
Moscow, the Soviet Army invaded Afghanistan and turned the international communist 
movement upside down. 
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Chapter 5. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
 
“...a land where your enemies will fight you forever”113 
The invasion 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan officially began on 25 December, 1979, when Soviet 
troops crossed the border into Afghanistan from Kyrgyzstan, one of the fifteen Soviet 
republics and the only one sharing a border with Afghanistan. Troops had been drafted from 
all over the Soviet Union and sent to Kyrgyzstan. Here, several weeks were spent preparing 
for an eventual invasion. At the same time, Soviet pilots and soldiers were flown in to the 
existing Soviet military bases in Afghanistan, apparently not knowing that they were the 
vanguard of a full-scale invasion. The final decision to go into Afghanistan was made only a 
few days before the invasion, by a handful of people in the top Soviet leadership – including 
President Leonid Brezhnev, Foreign Secretary Andrei Gromyko, KGB Chairman Yuri 
Andropov, and Defence Secretary Dmitri Ustinov. The secrecy surrounding the invasion was 
extremely strict, and the final go-ahead was not given to the military until a few days before 
the invasion was scheduled to begin. The Soviet troops were to be commanded in person by 
Sergei Sokolov – war hero and Marshal of the Soviet Union.114  
 
The invasion took the world completely by surprise, and the timing was instrumental for its 
success. The Western world was celebrating Christmas, and government agencies operated on 
minimum staff. An invasion was not expected, and nobody foresaw that the Soviet Union 
would attack in the middle of winter, sending its troops across the snow-covered, hostile 
mountains of northern Afghanistan. The troops of the 40
th
 Soviet Army marched steadily on 
Kabul, meeting with practically no resistance and supported by the Soviet Air Force, whose 
bases in the country had been operative since before the invasion – the Soviets had built them 
as part of their foreign aid to the Afghans. Places of strategic importance were seized quickly, 
and three days into the invasion the troops reached Kabul. The Afghan capital is difficult to 
defend, and fell in a few hours.
115
 Parallel to these events Soviet elite soldiers landed in secret 
outside one of the residences of Afghan president Hafizullah Amin. Details surrounding the 
operation remain unclear, but the result of the assault was the death of Amin, whether by his 
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own hand or those of his assailants.
116
 At dawn the following day, Afghanistan was left 
without a formal head of state. Babrak Karmal became the country’s new leader. Once a 
friend of Amin and Amin’s predecessor Nur Muhammad Taraki, he had fallen into disgrace 
and gone into exile in Eastern Europe. In secret, prior to the invasion, Soviet agents had 
contacted Karmal, persuading him to return to Afghanistan when circumstances were more 
favourable. He was taken to the Soviet Union, from where he made a speech to the Afghan 
people in the wake of the Soviet invasion – calling on them to cooperate with the Soviet 
forces and refrain from any resistance.
117
 Shortly after, he arrived in Kabul, and on 28 
December, he was instated as head of the country’s new Revolutionary Council.  
A defiant people – understanding the history of the Afghans 
When the invasion was completed, a new leadership installed, and Kabul, along with other 
important towns, communication lines and infrastructure were safely under Soviet military 
control, the real war started. The Afghan people in general did not acknowledge Karmal’s 
government, seeing it as a Soviet puppet regime led by an Afghan quisling. The Afghan army 
experienced mass desertion and nearly disintegrated. It had to be completed rebuilt and 
reorganized under Soviet control. The Soviet Army had initially been designated a 
administrative and monitoring role – instead the burden fell on it to protect its conquered 
territories from the onslaught by the ever-growing threat from armed resistance fighters, 
organized in small, local groups.
118
 They hid in difficult terrain, attacked only from positions 
of strength and employed guerrilla tactics in their warfare – including ambushes, sabotage 
actions and the use of snipers. In time they grew stronger, more mobilized and organized, and 
gained vital combat experience. Their numbers soared, and their successes were detrimental 
to Soviet morale. Though usually operating independently from one another and under 
different names, they were seen as soldiers belonging to the same army, and they were given a 
common name – the Mujahidin – Allah’s warriors.  
 
They fought for Islam – and a way of life that had stayed unchanged for centuries.119 
Afghanistan was in 1979 one of the world’s poorest and least developed countries. It lacked 
vital infrastructure, modern institutions, and industry and technology had taken quantum leaps 
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past it. Virtually the entire population was illiterate – the vast majority being farmers and 
peasants who still lived in rural communities steeped in lingering feudalism. Society was 
based on ancient traditions and the religious teachings of Muslim clerics. Political rule was 
wielded directly by local warlords and chieftains. Sharia was the basis of law. Afghanistan 
was a fiercely traditionalist, tribal and decentralized country. Most communities lived 
independently from one another and from Kabul. There was very little contact between 
different regions, and trade and commerce were mostly confined within the provinces.  
The lack of infrastructure had also made it extremely difficult for the central government in 
Kabul to control the vast Afghan territory. It was openly defied by local and regional leaders 
if these opposed any proposed reforms or other changes.  
 
Afghanistan, who fell into British hands during the colonial “Great Game” of the 19th century, 
had become a republic in 1973, when former Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud Khan ousted 
his cousin, Zahir Shah – Afghanistan’s king of forty years – in a coup d’état. Daoud’s rule 
would be very similar to that of his cousin’s – corrupt, illiberal and militant – though slightly 
less legitimate in the eyes of his subjects. Daoud entertained good relations with the Soviet 
Union, and bilateral agreements gave Daoud access to Soviet technology and expertise. 
However, Daoud did not wish to bind himself unconditionally to Moscow – he firmly stated 
that Afghanistan was to be considered, for all intents and purposes, as a non-alignment 
country.
120
 In the meantime, the Soviets strengthened its support of Daoud’s greatest political 
adversaries, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan – the communists. Collins 
described Soviet policy in this matter as “burning the candle at both ends.”121 The PDPA was 
founded in 1965, and remained an illegal party until it took power. Basing itself on traditional 
Marxist-Leninism, it primarily appealed to workers, students and intellectuals – who 
combined constituted only a small minority of Afghan society. The party would soon split 
into two factions, Parcham – “the Banner” and Khalq – “the People.” Although the two 
factions reunited upon Daoud’s ascent to power, the loyalties forged during the split would 
influence the PDPA’s politics and leadership for the rest of its existence.   
 
The PDPA’s coup, the so-called Saur Revolution, took place in April, 1978, and was named 
after the month’s name in the Islamic calendar – it was meant to be a nod to the October 
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Revolution. The coup was initiated at dawn on the 27
th
 when PDPA partisans attacked 
Daoud’s forces in Kabul. The fighting was of short duration, and limited itself to the capital. 
Daoud was killed, though it is unclear whether he was the victim of a planned assassination. 
The ease with which the PDPA could seize power reveals the weakness inherent in Daoud’s 
regime, rather than the strength of the PDPA, whose members were few and the majority of 
which was confined to Kabul. Furthermore, the PDPA was also greatly helped, however 
indirectly, by the army. Many of Daoud’s military commanders simply refused to send their 
men into action, keeping instead to the sideline, ready to pledge their allegiance to whoever 
emerged victorious.
122
 As the Democratic People’s Republic of Afghanistan was proclaimed, 
old enemies combined forces to form a new government. Nur Muhammad Taraki, former 
leader of Khalq – the radical faction of the PDPA, became prime minister and leader of the 
newly established Revolutionary Council. Babrak Karmal, who had spearheaded Parcham, 
was appointed vice prime minister jointly with Hafizullah Amin, Taraki’s old aide-de-camp 
and head of propaganda.   
Soviet-Afghan relations, 1978-1979 
The Soviet Union quickly congratulated the new regime – as well as promised it its fraternal 
and ideological support. Being the first regime to congratulate the PDPA, Moscow also 
applauded the wise decision the people had made.
123
 The Soviet leaders were astonished, 
however, as the coup had come as a complete surprise.
124
 The PDPA leaders had consciously 
decided to keep their Soviet comrades in the dark, for fear of the Soviets’ disapproval. Both 
Ouimet and Westad state that disapproval had assuredly been expressed had Moscow 
known.
125
 It was an unmistakable indication of a lack of trust between the PDPA and the 
CPSU when not even Alexandr Puzanov, Soviet ambassador to Kabul, knew anything about 
what was about to happen. Puzanov also expressed scepticism towards the new regime, 
emphasising its endless in-fighting between the two factions.
126
 However, as Ouimet points 
out, several Soviet leaders were enthusiastic, and both Central Committee member Suslov and 
Ponomarev immediately counted Afghanistan among the socialist states of the world.
127
 And 
with the continued financial aid from the Soviets, the Afghan government sought to initiate 
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several reforms in an attempt to modernize the country. It wanted to increase literacy, 
improve women’s rights and promote trade and industry. Furthermore, it wished to rid the 
Afghan society of its most feudal aspects as well as liberating the legal and educational 
institutions from Islam influence. But Afghanistan proved impossible to modernize, because 
its people proved almost immune to all kinds of change. Opposition grew following the coup, 
especially in the provinces. In addition to an upsurge in insurgency, tensions also rose within 
the Afghan leadership. In the summer of 1978, a purge of the Parcham members of 
government was initiated by Amin. Karmal was expelled from the party leadership and was 
forced to leave the country.
128
    
 
Parallel to this increase in domestic turbulence, the Afghan regime formalized its ties to 
Moscow. The military cooperation between the two countries was strengthened and its scope 
widened. In December, 1978, a bilateral Friendship Treaty between Afghanistan and the 
Soviet Union was signed in Moscow. Article 4 stated that,  
The High Contracting Parties, acting in a spirit of the traditions of friendship and good-neighbourliness and in 
the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, shall consult with each other and shall, by agreement, take the 
necessary steps to safeguard the security, independence and territorial integrity of the two countries. In the 
interest of strengthening their defensive capacity, the High Contracting Parties shall continue to develop their co-
operation in the military field on the basis of the relevant agreements concluded between them.
129
 
This article of the Treaty was to be referred to many times on later occasions. As well as 
given access to military technology, the Afghan regime also benefitted from Soviet financial 
aid and industrial expertise. Towards the end of 1978, it became clear that the ongoing Islamic 
revolution in Iran could destabilize the situation in Central Asia, as well as threaten the 
Soviets’ position in the region. This gave the Afghans more leverage in their demands to the 
Soviets for more money and military advisors.
130
  
 
In 1979 several events took place in rapid succession. The relationship between members of 
the leadership became strained, both due to personal ambitions and old political 
disagreements that resurfaced. The Khalq faction ruled alone, following purges directed at the 
Parcham members. Taraki – willingly or involuntarily – increasingly gave up his power in 
favour of the younger and much more uncompromising Amin. The number of political 
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prisoners skyrocketed, and there was open disagreement and mistrust between leading 
members of the government. By March, there were riots and rebel forces operating in half of 
the country’s 28 provinces.131 The following month, the United States initiated their support 
for the rebels.
132
 The central government in Kabul asked for increased aid from the Soviets to 
keep the situation under control. Joseph Collins writes: “…the insurgency prospered and army 
mutinies proliferated. This brought increased Soviet military aid. The presence of growing 
numbers of Soviet military and civilian advisers fuelled the insurgency and the mutinies, thus 
establishing a vicious cycle.”133 In 1979, Afghanistan did not merit to be called a political 
unity, let alone a nation. Parallel to these events, when it became clear that civil war had 
erupted in the country, the Soviet leadership began discussing an eventual military response to 
the problems in Afghanistan. 
Soviet’s rocky path to invasion 
There were many arguments against a military operation. First, it was crystal clear to the 
Soviet leadership that any Soviet military operation in Afghanistan would be a highly 
controversial political move. Andropov pointed out Moscow’s dilemma; “We must finalize 
the political statement, bearing in mind that we will be labelled as an aggressor, but that in 
spite of that, under no circumstances can we lose Afghanistan.”134 Furthermore, Puzanov was 
not impressed with the Afghan regime and expressed doubts as to its efficiency and gratitude 
towards the Soviets. Ponomarev was also beginning to question the vitality of the Khalq 
regime. Afghanistan was not ripe for revolution, he declared, meaning that the masses would 
not fight for the survival of the regime. A socialist regime that needed military help to stay in 
power obviously did not have the necessary legitimacy. Indeed, as Kirilenko and Soviet 
Premier Kosygin repeatedly pointed out, the most important question to answer before any 
military operation could be launched was to ascertain who the Soviet troops would end up 
fighting – the regime, the rebels, or the entire Afghan people? Kirilenko added a poignant 
element to the discussion, when he made an almost sensational remark to his comrades on the 
Central Committee, in which he seemed to question whether the Afghan regime was even 
worth saving; “We gave it [the Afghan regime] everything. And what has come of it? Nothing 
of any value. After all, it was they who executed innocent people for no reason and told us 
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that we also executed people in Lenin's time. You see what kind of Marxists we have 
found.”135 Although it had no power over the political decisions made by the Soviet 
leadership, it is important to note that the Soviet military leadership was also firmly against an 
invasion – Marshal Ogarkov, head of the Soviet Supreme Command – had on several 
occasions warned against such a move, presumably by explaining to the political leadership 
why such an operation would most likely be unsuccessful.
136
  
 
The Soviet leadership decided that a military operation in Afghanistan was out of the 
question. Despite repeated requests for troops to be sent against the rebels the Soviet Union 
refused, increasing instead its arms exports to Afghanistan while monitoring the situation in 
the country closely.
137
 But then, only a few months later, on 12 December, 1979, the Soviet 
leaders signed the document entitled “Concerning the situation in A” – giving the all clear for 
a full-scale invasion. Not everyone was happy with the decision. Kirilenko signed the 
document after some hesitation, and Brezhnev only after the meeting was over and the 
decision was made. It is important to note that not only the Soviet president, but also Soviet 
Premier Kosygin was absent from the meeting, as he would “almost certainly (…) have 
opposed an intervention.”138 However, several events had eventually pushed the Soviet 
leadership in favour of an invasion. Amin’s tight grip on power was one of Moscow’s worries. 
Any hope that Taraki would regain some of his quickly evaporating authority was crushed in 
September when Amin ousted Taraki from his position and formally seized Afghanistan’s 
highest office. Taraki was soon after killed. His death was a blow to Brezhnev, who did not 
like Amin – a brutal, unpredictable leader – and who had promised to help Taraki.139  
 
The rebellion gained momentum. An unstable Afghanistan on the Soviet Union’s doorstep 
was a nightmare to the Soviet leaders; especially as such a regime would be vulnerable to 
imperialist aggression. There were indications, the Soviets felt, that the Americans were 
cementing their presence in Central Asia – and that they might use Pakistan or Iran, 
Afghanistan’s closest neighbours, as proxies to promote American foreign political goals in 
the area.
140
 Westad attributes the political wish for an invasion within the Soviet leadership 
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itself mainly to the ambitions of Defence Secretary Dmitri Ustinov.
141
 He persuaded and was 
subsequently joined by KGB chief Yuri Andropov, who had initially been disinclined to 
support a military operation. The Afghanistan issue – and how different leaders chose to react 
to it – could be decisive in the upcoming power struggle, as it was becoming clear that 
Brezhnev did not have many years left.  Andropov, however, did not forget that whatever plan 
of action was settled upon by the Soviets, they would be regarded by the outside world as the 
aggressive party.
142
 
 
The 1979 invasion was to have profound consequences for both countries involved; it sparked 
widespread diplomatic fury and sent the stocks of the Soviet Union in the international 
community plummeting. The regime in Moscow would soon discover that it had few allies. 
The PCF, however, was one of them.   
 
“Those who live are those who fight,” said the poet…”143 
The reaction of the PCF 
The reactions of the PCF to the invasion can be traced reading the party’s documents dated 
January and February, 1980. Because of the Christmas holidays, the various committees of 
the party did not meet until after New Year, at which time the invasion had been a news item 
for over a week. In the Western world, the general attitude towards the Soviet Union had 
become extremely negative and sceptical, and France was no exception. The invasion was met 
with disbelief, shock and anger in the media as well as in political circles. The PCF was well 
aware that any decision going remotely contrary to the current public opinion would be 
regarded as highly controversial. Before publishing a statement outlining the party’s position 
on the issue the PCF, therefore, had to take into consideration the upcoming official visit to 
Moscow, as well as its own ideological convictions, its commitment to international 
solidarity, its ties with the Soviet Union – and its responsibility to its electorate.  
The Politburo 
The Politburo of the PCF met on the 4 January. It was the first meeting of the year, and there 
were many topics on the agenda. The first pages of the meeting report are devoted to the 
                                                          
141
 Westad in (ed) Westad, 1997:132-133 
142
 Ouimet, 2003:90-91 
143
 Central Committe, 22.11.79 
56 
 
social situation of France; concerns over the rise in gas and electricity prices, the 
unemployment rate, and the general “austerity policy” pursued by the sitting conservative 
government, led by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. On page four in the report, under the heading 
“The international situation” is the invasion of Afghanistan finally mentioned. It does not 
occupy first place, though, it is third on the list following Iran – of interest due to the Islamic 
Revolution the previous year, as well as the hostage situation at the US embassy in Tehran, 
still not resolved as of January, 1980 – and Cambodia – where information was emerging 
casting a black shadow on the communist regime of Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge.  Then, at 
last, a few short paragraphs describe the Politburo’s general views with regards to the 
“situation” in Afghanistan – it was consistently not referred to as an invasion. The Politburo 
declared its intention to “publish a declaration of the Politburo on the whole situation, and in 
it express our position on Afghanistan.”  
 
For a clearer view of this “whole situation,” it is referred to a report on the subject by Gaston 
Plissonnier. He began his report with a poignant reminder to the Politburo, stating what its 
task should be; “…Do not condemn the invasion, but do not adopt an attitude of approbation 
– which could resemble an alignment; and consequently, in contradiction to our position on 
non-interference [and] the independence of countries and peoples.”144  
 
In the report, Plissonnier outlined Afghan history and the history of the PDPA, describing 
Afghanistan as a backwards country in dire need of reform and modernization. He stated that 
progress was under way when political conflicts threatened to halt the positive effects of the 
Saur Revolution. Amin was declared the villain, the murderer of Taraki and the man 
personally responsible for the crimes committed and the oppression suffered by the Afghan 
people under his rule. The Soviets, for their part, feared an unstable, anti-Soviet regime 
strategically positioned in an important and difficult region, in their own back yard. Also, 
wrote Plissonnier, according to exiled Afghan politicians in France “would an armed 
insurrection have broken out against Amin” on the night of the 26 December. To sum up, 
Amin was about to destroy the Revolution, the Afghan people and destabilize the country. He 
had lost the support from his subjects. It was in this climate the Soviets decided to intervene. 
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He continued. In the evening of the 28 December, the PCF received a spoken message – the 
report uses the phrase communication orale – from the CPSU: “We [the Soviet Union] have a 
treaty of friendship and military support with Afghanistan. Under the UN Charter and this 
treaty, the new government has asked us for military aid to combat the rebellion and its 
supporters abroad. We have accepted this demand.”  
The question faced by the PCF was therefore, to support or not to support? According to 
Plissonnier, the party would have to make a decision based on three principles; independence 
and non-intervention in domestic affairs, the right and possibility of every country to ask 
another country for help, and the Party’s dedication to be in solidarity with all forces for 
progress.  He then wrote, “The first reactions within the Party express agreement with what 
has happened.”  As a precursor to this conclusion, he stated; “in acting as we do with regards 
to Afghanistan, we think we can assert that we are in compliance with our principles.”  
Plissonnier took his time to warn and advice his comrades in the leadership. His report began 
with a statement of the Party’s overall responsibility: “Since the beginning we tried, the few 
who were there, to define the position that seemed to us most just with regards to our position 
of class and the interests of our Party.”  It seems clear that this old party veteran wanted them 
all to keep this in mind, as he started his report. He went on to warn the Politburo of the 
accusations that would come from many quarters, and the nature of these attacks. Many 
would accuse the party of aligning itself with Moscow – in effect, of being fifth columnist and 
traitorous.  Therefore, he recommended that the party and its press should seek to inform and 
help the public to understand what was happening. Plissonnier’s final words reveal a deep 
understanding of the system he was a part of:  
Though our Party bears no responsibility for these events, though it is not tied to them in any fashion, it is 
nevertheless subjected to political assaults. It seems to us that we cannot act differently and that we shall 
continue to act in the spirit of responsibility and the spirit of class, and not claim responsibility that is not ours. 
The report by Plissonnier addressed several issues that were to be much discussed in the 
weeks to follow, both by the party and by French media. Plissonnier mentioned two things in 
particular which became a matter of debate. First, he compared the invasion of Afghanistan 
with that of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Plissonnier found the two invasions very different; they 
hardly bore a resemblance to each other at all. He was right, of course, based on the 
information he had available. To Plissonnier, an invasion that sought to help a regime that 
58 
 
fought feudalism and promoted progress would be legitimate in a way the Soviet intervention 
of Czechoslovakia could never be – as in the latter event, the progressive forces were the ones 
who were suppressed! Secondly, he voiced his concern over the visit conducted by the PCF 
leadership to Moscow, which was scheduled to take place later in January. He concluded that 
it was vital to make it clear that this visit had been planned for some time – and it was a part 
of the party’s dedication to international cooperation and the global political activity in which 
the PCF took part. Georges Marchais and his delegation were to go to Moscow “...ni pour 
accuser, ni pour s’aligner ou cautionner.” (“..[N]either to accuse, nor to align itself or to 
caution.”)145 
A second Politburo meeting was held only three days later, on the 7 January.  It was a brief 
meeting, and the topic of discussion was a planned joint statement from the communist parties 
in Europe to declare themselves firmly against the placing of American missiles on European 
soil. There had been broad consensus on this matter, but now it seemed that something had 
changed. A shift in loyalties. The meeting report stated, not without an air of regret, that the 
party would “...consider, because of the views of the Italian Communist Party (the PCI) – 
which present difficulties for a broad initiative – it was right that our Party refuses to propose 
a meeting of the communist parties of Europe for a common stance on the Euro missiles.”146 
This was not the first time the PCI had chosen a different path than the PCF, and the tension 
between these two parties was tangible throughout the history of the Communist International 
and in later years. Here, following the invasion of Afghanistan, the conflict resurfaced, a 
conflict that this time had consequences for the common project of Eurocommunism. Unlike 
similar situations in the past, when it was the PCI that had most often been perceived to stray 
from the unison communist path – this time it was the PCF that abandoned their European 
counterparts.  
Another three meetings were held in the Politburo in January, and every meeting seemed to 
add elements to the events that unfolded. The visit to Moscow was discussed, and plans to 
publish the results of the visit were put forward. A suggestion was made to organize for a 
Soviet parliamentary delegation to come to the National Assembly to clarify the Soviet 
intentions with regards to Afghanistan. This idea would naturally be at the initiative of the 
Franco-Soviet friendship committee in the Assembly. Towards the end of January, as the PCF 
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declared with sadness that a campaign of anti-sovietism was waged by the bourgeois French 
media, the party now had to put their efforts into persuading the French public not to support 
an alarming idea that had come from Washington, namely that in response to the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan the Summer Olympics in Moscow of that year should be 
boycotted.
147
 
The Secretariat 
The Secretariat’s first meeting in 1980 took place on the 9 January. The most important 
subject discussed was this; how to counter the claim set forward by the party’s opponents that 
the PCF had changed its policies and was now aligned with Moscow? Several courses of 
action were decided upon; the party was to “denounce in an offensive fashion” the charges 
levelled at it, using the communist press – specifically L’Humanité – to fight back these 
claims, then inform the public of what really happened in Afghanistan, and finally declare that 
the Socialist Party – the PS – was abandoning le Programme commun – the Common 
Program – and was losing the trust of their rank-and-file. Plans were also made for 
membership campaigns and campaigns of enlightenment and information directed at the 
followers of the party as well as active members on a local level. Furthermore, the Secretariat, 
commenting on the international situation, stated in its report that “the events in Afghanistan 
present a hard blow for the United States. In effect, all imperialist activity since the Soviet 
intervention shows that their plans have failed.” The report ends in an optimistic fashion, 
though it voices a minor concern over those perpetual few who will always insist on rocking 
the boat;  
In the present political situation, the vast majority of the followers approves and supports the standpoints of the 
Party. A small number of comrades ask themselves and try to understand the present events. A very small 
faction, traditionally in opposition to the Party, continues to attack it. Some even occasionally use insult. 
The Secretariat also reminded the Party that the intense class struggle seen in France at this 
time was a direct consequence of the crisis faced by French society, and the aggressiveness 
shown by weakened imperialist forces worldwide.
148
  
 
The next meeting in the Secretariat was held a full two weeks later, on the 24 January. The 
report declared that “everything shows that the Party’s position is just in all political 
questions.” It went on to state that all illusions with regards to the PS were shattered following 
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the statements made by the PS and its leader, François Mitterrand. The PS had shown itself to 
be a “profoundly anti-communist” party, and that in its dedication to the current anti-Soviet, 
anti-communist vogue it had moved decisively to the right and was therefore grossly 
misleading its electorate and the French public. The Secretariat went on to discuss how the 
party could make a greater effort in the French peace movement – le Mouvement de la Paix – 
following the statements made by the movement concerning the events in Afghanistan. The 
party also wished to attract the support of intellectuals, and benefit from their scientific 
standing, as well as their signatures. Focus was put on the campaign to prevent France from 
boycotting the Olympic Games. Finally, the Secretariat noted with satisfaction that 
membership numbers were rising, and wished to see the positive trend continued. It 
concluded; “…in the current difficult political battle, the followers of the Party behave 
well.”149  
The Central Committee 
The first Central Committee meeting of the year took place on 21 and 22 January. The PCF 
had already been through some rough weeks, and there was a great deal of information the 
Committee needed to digest upon returning to party work after the holidays. A report written 
by Maxime Gremetz, counting nearly a hundred pages, was presented to the Committee. The 
report must have been a disappointing read to the members of the Committee determined to 
continue the PCF’s move away from the CPSU. It is remarkably meek and one-sided.  On 
pages eight and nine in the report, Gremetz claimed that it was beyond contestation that 
“…the development of the socialist countries is today more than ever linked to improvement, 
to democratization, to the decentralization of their social organization, goals set by the various 
economic reforms that are under way there.” He went on to praise the positive contribution of 
socialism worldwide, and especially its contribution to peace. Only two years earlier, in April 
1978, the Politburo had declared: “Since the 22th Congress, the situation in the majority of the 
socialist countries has not improved but deteriorated, as is demonstrated by a number of facts 
that are contrary to the socialist democracy and to the liberties.”150 In his report of 1980, 
Gremetz repeatedly denounced the current anti-communist and anti-Soviet campaigns being 
waged in Western media.  
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The report went on to condemn China, in a style reminiscent of Soviet rhetoric, then the 
United States (how dared the Americans lecture the Soviets on imperialism?), and finally, 
over five pages, the report argued the PCF’s dissatisfaction with the PCI – one of its supposed 
European partners. Gremetz then moved on to the PCF’s official meeting with President 
Brezhnev in Moscow, and the former was pleased to underline “…the exceptional importance 
to which the CPSU attached this visit by Georges Marchais and the delegation.” Brezhnev had 
himself brought up the issue of Afghanistan, and he had been adamant that the invasion 
“…had not been an easy decision to make, (…) but, ultimately, one could not do otherwise.” 
He said that when military aid was asked for, “…we could not continue to refuse…” Late in 
the report, Gremetz recounts a noteworthy conversion between Marchais and what is 
presumably Brezhnev himself, or another top CPSU official. Keeping in mind the beliefs of 
many people and organizations – including communist parties – that the Soviet Union was 
going back on its commitment to peace, Marchais had asked “gravely,” a “question in 
confidence.” He wanted to know if these beliefs had any basis. The answer was “…nette et 
affirmative: l’URSS veut la paix…”  
 
As for the PCF’s own opinion on the subject of Afghanistan, Gremetz was clear: “Should not 
the progressive forces of this country have the right to defend themselves (…) when 
Afghanistan, facing imperialist interference, invokes the Treaty it has signed with the Soviet 
Union!” Assumingly without noticing that he was about to contradict himself, Gremetz also 
repeated that “…Our Party has, in grave circumstances, made a clear and responsible 
decision. We have reaffirmed our unswerving attachment to the principles of sovereignty and 
the free disposition of peoples, [and] to non-interference.” Finally he declared that “…nous, 
nous sommes avec tous les peuples en lutte.”151 The political outcome of these meetings in the 
PCF leadership was, despite warnings and a premonition as to what might come of it, that the 
PCF would support the Afghan people’s struggle for progress, i.e. that it therefore stood by 
the Soviet Union’s decision to intervene in aid of an ally. As the Central Committee itself 
declared, 
Committed as we are to international solidarity, this great tradition that runs like a red thread through our history, 
there can be when people fight neither neutrality nor equidistance. We cannot confuse non-interference and non-
intervention (an idea that evokes tragic memories). It is not and it never will be in question for us to leave the 
ground free for imperialist interference, and let people alone face the reactionary and imperialist project of 
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restoration. Yes, every people should have the right to be master of its destiny. That means to inseparably refuse 
both exportation of the revolution and importation of the counter-revolution.
152 
The reaction of France – and of the world 
It soon became clear that the PCF’s response was not in line with the attitudes adopted by the 
other political parties in France, the Western communist parties, the Western states, the 
communist regimes belonging to the Chinese bloc, and the non-alignment nations.
153
 The vast 
majority – 104 against 18, with 30 abstentions – of the membership nations in the UN 
protested against the invasion.
154
 On the 14 January, after five days of meetings concerning 
the invasion, the UN General Assembly passed its first in a series of resolutions expressing its 
discontent with the Soviets, and calling for a withdrawal of Soviet troops. The UN Security 
Council was prevented from officially condemning the invasion, as the Soviet Union, one of 
its five permanent members, vetoed any such motion. The Chinese communist bloc 
condemned the invasion in harsh words, and the independent communist regimes followed 
suit – Albania and Yugoslavia amongst others. Cuba was displeased with the invasion, and 
other Marxist countries, or Marxist-friendly states such as Romania and India refrained from 
casting their votes in the UN Assembly. The non-alignment nations were also outraged as 
Afghanistan was generally counted as one of them – a neutral country. Western military and 
political analysts found this particularly worrying – Afghanistan was not within the traditional 
Soviet sphere of influence, and therefore not covered by the Brezhnev Doctrine. The 
Doctrine, which stated that Moscow had a right and a moral duty to intervene in countries 
whose communist regimes were threatened by foreign or internal forces, did not apply to the 
non-alignment nations, regardless of them being run by communist governments. The 
criticisms directed at the Soviet Union at this time therefore had an element of fear in them; as 
well as being a violation of international law the invasion was interpreted by many as a sign 
that Soviet foreign policy had entered a new and more aggressive phase.  
The threat that the invasion might jeopardize the détente efforts between the two superpowers 
was a chief concern also for the European communist parties. In their near-unanimous 
condemnation of the invasion, they focused in equal measure on the danger it posed to the 
peace efforts and the illegality of it. Shortly after the invasion, the PCE and the PCI 
condemned it publically, the PCE in an article in the Mundo Obrero and the PCI in an 
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editorial in L’Unità, published on 29 December.155 On the 30th, Paolo Bufalini, one of the PCI 
leaders, made a speech in Cologne where he repeated his party’s stand on Afghanistan. A 
statement from the PCI leadership, published on 4 January, 1980, declared that “…It is not 
admissible to violate the integrity and the sovereignty of States to uphold reactionary regimes, 
neither to export the revolution, [nor] to punish, or to prevent more or less hypothetical 
threats.”156 Furthermore, the PCI pointed out, a regime that needed to seek foreign military aid 
in order to maintain control, could not be judged to have sufficient popular support for it to be 
entirely legitimate.
157
 The PCI also stressed the importance of re-establishing and improving 
the relations between the USA and the Soviet Union. The PCE, though it condemned the 
Soviet Union, at the same time deprived the Western imperialists of any right to condemn the 
Soviets, taking into consideration their own miserable track records in that field. The British 
communist party sided with the Afghan people in an editorial in the Morning Star on 31 
December, 1979. While it pointed out that it supported the Afghan people in its struggle 
against feudalism, it also made abundantly clear that a military intervention was not the best 
way to achieve success, and would only be used to promote the cause of forces opposed to 
progress.
158
  
The French political parties were equally unanimous in their disapproval. The PS issued a 
communiqué on 2 January in which the party stated that it “...condemns this intervention as it 
has condemned the American interventions in Southeast Asia and Latin America or the 
interventions of the French government in Africa.”159 The Mouvement radicaux de gauche, 
the MRG, was less diplomatic in its statement, declaring that with this “flagrant interference” 
in Afghanistan's affairs the Soviet Union was attempting to deprive the country of its right to 
“master its own destiny.”160 The Force Ouvrière – one of France’s leading workers’ unions – 
believed the invasion proved “...the imperialist character of the USSR.” The organization took 
the opportunity to call for greater authority to be given to the UN, stating that it was high time 
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this international organization was given more power.
161
 L’Union pour la démocratie 
française – the UDF, France’s largest centre-right party – considered the invasion to be a 
threat to world peace and to the stability of Asia. Furthermore, it soon became clear that 
President Giscard d’Estaing and the French government would echo US President Carter in 
his disappointment in the Soviet Union, the latter declaring that he had “profoundly changed 
his opinion of it,” as well as calling the invasion “…the greatest threat to international peace 
since World War II.”162 On 3 January the Bulletin Quotidien reported that foreign secretary 
Jean François-Poncet was calling home Georges Perruche, France’s ambassador to 
Afghanistan.
163
   
As sanctions against the Soviet Union were being discussed and the invasion was condemned 
worldwide, French media and politicians turned to the PCF, asking it to explain itself and its 
position – though not always in such diplomatic terms. The PCF’s decision to support the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan sparked angry debate and astonishment in France and 
discontent amongst the Eurocommunists. The criticisms directed at the PCF following its 
support for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan came from all corners of French politics and 
French society. The gravest accusation, from which all other accusations stemmed, was the 
claim that the PCF acted as a spokesperson for Soviet politics. However, the phrase in the 
Secretariat’s meeting report from 9 January suggests that the critics accused the Party of 
changing their politics to be in alignment with Moscow.
 164
 That would presuppose that PCF 
politics at the time was not necessarily a reflection of or in tune with Soviet policy, and that 
the support for the Afghan invasion was indicative of a decisive and, from a French point of 
view, unwanted shift in PCF policy. Indeed, the PCF did its best in the turbulent weeks and 
months to come to convince the French public that supporting a political ally, was not the 
same as being in ideological alignment with it.   
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Chapter 6. The PCF, 1980-81 – the Aftermath of Afghanistan 
 
“Seul contre tous” 
 “Alone against all” 
Bittersweet success – the communiqué that disappeared 
January 1980 proved to be an eventful month for the PCF. On 7 January, a PCF delegation 
flew to Moscow for its five day visit. Robrieux describes how Marchais was given a royal 
welcome, with full honours, received like a head of state by Ponomarev and Suslov, and given 
more time with Brezhnev than had been bestowed on Giscard d’Estaing during his visit to the 
Soviet Union. Brezhnev proved himself to be a good psychologist, as both he and Marchais 
were aware of the honour this was for the latter.
165
 The visit was a success for both parties. 
Especially so for the PCF, as Marchais came home to France on 12 January bringing back a 
joint CPSU-PCF communiqué with no less than revolutionary contents. As Gremetz pointed 
out in his report to the Central Committee; although Brezhnev had said “…We have [our] 
differences (…) but one must not exaggerate them,” Gremetz went to state that “…This 
communiqué represents (…) an important text, as, until now, the CPSU has never signed such 
a text that recognized in the least the existence of divergences between the CPSU and another 
communist party. As such, it is the recognition of the diversity in the international communist 
movement and a change with regards to the monolithic nature of it…”166 This was a repetition 
of the statement made by Politburo member Paul Laurent in a radio interview with famed 
French journalist Joseph Paletou earlier in the month, in which he asserted that the 
communiqué was in line with the policies of 23
th 
PCF Congress (which, in their turn, were a 
continuation of the decisions made at the 22
th
 Congress), and that it confirmed the 
independence of the PCF. He made it quite clear that there were major issues of which the 
two parties had differing opinions, and it is equally safe to conclude that he wished in the 
present situation to focus precisely on these differences – as the topic of discussion was the 
invasion of Afghanistan.
167
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Problems – the French reaction to the PCF’s decision 
Although the communiqué was indeed a triumph, obtained by no communist before them, the 
leaders of the PCF foresaw trouble. First and foremost, it was important to stress that the visit 
by the PCF delegation to Moscow had not been a fire-extinguishing exercise, but a friendly 
meeting between two sister parties. Furthermore, speaking of the anti-communist sentiments 
the invasion had stirred up in France, Gaston Plissonnier noted that “…It cannot be concealed 
that the exploitation of this situation, against the USSR, affects us, too.” And later, knowing 
that the PCF’s decision could cause some uneasiness amongst the party’s own rank-and-file, 
he added; “We will no doubt have members (Paris – intellectuals) which will try to push for a 
condemnation.” He went on to advice caution in which manner the visit to Moscow was to be 
reported in the communist press, keenly aware of the unfortunate timing of it.
168
 The PCF 
went on to do its best to distance itself not only from Soviet policy, but also from the invasion 
itself. Marchais tried to make this point in an interview, when he said, “The Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union is a major party that determines its policy in complete independence; the 
PCF is a party that determines its policy in complete independence.”169 Laurent echoed this 
sentiment only a few days later in his interview. “…only because we are an independent party 
in the European Assembly in Strasbourg,” he began, when Paletou interrupted him and asked, 
“Seul contre tous?” This phrase, meaning “alone against all,” was used both by and of the 
PCF, especially at times in French history when the communists had found themselves – 
politically – more isolated than usual.170 Laurent defiant response was that “…we do not need 
to take advice from anyone to assert the positions of the French Communist Party.”171 
However, with the PCF being the only political party in France, indeed one of the few parties 
in Western Europe who supported the invasion, it became increasingly difficult for the PCF to 
hide from a rising current of more or less rational accusations.  
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The criticisms of the PCF started even before the party had published its official position. On 
New Year’s Day, French news broadcast an interview with Edmond Maire, the powerful 
leader of the CFDT – France’s largest workers’ union. He was quite unequivocal in his 
verdict; “…we sincerely wish that the communist party stops this unconditional alignment to 
Soviet foreign policy.” He lamented this “…regression” of the PCF, this “regrettable 
evolution.”172 
 
The PCF could not fully protect itself from one of their own, either. Secretary General 
Marchais alone was responsible for one of the most controversial incidents marking the 
debate of 1980, and the one who served to cement many people’s view of the PCF as 
essentially a Soviet, and Stalinist, satellite. In defence of the PCF, however, it must be added 
that Marchais’ actions were most likely neither pre-approved by the party leadership nor 
approved by it afterwards. On 11 January, Marchais was interviewed by French television 
from Moscow. The interview was broadcast on France’s channel TF1, the result of which 
Robrieux, supporting the conclusion of Jean-Luc Parodi, French political scientist, declared 
was detrimental to the PCF, as it now faced “…un recul profond et généralisé.”173 The day 
after the interview, the PCF plunged to a record low in a popularity poll; 70 % of the French 
public was now negative to the PCF.
174
 Robrieux gives an altogether damning verdict of 
Marchais’ behaviour during the televised interview. His language was uncompromising, his 
air was menacing, and he even spoke like the Russian leaders he was visiting. On the issue of 
Afghanistan, he promptly denied that any military invasion had taken place, he claimed that 
the Afghan government had pleaded with the Soviets for months and years for help, and that 
the Soviets, after having declined several times so as to not “…aggravate the tension in that 
region of the world”, had finally given in to the Afghans’ request. Marchais then went to full-
frontal assault on the imperialist forces at work in Central Asia, especially lashing out at 
Pakistan, who worked for the Western powers in the region.
175
 Robrieux concluded; “…Too 
sure of himself, deprived of the least tact, totally cut off from popular sensitivity, the 
Secretary General had just, without realizing it, crossed a line: in intervening in this manner, 
he had committed two unpardonable mistakes, the first consisting of justifying the Soviet 
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intervention from Moscow, the second breaking his [own] records of brutality, vulgarity and 
vehemence in unjustifiable circumstances.”176 It is noteworthy that Robrieux added the two 
words from Moscow to his conclusion, suggesting that the fact that Marchais was in Moscow 
when he made his statements somehow added to the severity of his crime. It rather served to 
explain them.  
 
As Robrieux pointed out, the PCF delegation was in awe over the welcome it received from 
the CPSU and the Soviet leadership.
177
 Being in Moscow – the heart of the socialist world – 
would have had an immense impact on the French communists, immersed as they were in 
Soviet propaganda, standing face to face with some of the most powerful men on the planet, 
and surrounded by all the splendour “la Moscou sainte” could muster to sweep them off their 
feet. It may seem like a statement of the obvious, but it is important, especially when 
analyzing this situation, to stress the relative relationship between the PCF and the CPSU. 
The PCF was a modest political party with an electorate of just over 20 % of the French 
population. It did not represent a country, only itself and the interests of its voters. The CPSU 
was the political power of the Soviet Union, the world’s largest political unity and one of the 
two global superpowers. When President Brezhnev, ruler of more than 22 million square 
kilometres, nearly 300 million people and an unknown number of nuclear warheads, saw fit to 
receive Marchais no less than three times for talks during the latter’s five day visit, Marchais 
would naturally feel privileged, and grateful. When met with such benevolence, honour and 
warmth, it would be difficult, and perhaps also deemed unwise, to sour relations by criticizing 
one’s host. And when Brezhnev talked, should one not assume that he spoke the truth about 
issues he himself had brought up? The CPSU made the PCF feel important, by – at least 
pretend to be – valuing its opinions.  
 
Although the bond between the PCF and the CPSU was ideological in origin and in essence, it 
was political in nature and expression. The PCF’s ties to the CPSU transcended into loyalty to 
the Soviet Union. Over the years, the respect for the First Socialist Country and the country of 
the October Revolution had cemented a cultural and historical bond – based on the courage 
and vision demonstrated in launching the greatest social experiment in history, and a deep 
respect for the paramount role played by the Soviet Union in defeating Nazism. Paradoxically, 
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the PCF seemed to gradually have come to regard the socialist utopia not as an achievable 
future goal, but as a glorified version of Soviet’s past. True communism had become the 
means, not the goal, and the means was honest, idealistic class struggle. This belief, however 
unconsciously arrived at, is illustrated by the revolutionary rhetoric the PCF used, and its 
return to the Stalinist solutions of its predecessors when challenged politically.  
 
It was not only the CPSU that sought the confidences of the PCF. Via the Bulgarian 
Communist Party came a letter to the PCF from the Central Committee of the PDPA. 
Considering that the Bulgarian Communist Party was close to the Soviet leadership, and 
taking into account the wording of the letter, it is safe to assume that the CPSU was not 
entirely unaware of the letter’s existence. In it, the PDPA addressed itself to “…you, dear 
friends, for help and support, for, at this moment, nothing is so necessary to us than the 
fraternal solidarity of revolutionaries…” It went on to inform the PCF of what really went on 
in Afghanistan, including giving an explanation as to why the PDPA had chosen to “…oust, 
convict and execute Amin,” who was described as bloodthirsty, oppressive and a “…fierce 
nationalist.” The Afghan communists had chosen to ask the Soviets for military aid, and their 
aim was to stabilize the country, and save the revolution. The letter finished with a heartfelt 
appeal: “We count on your aid and your support in word and in deed, we believe in your anti-
imperialist solidarity.”178 The PCF clearly took the letter to heart, or, depending on when the 
letter arrived, was already perceptible to its contents, as one of the sentences in it, “…no 
revolutionary can remain indifferent and passive faced with the ideological and political 
counter-revolutionary manipulation against Afghanistan and its loyal friends,” rings 
remarkably similar to the wording in Gremetz’ report that he presented to the Central 
Committee on 21 January.   
 
While the PCF’s own actions were the main cause of the party’s political isolation in France, 
it was not all the PCF’s own doing. Realizing that the public opinion was massively against 
the PCF, its main rival for the Left electorate, the PS, did its best – and succeeded – in making 
political capital out of the Afghanistan issue. Its reaction to the invasion was in line with that 
of the Western (often conservative) governments, including the French. When President 
Giscard d’Estaing expressed his fear that this invasion might have made the world a more 
dangerous place, the PS had agreed, and the PCF scornfully attacked the PS, who, in 
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“…howling with the wolves (…), participates greatly in the campaign of dramatizing the 
international situation launched by the Elysée…”179 Paul Laurent went even further, accusing 
the PS of being more Catholic than the Pope, as it were, when he stated that “…now, the 
Socialist Party thinks that in the Afghan affair Giscard d’Estaing is soft, [and] that the French 
diplomacy is creeping.”180 PCF documents from 1980 all testify to the profound disapproval 
of the PS in the communist party, and the task the PCF took upon itself in informing the 
French public of the PS’s true, bourgeois nature. Much of the PCF leadership debates in 1980 
– as had been the case also in the previous years – would revolve around the PS. The PCF 
understood full well that from the moment the Common Program collaboration broke down, 
the two parties would become each other’s fiercest enemies. This, however, did not prevent 
the PCF from publically declaring its dedication to the Union of the Left on several occasions, 
proving that the PS had caused the split – that the PS had betrayed the Left. Marchais’ 
damning verdict serves to illustrate the PCF’s attitude;  
You know, the fall of the Union of the Left, it was François Mitterrand who crushed it, in 1977. (…) In 1975 
(…) a delegation from the Socialist Party went to the Soviet Union, led by François Mitterrand. It signed a joint 
communiqué with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In this joint communiqué, François Mitterrand had 
noted the progress made by the Soviet Union on its socialist path. And voilà, today, or rather tomorrow, the PS 
will sign a document in which it says: “Socialism does not exist in the Soviet Union. It exists nowhere. Blum 
was right in 1920…”181  
The PCF and the Eurocommunists, 1980-81 
Another important issue on which the PCF and the PS came to lock horns, was 
Eurocommunism. The relationship between the PCF and the Eurocommunist parties was 
strained already before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the different reactions to the 
invasion revealed how far from each other the Western European communist parties stood, 
especially the PCF and the PCI – two parties that had always been separated by a vast 
ideological gulf, particularly with regards to their respective ties to the CPSU and how they 
viewed the Soviet Union. On 5 January, 1980, two days before Marchais was due to travel to 
Moscow he had a meeting with PCI leader Berlinguer and a delegation of Italian communists. 
Considering both the PCF’s disapproval of the PCI’s stand on Afghanistan as outlined in 
Gremetz’ report to the Central Committee,182 and the very diplomatic wording by Marchais 
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when he gave his account of the meeting to L’Humanité, it is safe to deduce that any great 
agreement did not exist between them; “…Each speaks for himself. (…) Comrade Berlinguer 
(PCI) informed me of his position and I informed him of mine. The fact remains that we are 
very good friends.”183 Only five days earlier, the Politburo had lamented the “difficulty” 
posed by the stand taken by the PCI. As mentioned in an earlier chapter, the PCF deemed the 
PCI to stand in the way for a “broad initiative.”184 This attitude was an echo of the PCF’s 
relationship with the PS, and with the CPSU in the late 1970s: the PCF itself was blameless in 
any conflict. It merely wished to execute its policies in accordance with the Marxist-Leninist 
principles that had always been at the basis of its political and moral convictions.  
 
The PCF seemed at this point quite detached from the Eurocommunist project. It is 
questionable whether the PCF ever had any serious intentions of going wholeheartedly into 
the collaboration. The general view amongst historians is that it had not. Indeed, Courtois and 
Lazar declare outright that the PCF had discarded the entire project as early as 1978, when 
Marchais in a speech at the PCF 23
rd
 Congress in May had hailed the socialist world led by 
the Soviet Union as “presenting a “globally positive balance sheet.”185 Marchais’ words in 
French – un “bilan globalement positif” – have become infamous in French communist 
history. However, if the PCF had positively decided against Eurocommunism, it is remarkable 
that there is not a single clear statement to that effect in the party documents. Furthermore, the 
PCF seemed to disapprove of statements declaring Eurocommunism to be dead, or 
accusations that the PCF had damaged the Eurocommunist project. However, nothing 
suggests that the PCF was prepared to fight for the Eurocommunist efforts, either. In undated 
notes by Gaston Plissonnier and Georges Marchais on foreign politics, the two leaders simply 
stated that an anti-PCF campaign was waged in French media, accusing the PCF of being a 
Stalinist Moscow puppet, and declaring Eurocommunism dead because of the differences 
between the PCI and the PCE, and the PCF.
186
  
 
When PCF Central Committee member André Lajoinie was interviewed by Joseph Paletou on 
his radio program Parlons clair on 26 March, 1980, Paletou stated that “…les communistes 
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italiens lâchent Marchais!”187 He did not receive any reply. He went on to say that the PCF 
must now be regarded as political isolated and alone – still no reply from Lajoinie. It is 
noteworthy that Paletou focuses on Marchais, and not the PCF, as he refers to the PCI. This 
serves to strengthen the belief that Marchais’ position in the PCF was so strong that he 
seemed if not alone in dictating policy, then strong enough to see his motions carried out. 
 
The following day, the French independent radio channel Europe 1 broadcast that the 
relationship between the PCF and the PCI was deteriorating. Journalist Étienne Mougeotte 
declared: “If Afghanistan contributed to kill Eurocommunism, [then] the Berlinguer – 
Mitterrand meeting has sealed its burial.”188 The meeting between the leaders of the PCI and 
the PS respectively took place in the European Parliament in Strasbourg on 24 March, and 
Marchais’ deep public disapproval led observers to conclude that the PCF had “made official 
its de facto break with the Eurocommunist line.”189 It is interesting that very little is said on 
the subject in the PCF’s own documents. Apart from the usual, evenly distributed attacks on 
the PS, the PCF’s meeting reports in 1980 say almost nothing about the relations with other 
European communist parties – and the PCF never assumed any responsibility for the failure of 
Eurocommunism.
190
 However, the prevailing opinion amongst observers was that the PCF 
had irreparably damaged any serious attempt at a working communist cooperation in Europe. 
From the PCF’s point of view, the situation looked very different. To disagree on a political 
issue, in the PCF’s opinion, had to be accepted as a natural occurrence between two 
communist parties – without it raising suspicions of a break, or a serious conflict. When it was 
claimed that the Eurocommunist project had suffered from the Afghanistan affair, it was clear 
proof to the PCF that such an acceptance was still not recognized. It was the conflict of 
divergence with the CPSU all over again, and again the PCF felt ideologically betrayed and 
politically misunderstood.  
Support and self-defence – the PCF mobilizes the press 
The PCF – and especially its leadership – felt victimized, not an altogether unfounded 
sensation, however self-inflicted it might have been. The support of the Soviet Union had 
yielded few positive results and given the PCF much trouble. The French communists felt 
                                                          
187
 ”…the Italian communists let Marchais go!” 
188
 Transcription of radio program, broadcast on Europe 1, 27.03.80. CCCP, dossier “Affaires Fiszbin.” 
189
 “Berlinguer-Mitterrand meeting provokes PCF-PCI polemics”, Internet, 2.  
190
 It must be noted here that the Politburo records covering the period from September through December, 1980, 
have not been made available to the public as of 2011.  
73 
 
abandoned by the European communists, unfairly accused by the French media, and generally 
misunderstood. One of the ways in which the PCF sought to justify itself and present a 
contrasting picture to the events in and concerning Afghanistan, was to mobilize its press.   
The PCF and its leadership launched several major press campaigns as a response to the 
public outrage following its supports of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. All these 
campaigns were followed up in the communist newspapers, especially L'Humanité, and all of 
them focused on the perceived injustice suffered by the Soviet Union and/or the PCF in 
French "bourgeois" media.  
 
The first was simply an information campaign, a series of in-depth news articles and reports 
on the actual situation in Afghanistan and the events that took place there. At a meeting with 
Afghan comrades in Paris – members of the Parcham faction of the PDPA – on 3 January, 
1980, the PCF was invited to send a journalist to Afghanistan, to which the party accepted.
191
 
At a meeting in August of the same year, the Politburo repeated the need for information on 
Afghanistan, and it was decided to keep a reporter permanently in the country.
192
 The French 
communist reporters present in Kabul were to paint an objective and moderate picture of a 
country believed by the Western world to be in a state of chaos and anarchy. The articles were 
also written to show that the Soviet forces were not in Afghanistan in the capacity of an 
invader or an occupant, but as a friend, coming to the rescue of an ally in need.  
 
In January, L’Humanité Dimanche sent one of its reporters to Afghanistan. Martine Monod 
wrote several long articles in which she presented the “real Afghanistan,” in order to enlighten 
the French public. In an article series called Dossiers Secrets, Monod and other journalists 
described in detail Kabul, their journeys inland and the atmosphere of the country. In June, 
one could read how “…Kabul stupefies the Western traveller. He searches there in vain for 
the besieged capital, surrounded by Soviet troops (…) No fighting in the mountains above the 
city. Everything is calm…”193 Earlier in the year, when the attacks on the Soviet Union were 
at their harshest and most frequent in Western media, Monod had also lashed out at the 
Western journalists in Afghanistan, who claimed to be reporting back the truth about the war. 
They did not travel around the country, she wrote, they did not even leave their hotel, a luxury 
resort in the middle of Kabul, protected by security guards, high fences and barbed wire: 
                                                          
191
 Note on PCF’s meeting with Afghan communists in Paris,, 03.01.80. Fonds Plissonnier, I. 
192
 Politburo, 05.08.80 
193
 L’Humanité Dimanche, 20.06.80 
74 
 
“…The Hotel Intercontinental is on the outside of Afghan reality. To stay here, is to be very 
far from Afghanistan.”194 In February, a French traveller in Kabul was interviewed by 
L’Humanité Dimanche. He claimed that he “…had not seen any Soviet soldiers” in the 
capital. The same edition quoted the correspondent from Associated Press, who had 
interviewed a Soviet officer; “The Soviet Command,” he concluded, “does not, it seems, have 
any intention of throwing itself into a guerrilla war.
195
 
 
The PCF’s press and its journalistic approach to the invasion of Afghanistan were, and should 
be, a reflection of official PCF policy.
196
 On the issue of Afghanistan, the aim was clearly to 
play down the Soviets’ role in the country, and instead focus on the achievements of the 
Afghan people and regime. A picture was painted of a calm and quiet country, where, 
paradoxically, the struggle by the progressive forces – aided by the Soviets – against 
backwardness nearly drowned in the romantic sheen of a pre-modern life near the roof of the 
world. The journalists described Afghanistan as though they were travelling in the footsteps 
of Marco Polo, on an exotic journey through lands of legend where time had stood still for 
centuries. In addition to being strictly one-sided in its approach to the subject-matter, there 
was altogether a degree of immaturity, or rather naivety, over several aspects of the 
journalism. A prime example is Monod’s moving descriptions of the young soldiers who 
“…mobilize to defend the [Karmal’s] regime.” She painted them in the colours of idealist 
struggle, called on to defend their country and their future in a free nation; “…Chacun 
prématurément muri par la brusque intrusion de la lutte armée dans sa vie.”197 The romantic 
sheen of revolutionary struggle against a superior enemy would appeal to a sense of occasion, 
and of history, but would to more cynical observers be seen as evidence of a journalist who 
had not understood the grim realities of war.   
 
The campaign was impressive, and could convince anyone but the most well-informed reader. 
And, however one-sided it was, the PCF could always argue that the clear anti-Soviet agenda 
propagated by the bourgeois media and its journalists did not render their articles completely 
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objective, either. L’Humanité focused on topics that Western politicians left out when 
discussing the war, such as the profound illiberal and undemocratic policies advocated by the 
rebels that Western governments had given their support to – scornfully called les féodaux – 
the feudalists – by the communist press.  
The PCF between ideological considerations and political loyalty 
When analyzing the PCF’s press campaign, one question springs to mind: Did the PCF – 
above all its leadership – believe in it? As the Politburo documents outlined in chapter 5 
reveal, controversy was expected if the PCF decided to side with Moscow. Charges of a 
Soviet alignment would (re)surface, accusations would come. Emphasising the importance of 
neither openly supporting the invasion, nor condemning it, would suffice to prove that the 
PCF was full aware of the dilemma it found itself in. Such a display of hesitation would 
indicate that the PCF did question the legitimacy of the invasion, and felt trapped between the 
party’s ideological beliefs and its political commitments. And therein lay the root to the 
predicament.  
 
War – indeed any display of military aggression – was categorically denounced by Marxist 
teachings as an imperialist act that only served to enrich the already rich, impoverish the 
already poor, perpetuate the capitalist system and keep the smaller, vulnerable nations in 
subjection to the great powers. War from above – i.e. not the armed revolt of the oppressed 
masses, but the political tactic employed by bourgeois governments – was therefore contrary 
to Marxist thought, and in breach of communist conduct. The PCF had fought aggressors 
before, both at home and in its press against imperialist warfare the world over. But how to 
react when the great power invading a small country was a socialist state, and the PCF’s old, 
political ally? The PCF had lashed out at socialist countries at war before – most recently 
when China sent troops into Vietnam. On the issue of Afghanistan, the PCF had to base its 
decision on very vague information. Had the Afghans sent a genuine, legitimate appeal to the 
Soviets for military aid, the invasion might be correct – though it would raise more questions 
on the legitimacy of the Afghan regime. Was there no such demand made, however, then the 
Soviet Army had crossed the border without permission from the Afghans themselves, and the 
invasion was clearly illegal.  
 
76 
 
Whatever the reason(s) for the PCF’s hesitation, there was undoubtedly an element of genuine 
confusion in its leadership, and one cannot help but suspect that the French communist press, 
in reporting on the Afghanistan affair, intentionally or unintentionally had its facts crossed. In 
an interview with TF1 on 11 January, 1980 – quoted in its entirety in L’Humanité on the 
following day – Marchais was asked “who, in Afghanistan, had made the appeal to the 
Soviets?” To which Marchais responded that he had put precisely this question to Brezhnev, 
and the response had been “clear”: “Amin himself had asked the Soviet government to 
intervene.”198 This was an extraordinary declaration, both in view of earlier assessments made 
by the PCF on the subject, statements by the CPSU, and the general opinion of Amin as a 
dictator who cared little for the Soviets and had threatened to destroy the revolution in 
Afghanistan. As described by Ouimet, Amin did request for Soviet troops to protect him 
while he stayed in the capital, and the request was granted. But it is highly unlikely that Amin 
could have foreseen that these same 500 men would storm his palace only weeks later – even 
less likely that he approved. Furthermore, it is clear that one must render Amin’s expressed 
beliefs and opinions worthless, as he was deliberately misguided by the Soviet leadership 
immediately prior to the invasion – especially regarding the reasons for Soviet troop 
movements.
199
 The PCF may have been privileged in its access to Soviet information, but in 
this particular instance there were many unknown factors. In his report to the Politburo on 4 
January, Gaston Plissonnier claimed that a coup against Amin had been planned for 26 
December, but that this had been rendered superfluous by the Soviet invasion.
200
 This fact, 
originating from PDPA exiles in Paris, was meant to prove that the tide was turning against 
Amin, and that the Soviet intervention merely acted to help the Afghans save the revolution – 
and that the invasion was to be considered as a consequence, not as an a priori event.  
It is also important to note that the PCF itself was being misinformed by the CPSU, and this 
of course influenced the former’s decisions. In the latter’s communication to the PCF on the 
28 December, 1979, in which the CPSU Central Committee outlined its reasons for 
intervening in Afghanistan, several anomalies – or even lies – occur. Amin was described as 
the oppressive leader of an even more oppressive regime, and the CPSU had therefore decided 
to aid the new government (who?) in combating the reactionary forces that now fought Amin 
and sought to destroy socialism in Afghanistan. The Soviet troops would also be helping the 
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Afghans to counteract the military interventions from Pakistan. And finally, the CPSU 
reassured the PCF, “…in Afghanistan, there were sufficient forces to create the organization 
of a new power with Taraki and those who had fought against the royal regime.”  
The communication ended with an appeal to the PCF, an appeal that could serve to 
understand how the PCF could – still using communist doctrine – support the Soviet Union’s 
aggressive war: “The Central Committee of the CPSU took into consideration a probable 
negative reaction from imperialist states and media, but attacks from class enemies did not 
incite the USSR to refuse to respond to the demand from Afghanistan’s government. It is 
asked of the PCF to understand the necessity of carrying support to this decision by the 
USSR.”201 Ouimet writes, “…the Soviet leadership had spent the 1970s proclaiming an 
unshakable commitment to the political stability of its socialist allies. The national interests of 
the USSR, according to socialist internationalism, were indistinguishable from those of its 
allies. A threat to communist rule in any one nation constituted a threat to the entire 
community.”202 Though this principle would be used to justify acts under the Brezhnev 
Doctrine, it carried much meaning to a devout communist. Could the PCF support an invasion 
to help a fellow socialist country? Of course it could, as was expressed repeatedly by the PCF. 
The PCF had done it in the past – for example in 1956, when the Soviet intervened in 
Hungary.
203
 When Plissonnier pointed out the difference of situation between the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan and that of Czechoslovakia in 1968, he was most likely not aware of 
the historic resonance of that remark. As Lazar wrote, the PCF condemnation of the Soviet 
intervention in Czechoslovakia would be the only time in the PCF’s history that it criticized a 
Soviet foreign political decision.
204
  
 
It is possible, however, that the PCF’s concerns over the invasion was not only over the 
legitimacy of it, but the fact that the invasion would scare the West into believing that the 
Soviet Union again was on the warpath. In addition to it being the Soviets’ fear, too, this was 
indeed one of the interpretations of the invasion – as testified by US President Carter, 
France’s President Giscard d’Estaing and others, including analysts and neutral observers. 
                                                          
201
 Transcription of communication from the CPSU Central Committee to the PCF, sent on 28.12.79. Fonds 
Plissonnier, I. 
202
 Ouimet, 2003:88 
203
 Letter from the PCF to the CPSU, unsigned, declaring the PCF’s support for the Soviet operation in Hungary. 
12.11.56. Fonds Plissonnier, I.  
204
 Lazar, 2002:39 
78 
 
Such a fear would spark anti-Sovietism in Western media, and again, the PCF’s fears were 
realized. The PCF also rightly predicted that in such a maelstrom of anti-Soviet and anti-
communist criticisms, the PCF would be thrown in, too. It is important to note, however, that 
when the PCF had made its decision – however unwilling the party might have been to do it – 
it could not, and did not, attempt to hide from the accusations of alignment. Several events in 
1980 would have made it difficult, should the PCF have tried to alienate itself from the CPSU. 
In addition to Marchais’ TV interview of 11 January, a conference was put together for April 
of that year – a conference that served to cement the PCF’s stance on Afghanistan. The Paris 
Conference of European Communist Parties was a convention of Europe’s pro-Soviet parties; 
many notable communist parties were not present, amongst them the PCI, the PCE, and the 
Romanian Communist Party, the latter being especially noteworthy as it was the governing 
party of a Warsaw Pact state. The 22 parties present expressed their support to the Soviet 
Union, and agreed to the Soviet policies in Afghanistan. Deciding to hold the conference in 
Paris, with the PCF as host party, would have been the result of careful consideration on the 
Soviets’ part, taking into account both the vastly improved relations with the PCF and the 
potential influence of the latter in being a “legitimizing” element to Soviet policy. In a 
paradoxical political manoeuvre, the PCF was thus given the task of “spearheading the Soviet 
peace campaign” – initiated by the Soviets and designed to soften the image of the 
superpower in the eyes of European and global communists.
205
 Both Rubinstein and Ouimet 
argue that the conference was a Soviet attempt at reasserting its position and strength in the 
European communist movement, as well as striking a divisive blow against Eurocommunism, 
burying it for good.
206
  
 
However, the general view is that Eurocommunism had ceased to be a major concern for the 
Soviet Union even before the invasion of Afghanistan. The PCI and, to a lesser extent, the 
PCE, continued their criticisms of the CPSU and Soviet policy, but the relationship between 
the PCF and the CPSU was mended, and the division this caused within the Eurocommunist 
movement had taken place without the Soviet Union having to do more than make a political 
decision on which it proved impossible for the PCF, the PCI and the PCE to agree. The PCF 
was weak; Courtois and Lazar point out, and the hold the CPSU had over the PCF always 
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tightened when the PCF experienced problems, predominantly domestic.
207
 In this situation, it 
was the breakup of the Common Program in 1977 and the devastating election results in 1978 
that had contributed to a return to the safe predictability of the Soviet fold. Courtois and Lazar 
claim that the political failures of the PCF gave the communists a reason – or an excuse? – to 
return to their revolutionary inclinations – with radicalization as almost a therapeutic 
exercise.
208
 The PCF returned to the one stable relationship the party had ever enjoyed - that 
with the CPSU. In this regard, support for the Soviets in their war to salvage communism in 
Afghanistan would be deemed a natural course of action.  
 
A second press campaign came about as a reaction to the suggestion voiced by the American 
government to boycott the summer Olympic Games in Moscow scheduled for July and 
August, 1980. The PCF's campaign was designed to support those in favour of letting the 
games proceed as normal, and give their arguments media attention. It also strongly rejected 
this blatant attack on the Olympic peace, and criticized the American government for 
disrespectfully mixing politics with the international solidarity and apolitical harmony of 
sports in this manner. The PCF could declare victory when the French Olympic Committee, 
after much debate, voted to participate in the Games as usual. In this campaign, the PCF 
seemed to be more in tune with the sentiments of the French public.  
 
The third campaign was waged as a war, close to home. It was a reaction to the virtual hate 
campaign waged in its turn against the leadership of the PCF. The support for the Soviet 
invasion, immoral to many and incomprehensible to many more, upset a lot of people, both 
amongst public figures such as politicians, commentators and journalists, and members of the 
public. Their reactions ranged from verbal protests, based on rational arguments, to death 
threats and personal attacks. The PCF, through its newspapers, made it clear what it thought 
of these depraved actions unworthy of a democracy, and showed its unflinching support for its 
leaders who had become the victims of such a savage and irrational debate.  
 
On a Central Committee meeting in late January, Gaston Plissonnier stated that the main 
accusation against the PCF was that it was “subservient to Moscow. Obviously the argument 
is simplistic. But the charge is to see us firmly on the side of the global revolutionary 
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movement and resolutely hold the national positions.” He went on to put the current situation 
the PCF found itself in, in a broader, historical context, thereby adding legitimacy to it: “Anti-
communism is not new. It is as old and as tenacious as the Party. It is more or less virulent 
according to the sharpening of the class struggle, according to the difficulties of the 
bourgeoisie and the political stakes.”209 Tartakowsky points out how the ideological triumph 
of the PCF in bringing about the recognition of divergences into the PCF-CPSU communiqué 
was completely overshadowed by the PCF’s stance on Afghanistan.210 Where the PCF saw 
recognition of its own efforts and independence, the French media and public, to the extent 
the communiqué was noticed at all, saw only strengthened evidence to support their 
convictions that the PCF, regardless of the opportunity to disagree with the CPSU – with the 
latter’s blessing! – followed blindly where the CPSU led. To the PCF, however, the 
communiqué was important because it had initiated a new era in the important CPSU-PCF 
relations. The communiqué was an ideological breakthrough, a revolution. But the French 
media, it seemed, would not see the bigger picture – and focused on Afghanistan detached 
from any ideological considerations. To the PCF, the Afghanistan issue was clearly a burden, 
but no more than one matter of many – to its political opponents and critics it cemented their 
negative view of the PCF and gave it a historical significance. The French media put far too 
much focus on Afghanistan than the PCF liked. And more than anything, it put the spotlight 
on Georges Marchais.  
 
Marchais was the most famous French communist of his day. He was a well-known figure in 
the French media and political circles, outspoken and authoritative. Perceived as the strong 
man of the PCF, it seems natural that the press should focus on him in its criticisms of the 
party. Perhaps it was inevitable that the attacks on Marchais became personal after a while – 
his strong personality, and his omnipresence and power within the party invited to it. The PCF 
could indeed lament that the bourgeois press did not stay focused on the topics of discussion, 
and instead degraded itself by resorting to character defamations and unsporting behaviour. 
The “anti-Marchais” campaign – dubbed la machination – the fabrication – by the PCF, 
sought to discredit the PCF leader as a professional politician by portraying him as a man of 
unsavoury credentials and connections. New charges were brought forward at regular 
intervals, followed by the PCF disavowing them, one by one. There was a pattern in these 
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charges, however, all of them evolving around Marchais’ loyalties and moralities. It was 
claimed that Marchais had gone to the infamous “cadre school” in Moscow, where many 
foreign communists had been educated in the arts of the professional revolutionary. Some 
members of the PCF – former and current – had indeed attended the school, but Marchais, as 
the PCF tried to convince French media, was not one of them, as he had had political 
obligations in France that year he supposedly had been in Moscow. It descended to near farce 
when Marchais was subjected to violent accusations claiming he spoke Russian.
211
 It was by 
all accounts not true, as the PCF repeatedly stated and the use of interpreters during meetings 
with CPSU leaders would indicate, but even if it were true, it was completely irrelevant to any 
objective, political debate.   
 
The story that proved potentially most damning to Marchais’ reputation, however, had 
nothing to do with communism – Soviet Stalinism or otherwise – but questioned Marchais’ 
actions during the Nazi occupation of France. Whether the story is true or false has not yet 
been settled, although general opinion seems to favour its truth. The story declared that 
Marchais, who had for a time during the Second World War worked at the Messerschmitt 
factory in Augsburg, Bavaria, had in fact left for Germany willingly, drawn by the prospect of 
making money building fighter aircraft and bomber planes for the Reich’s Luftwaffe. Because 
Marchais had left France in December, 1942, he would not have been victim of the French 
forced labour act – a law that was not put into effect until February, 1943. Furthermore, it 
remained a mystery what Marchais had done for the remainder of the war, as he only stayed 
in Augsburg a year. Marchais was not yet a member of the PCF, and the story was discarded 
by the PCF as completely irrelevant. The party was right of course, but it did however go to 
great lengths to discredit the supposed evidence that emerged.
212
 The story serves to illustrate 
the nature of the polemic that had created a veritable abyss between the PCF and opponents in 
French media and politics.  
PCF-CPSU relations, 1980-81 
After the discussions regarding the PCF visit to Moscow were over, it is remarkable how the 
CPSU seems to disappear from the PCF documents, and, consequently, from the literature on 
the PCF in the period 1980 and ’81. The Soviet Union was mentioned in connection with the 
anti-communist, anti-Soviet campaign that the PCF did its level best to counter, and on the 
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Afghanistan issue – although not needlessly, as any unnecessary link between the two parties 
seemed to be played down. While the PCF had been left to fend for itself – and for the Soviet 
Union – the CPSU sent a message to the PCF, in June, 1980 – after several months without 
any discernible communication between the two parties.
213
 The message informed the PCF of 
a note from the Soviet government that had been sent to President Giscard d’Estaing on the 
occasion of an upcoming meeting between the latter and President Brezhnev in Warsaw, at 
which Afghanistan was to be one of the topics of discussion. The French president had been 
informed of a normalization of the situation in Afghanistan, the note said, and he had been 
told, in strict confidence, that the Soviets therefore intended to withdraw parts of its military 
contingency. The CPSU had added a message to the PCF at the bottom of the page. It 
expressed its belief that this information would help the PCF understand that it had been right 
in standing its ground against the bourgeois press in the previous difficult months. The CPSU 
did not thank the PCF for its support – which would have indicated first, that the CPSU 
admitted to have needed help, and secondly, that the conduct of the Soviet government had in 
any way been morally questionable and it had therefore appealed to an external party – 
literally – for moral backup. The CPSU merely stated that the PCF had been right, and acted 
accordingly.  
 
The message reveals more. It ended with the significantly worded phrase; “The Soviet 
comrades emphasize that the communication made to us is highly confidential.” Someone – 
presumably in the PCF – had underlined the last word of the typed message with a pen or 
pencil. Such a phrase is not uncommon in the PCF’s records, but this time, it is marked by a 
heightened sense of occasion. The CPSU had not needed to give the PCF this information, but 
in making the French communists privy to it, it gave them a sense of importance. Finally, the 
message, though short, and though practically alone in representing CPSU-PCF contact 
during this time, shows that the relationship between the CPSU and the PCF had returned to 
its harmonious, unbalanced equilibrium of mutual understanding.  
 
The great highlight of the summer of 1980 was the Olympic Games in Moscow. Marchais had 
been invited to attend the VIP stand at the Olympic stadium, and he returned home full of 
praise. L’Humanité and L’Humanité Dimanche gave the Games full coverage, and the articles 
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especially made a point of the atmosphere of the Games, the thrill of friendly competition and 
the expressions of brotherly – and sisterly – respect between the athletes.214 Upon returning 
home, Marchais and the rest of the PCF leadership began preparing for the 1981 elections, 
shaping up to be the most interesting political battle in France for years.  
 
The winter of 1980-81 was a strange one for the PCF. The party had not been so politically 
alone, neither domestically or internationally, for many years. It turned inwards, and focused 
on its domestic affairs. This of course was a response to the turmoil it faced at home, but 
seems also to have been the result of its deteriorating relations with the European communist 
parties. PCF-CPSU relations were good, at least nothing suggests otherwise. Judging by the 
document selection in the PCF archives, it seems to be a general rule that extensive and 
available correspondence between the two parties indicated the presence of a conflict. The 
depth of their friendship can therefore be difficult to determine, but the absence of the CPSU 
in PCF debates can simply be attributed to the two parties being busy with domestic affairs, 
and the former also in Afghanistan. The PCF may also have wanted to keep the CPSU at 
arm’s length, as this would harmonize with the PCF’s wish to stress its political and now also 
its ideological independence vis-à-vis the other. Parallel to the dramatic events affecting both 
the PCF and the CPSU, important changes were beginning to take place within the Soviet 
leadership.  
 
President Brezhnev had always enjoyed the respect and friendship of the PCF and its leaders – 
letters sent to him from the PCF testify to this; they would typically begin “Dear comrade 
Brezhnev,” and continue in an informal but appropriately submissive tone, suggesting the 
presence of real trust and mutual understanding. French journalists would make references to 
it, thus underlining the remarkable nature of the PCF’s intimate relations with this powerful 
leader. Speaking of his recent visit to Moscow in January, 1980, Marchais was asked whether 
Monsieur Brezhnev was well, if he was “en forme.” Marchais promptly replied; “Leonid 
Brezhnev spoke for an hour and a half. He was well.”215 This was not entirely true, however. 
Brezhnev’s health was deteriorating, and the daily run of the country had gradually been left 
to other members of the CPSU Politburo, such as Prime Minister Kosygin, who died himself 
only a few months later, in December 1980, having left office two months earlier due to ill 
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health. Brezhnev followed suit in 1982, but not before having buried Mikhail Suslov, who 
together with Ponomarev and Kirilenko featured most often in the PCF’s documents, and who 
appeared to have been the most important links between the PCF and the CPSU. Suslov died 
in January, 1982. This situation – showing all the signs of the end of a generation, as well as 
that of an era – would trigger cautious apprehension within the PCF leadership, too, especially 
as the question of Brezhnev’s would-be successor was put on the agenda.  
In from the cold – the PCF’s return to government 
The presidential election in April, 1981 was a huge blow to the PCF and Marchais, its 
presidential candidate. Robrieux called it “Marchais’ historical failure.”216 Having won only 
15, 5 % of the votes in the first round, it was the worst result for a PCF candidate since the 
end of the Second World War.
217
 It soon became clear that what in the past would have been 
assured communist votes had been captured by the PS and its candidate Mitterrand. 
Interesting to note was also the high number of non-voters in traditionally red areas – areas 
commonly known for their ability to mobilize the electorate.
218
 At a Central Committee 
meeting on 28 April, Charles Fiterman presented – with an air of resignation – his report on 
the first round of the election; “It is evident that presently, in France, political conditions do 
not exist so that a majority of voters appoint a communist to the Presidency of the Republic.” 
After much subsequent debate, and after declaring that he really was not worth the support, 
the Central Committee then agreed – at the instigation of the Politburo – to publish its 
endorsement for Mitterrand’s bid for the presidency.219 This last point is important, as it 
seems to contradict earlier suspicions, based on rumours and accusations, that the PCF before 
the second round of the election had called for its electorate to support Mitterrand’s opponent 
– even though Mitterrand was the closest political alternative to Marchais. Mitterrand’s 
opponent was sitting President Giscard d’Estaing, and the PCF’s bitterness over the PS’ 
betrayal would have been deep indeed, had it decided to give its support to a president whose 
“austerity policy” the PCF had fought for years. 
On 10 May François Mitterrand won the presidential election, becoming the fourth president 
of the Fifth Republic and the first socialist leader of France since the legendary Léon Blum. 
As was his right as president, Mitterrand promptly dissolved the National Assembly and 
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called a general election. The PS went on to take a staggering 285 seats in the ’81 législatives 
and won the national majority with 58 % of the votes. The consequence of this no less than 
sensational result for France, to the PCF, was the strangest events yet to emerge from the 
catastrophic aftermath of Afghanistan. The Central Committee stated on 15 May that, “…the 
new President benefits from a favourable prejudice on the part of all those who aspire to 
change.”220 On the following day, Marchais declared à la une – on the front page of 
L’Humanité, that: “We are ready to assume immediately all our governmental 
responsibilities.”221 Soon it became clear that the PS had invited the PCF to government talks. 
What transpired at these negotiations, were not disclosed, but Courtois and Lazar point out 
that the PCF had to agree to several strict terms, as it was in no position to state any demands 
that the PS did not wish to agree to.
222
 The joint statement released to the press on 23 June, 
after weeks of talks, revealed the scale of the concessions made by the PCF. Of the terms 
agreed, the PCF fulfilled one of them the very next day, when Marchais said to the 
L’Humanité: “We say, from now on, that the Soviet troops should withdraw from 
Afghanistan.” He went on to declare, not concealing the air of this being a forced statement, 
that a withdrawal was the wish and in the interest of the Afghan government, the Soviets 
themselves, the PS – and now, the PCF, too.223 The PCF was given four ministerial posts in 
the new socialist government led by Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy. Only one of the four men, 
Charles Fiterman, member of the Politburo, was from the PCF’s top leadership. It is 
noteworthy that Marchais himself was kept out of the cabinet.  
Attempt at catharsis – Marchais’ speech to the Central Committee 
Returning to government for the first time since 1947 had a deep impact on the PCF. At its 
first meeting after the government talks were concluded, Marchais gave a speech to the 
Central Committee. Its transcription is a remarkable read.
224
 Considering Marchais’ own 
propensity for pretentiousness – echoing the rhetoric of his party – the speech incorporates 
rare elements both of self-reflection and acquired understanding with the benefit of hindsight, 
mixed with the odd twinge of what can also be described as regret. “I think,” he began, “of 
certain of our decisions made relating to international events, like those of Afghanistan.” He 
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went on to summarize which principle the PCF had based its decision on – with the right of 
every people to ask an ally for aid outweighing the principle of non-interference. However, as 
Marchais was quick to point out, the decision had been made “…naturally without pretending 
to judge the details of the events.” Here, Marchais seemed to admit that the PCF had made its 
decision not knowing all the facts on the issue, but at the same time, he waived responsibility 
for the decision itself. Marchais’ use of words also suggests that he regretted the decision, but 
implied that the PCF could not have been expected to fully comprehend the situation – who 
did? Marchais’ catharsis lost some of its potency as the leader himself did not address his own 
personal conduct in the affair. Ironically, Marchais – who had championed the invasion so 
warmly on live television – now echoed the warning words of Plissonnier in early January, 
1980, when the PCF leadership in adhering to Plissonnier’s opinion on the subject, had 
stressed the importance of neither to support an invasion it clearly found problematic, nor was 
it to condemn the actions of a political ally. Marchais’ words, then, would suggest that the 
PCF’s attitude had never changed – that it had always, despite supporting the invasion 
publically, disapproved of it and the consequences it could have for the party.  
 
Marchais continued; “… the moment when we were confronted with this problem practically 
coincided with the highest level meeting we had ever had with the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union.” He lamented the confusion caused by “...the proximity of the events in 
Afghanistan and this meeting,” which served as a “…manipulation of our position on 
Afghanistan and the presentation of our meeting with the CPSU as a sign of our party’s total 
realignment with the Soviet position, which is exactly contrary to the meaning of the common 
communiqué.” So far Marchais did not seem willing to shoulder any responsibility on behalf 
of the party for the decision it had made and Marchais had cemented – in the eyes of both the 
party’s rank-and-file, as well as the French public. Once the PCF had made its decision, it had 
stood by it, and found strength and justification in the criticisms levelled at it. It had sought to 
distance itself from Soviet policy and in particular the invasion. But the PCF had clearly not 
wished to distance itself from the Soviet Union. If that were the goal, it would have been for 
the PCF merely to condemn the invasion, and the French bourgeois media and its right-
winged politicians would have been pleased. The PCF did not stand by the Soviet Union to be 
popular. It gained nothing from doing it. It simply stood by an ally when nobody else did. It 
may not have been morally right, it was certainly not politically wise, but it was an expression 
of consistency and genuine dedication, however misplaced. Furthermore, ever believing in the 
87 
 
ideology, both Marchais and his party appeared truly saddened by the lack of attention 
bestowed on the PCF-CPSU communiqué, considering what an unprecedented success it 
represented, not only to the PCF, but to the entire communist movement. Marchais expressed 
his hopes that the communiqué would form a basis on which new and more positive relations 
could be built.  
 
Up to this point, Marchais’ speech can be judged as no more than an exercise in realpolitik, a 
clever introspective manoeuvre designed to re-establish political trust now that the PCF had 
become a governing party. It could also be that Marchais felt it was necessary to clarify the 
circumstances of the Afghanistan situation a year and a half earlier – as he was not happy with 
its outcome for the PCF. It is important to note that Marchais at no point said that the decision 
to support the Soviet Union was not the right decision; he only indicated that the PCF would 
most likely have chosen differently, had the circumstances been different. This would seem to 
suggest the idea that the PCF’s decision to support the invasion of Afghanistan was a mistake, 
a glitch that ought not to have happened. Considering Marchais’ own enthusiasm and his 
party’s lengthy debate on the matter, this does not seem likely. It is much more plausible that 
Marchais instead, with the benefit of hindsight, regretted the decision the PCF had made, and 
this is how he chose to express it.  
 
The next issue raised by Marchais, however, would suggest that Marchais sought to correct 
critics of the party who believed that as well as politically standing by the Soviet Union, the 
PCF had also compromised its ideological stance.  
“We see it, during this whole period between the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956 and the 22nd Congress of 
our party in 1976, [that] our party has found itself facing more and more important demands of bringing forth 
new answers to new problems (…) In these twenty years, the world has changed a lot. First and foremost France. 
(…) And what has equally changed, too, little by little, [is] the situation, the reality of the socialist countries.” 
Marchais had mentioned the changes in socialist countries before, but not in a wider 
perspective. As late as 1978, Marchais had declared Soviet socialism – despite a few bumps in 
the road – to be a global force for good, for progress and peace. Now, he seemed to have 
reached a deeper understanding. He concluded that “our party has not drawn, from that 
moment, the necessary lessons of the 20
th
 Congress of the CPSU.” The sentence was 
underlined in the transcription – and one can only imagine the effect it had on the members of 
the Central Committee. 1956 was the year the post-Stalinist era was initiated, hailing the 
beginnings of de-Stalinization. Marchais clearly wished to repeat his belief in his party’s 
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ideological independence, as well as strengthening the foundations for collaboration with the 
PS, with whom it had now entered government. If one feels inclined to cynicism, one could 
put forth the argument here that Marchais acted according to a well-known phenomenon 
discussed by Courtois and Lazar; that the PCF’s tolerance and democratic efforts grew with 
domestic strength, and weakened in the face of resistance. Those were the times it sought 
refuge in the Soviet fold, and the Soviets’ influence was at its strongest.225 
 
The conclusion is clear – and reveals the complexity of the PCF’s position, pinned as it was 
between the ideological demands that a decision must be in keeping with Marxist-Leninist 
doctrines, on whose legitimacy the PCF placed the moral worth of its decisions, and the 
party’s political commitments – in this case international loyalties of which no bond was 
stronger than to the CPSU. This loyalty did not come without sacrifice, however, and 
situations – like the Afghan invasion – would force decisions made on the basis of realpolitik. 
This dilemma – made stronger by the PCF’s inherent use of ideology to justify its decisions – 
is poignantly illustrated by Marchais’ own evaluation of the Afghanistan issue: First, he all 
but admitted to regret the decision the PCF had made in January, 1980. It had been a disaster 
for the PCF in terms of support, and it had been a deeply ungrateful decision, yielding not one 
positive result for the party. It may sound like a paradox, then, that Marchais went on to deny 
that the PCF had made the wrong decision. However, this indirectly helps to explain why the 
PCF made its decision. It had simply judged it the best course of action, based on the 
available evidence and in honour of the party’s long standing commitment to the Soviet 
comrades. Marchais’ speech also reveals that the greatest cause for regret was the timing of 
the visit to Moscow – as it stole attention from the successful outcome of the visit itself – not 
the actual decision.   
 
This would seem to give an explanation as to why the PCF hesitantly chose to support the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Marchais’ enthusiastic praise for the invasion strengthened a 
view of the PCF as a Moscow puppet already shared by many Frenchmen. The PCF then 
cemented that view by doing its best to justify the invasion – as it had to, because it was 
unthinkable that such a decision could not have an ideological foundation. This conclusion 
still leaves us with an important question: how? Which structures allowed a primarily un-
wanted decision to be made? 
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Chapter 7. The PCF, 1980-81 – Stalinism in practice 
 
Although far from all of the PCF’s critics throughout 1980 and into 1981 accused the French 
communists of being Stalinists – showing their true colours as fifth columnists of Moscow – 
serious questions were asked. How sincere had the PCF been in its dedication to democracy? 
How willing – how able – had the party been to challenge its own principles of party rule? 
How were decisions made in a party still presided over by leaders of the Stalinist era? The 
PCF had once been a Stalinist party, that was clear. It had obligingly implemented all the 
Stalinist structures emanating from Moscow in the Comintern era – structures that had 
established the PCF as an undemocratic monolithic organization. These structures proved 
difficult to challenge, by the PCF leaders collectively, or by individual members. In any 
analysis of a communist party, we find that it is not only its ideology that dictates policy – it is 
as much about the structures of a party, and the methods of decision-making – methods often 
as established and unassailable as the ideological principles themselves. And the most basic 
and longest-living principle of party rule was that of democratic centralism.  
The Stalinist system – democratic centralism  
From the earliest beginnings of the Comintern, emphasis had been put on party unity as the 
most important basis for party efficiency, and the principle of democratic centralism as the 
tool to achieve party unity. The idea was to incorporate the freedom of discussion into a 
system of unity and discipline ensuring that the party did not degenerate into a “debating 
society.”226 Condition twelve of the Comintern’s legendary “Twenty-one Conditions” 
underlined the necessity of democratic centralism thus; “…the Communist Party will be able 
to fulfil its duty only if it is organized in the most centralized way possible and governed by 
iron discipline...”227 The principle of democratic centralism would forever after define world 
communism as the manifestation of the ever-present legacy of Stalinism. Tiersky found the 
principle of democratic centralism so essential to and defining of communist party rule still in 
the 1970s, that he placed it at the core of what he called “ordinary Stalinism.”228 The principle 
was put in place to ensure the effective implementation of party decisions – by stressing unity 
within a party leadership as a key to unity of action. The PCF was an ardent observer of the 
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principle, and in Marchais, democratic centralism had one of its greatest champions. Despite 
the expressed wishes to change the ideological direction of the party, it soon became clear that 
the structures of the PCF did not sway easily to change. 
 
First, in hailing “the democratic path to socialism,” the PCF faced a challenge with regards to 
its own decision-making processes. To the PCF, democratic centralism was still the most 
important principle ruling party debate. Leninist in origin, Stalinist in its corruption, used and 
abused by communists the world over, hailed and condemned in equal measure, democratic 
centralism remained at the base of PCF debates. Marchais gave a speech on the necessity and 
virtues of democratic centralism as late as 1976, addressing the newly elected Central 
Committee in March of that year. Speaking to both the veterans and the newcomers, he stated 
that “…quand les discussions sont terminées, alors évidemment prises, et bien la loi, c’est 
d’appliquer. C’est d’appliquer pour tous et de le faire avec beaucoup de fermeté.”229 He went 
on to remind the Central Committee of its responsibility to the party, and that the Committee 
keep in mind the privilege of sitting down and discussing policy for two whole days at a time, 
upon which it would make decisions that would affect the whole party. “The rest of the 
Party,” Marchais pointed out, “it (…) will have one page in L’Humanité of the report 
presented by comrade Piquet.” Finally, Marchais declared that “…the Central Committee 
should be a united bloc, a bloc welded like one single man.”  
 
Secondly, only two years later, after having committed itself to the democratic and 
modernizing project of the Eurocommunist collaboration, the dedication to democratic 
centralism did not seem to have lost any impetus in the eyes of the PCF leaders. In April, 
1978, after the PCF’s disastrous election results, Marchais called upon his comrades in the 
leadership to continue to fight the good fight. He declared that democratic centralism was 
essential to achieve a strengthening of the party: “Reinforce the Party, that means (…) to 
ensure the proper functioning of democratic centralism and perfect it. It is not by chance that 
the attacks against our party concentrate on democratic centralism: questioning it would be 
the surest means to achieve this weakening, this elimination of battle potential of the Party.” 
Marchais went on to defend the great collective and democratic traditions and routines of the 
PCF. He hailed what he called a “characteristic of our time” – namely the “democratic 
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tendency of the masses.” However, Marchais warned; “…To have the greatest concern for the 
democratic life of the party is one thing; dismantling the party in the name of a petty 
bourgeois, anarchistic wave is something else.” Before reminding the Central Committee that 
the PCF was a revolutionary, vanguard party, he returned to the issue of democratic 
centralism, where he, according to the report presented to the Central Committee, stayed for 
eight pages. It is clear that the idea of democratic centralism was close to Marchais’ heart, and 
that he truly believed in its importance to revolutionary struggle and efficiency. It is equally 
safe to assume that Marchais believed in democratic centralism as Lenin had originally meant 
it to be applied – removing the possibility to question a decided matter ensured action, Lenin 
had argued, and as long as a party leadership agreed on the important issues, everything else 
were minor issues who could only serve to create conflict if debated. However, as Marchais’ 
report reveals, the PCF leader did not fully convince as a democrat, either. Likening a 
democratization of the party to an act that was at the same time anarchistic and petty-
bourgeois, as he in effect did, is an example of a rhetorical exercise usually employed in order 
to discourage opponents to voice their arguments for fear of being perceived as extremists. 
Marchais was an intelligent and eloquent public speaker, and he succeeded in creating a 
plausible scenario in which democratic centralism became the means to obtain true 
democracy.  
 
It was equally clear that the PCF did not automatically approve of other forms of debate. A 
quotation from a report on the preparations to the European communist conference in 1976, 
serves to illustrate this: “the “consensus” serves to reach a compromise at the lowest level. 
(…) We consider that it is not good to impose on the revolutionary movement a method of 
diplomatic negotiation such as the consensus.”230 The author of the report, Jean Kanapa, 
revealed his deep distrust of the debating techniques applied by the communist preparation 
committees, of which consensus – defined here as unanimity – had been the prime basis for 
agreement. In analyzing the failure of the European communists to agree on an offensive 
stance, a manifest rife with uncompromising rhetoric in the language of the idealistic 
revolutionary who does not shun a fight, nor hesitates in placing blame where blame is due, 
Kanapa brought the Central Committee’s attention to the deplorable, petty bourgeois method 
of consensus. Kanapa, who has been described by biographers as a “true Stalinist,”231 not 
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necessarily as much in terms of his loyalty to Stalin as his loyalty to the latter’s system and 
principles, had no difficulty convincing the Central Committee of his discontentment. There 
was, in the PCF, an overall sense of the historic importance of democratic centralism – it was 
a very direct link to the early days of optimistic, revolutionary struggle. 
 
Tiersky pointed out that democratic centralism survived both the PCF’s attempts at socialism 
in French colours and its efforts vis-à-vis Eurocommunism,
232
 when he claimed that the 
decline suffered by the PCF in the late 1970s was “…in fact the historic decline of orthodox 
communism as an ideology. What is left is orthodox democratic centralism, but only as a 
practice.”233 The PCF had redefined the principle of democratic centralism, as well as placing 
it at the heart of the Stalinist influences over the party. Originally meant to be a party tool to 
ensure greater efficiency in the decision-making process, without denying party members the 
opportunity to voice their opinions, it had become a virtue in itself, an end rather than a 
means, and an instrument to stifle debate rather than encourage it. Finally, the PCF had 
reduced disagreement – including rational, useful and necessary disagreement – to a crime, a 
traitorous act. This would seem to apply regardless of the perceived dissidents’ actual 
opinions, or whether these opinions challenged the leadership’s decisions, or its 
interpretations of communist doctrine. To be right was to adhere to the principle of 
democratic centralism, and to obey the principle, was to be right. The PCF and its leader 
Marchais proved to be so dedicated to the principle that it was not discarded until 1993, 
having outlived both the Soviet Union and traditional Leninist thought.
234
  
 
“..un des ceux qui ont eu tort d’avoir eu raison trop tôt.”235  
Stalinism in practice – the Fiszbin Affair 
There were times when the PCF’s practical application of democratic centralism would 
resonance well beyond the confines of the party. When the leadership made controversial 
decisions, often regarded as running contrary to the interests of the PCF itself and of its 
members, both leaders and members of the rank-and-file would take their grievances to the 
leadership, or worse, to the press. One can assume that one of the reasons why some 
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disgruntled members of the PCF took their leadership debates in the national media was 
simply because they could not make themselves heard elsewhere.  
 
One of the elements of party rule in which Stalinist traditions prevailed well beyond the 
Stalinist policies of the PCF, was the party’s stance on dissidence. The PCF was 
uncompromising and unforgiving in its treatment of and view on dissidents. Traitors of the 
party were expelled without mercy, often, depending on the dissident’s position within the 
party, following a long trial in which the defendant’s life and activities were put under 
scrutiny and thereafter condemned. Though the era of Stalinist purges was over, the PCF’s 
dealings with dissidents serve as an illustration of the party system that every member was 
subjected to, making the PCF in essence a structure in which the individual (save for the 
leader himself) was not in a position to criticize or challenge party policy. 
 
The “Fiszbin Affair,” by some also referred to as the “Paris Affair,”236 is a case in point. It 
illustrates the tensions within the PCF leadership around the time of the Afghanistan invasion, 
as well as gives a more general insight into the inner workings of the party when it was faced 
with members who challenged – i.e. violated – the principle of party unity. The affair began 
soon after the 1978 elections, when Henri Fiszbin, head of the PCF’s Paris section – the 
largest and most influential party section – in addressing the national leadership, began 
expressing his concern – and that of his comrades in Paris – over an apparent dissonance 
between the political realities of France, and the political responses of the national leadership. 
He repeated his concerns at a Central Committee meeting in April, 1978. Fiszbin later 
recalled that “[t]his was the first time that certain members of the Central Committee had 
found themselves in the presence of criticisms or disagreements.”237 The conflict escalated. 
Fiszbin, who had support from many of his Parisian comrades, was summoned to a Central 
Committee meeting in January, 1979. Exactly what transpired at this meeting remains unclear. 
According to the PCF leadership, the meeting was meant to clarify certain issues with Fiszbin, 
ask him if he needed help with his section, and expressing the Committee’s concern that an 
investigation into the section might be needed – in order to uncover the sources of the 
discontentment.
238
 According to Fiszbin, he was attacked from all fronts, subjected to the 
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“four classic, Stalinist cliché accusation: “laxism,” “opportunism,” “lack of resoluteness” in 
defending the party’s line, and “lack of proper class spirit.”239 
 
The meeting ended with Fiszbin stepping down as leader of the Paris section, and although he 
kept his seat on the Central Committee until he was officially expelled from the PCF in 
October, 1981, he did not attend the meetings, and eventually he gave up all his duties. His 
position as head of the Paris section of the PCF was kept in the family, so to speak. Henri 
Malberg, the “militant worker” and hero of the 22nd Congress designated to be Fiszbin’s 
replacement, was his first cousin.
240
  
 
It would be wrong to say that Fiszbin was not purged. According to the strict communist 
definition of dissidence, however, Fiszbin was guilty, and that of a crime the PCF could not 
tolerate. Furthermore, he chose to voluntarily relinquish his position as head of the Paris 
section. This last aspect of the conflict is important, as it was from that moment that the 
Stalinist methods of dealing with dissidence truly began to make their presence known.  
On the one hand, the PCF played down the conflict by claiming that Fiszbin had asked the 
leadership as early as in September, 1977, to be relieved of some of his tasks, as his 
deteriorating health demanded it. Tiersky called Fiszbin’s illness “irrelevant” – and argued 
that in the process against Fiszbin and the Paris section, the PCF “adopted a classic hypocrisy 
of the Great Purge” by evoking the notion that “those who question the party’s line exclude 
themselves from the party…”241 This argument is strengthened by Paul Laurent when he 
reminded the Central Committee that the PCF leadership had never asked Fiszbin to step 
down as head of the Paris section, he had chosen to do so out of his own free will.  
 
On the other hand, once Fiszbin had made clear his disapproval of the PCF leadership, the 
latter reacted with the fury of former days. At a Central Committee meeting in November, 
1979, Marchais outlined the contents of a letter Fiszbin had written to him, in which the latter 
stated: “You are incapable of resolving the problems of our time on the union. You are 
incapable of solving the problems of socialism and of liberty.” Disregarding that it was a 
monumental task Fiszbin accused the PCF leadership of not being able to solve, nothing 
suggests that there was any love lost between Fiszbin and his former communist brethren. 
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Fiszbin may have felt both misunderstood and betrayed by the PCF in seeing his loyalty 
called into question in this manner. The feelings were mutual.   
 
It is difficult to ascertain exactly what Fiszbin said that would enrage the PCF leaders. 
According to the logic of democratic centralism, simply voicing disagreement may have been 
enough. Furthermore, Fiszbin was not above answering back when accused, as the bitter 
accounts of the January meeting in the Central Committee testify to. Marchais was deeply 
enraged at the insolence of Fiszbin, and he made his feelings known to the Central Committee 
at a meeting in November, 1979. His words reveal how badly the PCF leader reacted to 
resistance: “We, we are loyal. He was not loyal. He deceived the leadership of the Party. He 
deceived his comrades in the Politburo. He deceived everyone. As I have rarely seen in my 
life. I told the Politburo that the attitude of Henri Fiszbin helped me to understand how one 
could resort to methods belonging to Stalinism.”242 Marchais’ feeling of being deceived no 
doubt strengthened in March 1980. The PCF and its leader were subjected to the most intense 
attacks from the media, and Fiszbin published a book relating the entire unflattering affair to 
the public; Les Bouches s’ouvrent. The timing could not have been more favourable to 
Fiszbin, or more damning to the PCF.  
 
The Fiszbin Affair, which led to a wave of dissidents leaving the PCF in Fiszbin’s wake, 
illustrates the futility of individual initiative faced with the might of the PCF’s structures for 
political decision and its immunity for change. It strengthens the argument that the decisions 
made by the PCF did not necessarily reflect neither the beliefs of the rank-and-file, or all the 
members of the leadership. On the contrary it can be concluded that far from being 
ideologically justified in its decisions, the PCF leaders were left in a free position to make 
decisions based not on its expressed Marxist-Leninist foundations, but on political 
considerations answering to current affairs and events of immediate interest to the party. 
Finally, it contributes to an understanding of the totalitarian aspect of the PCF, and its 
leadership in particular.  
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”Le Parti de Georges Marchais”243 
Stalinist rule – the authority of the one – and the few  
Already in 1920, the Comintern had stated that the leadership of a communist party had to be 
“…strong, authoritative, and endowed with the fullest powers.”244 Traditionally, the PCF had 
been led by men whose tenure lasted decades, and whose position and person eventually 
acquired an almost mythical aura – not unlike the cults that built around the Soviet leaders. 
The PCF leaders, perhaps unconsciously, identified themselves with their Soviet counterparts, 
both in terms of relative importance to their parties, but also through personal friendships and 
mutual respect. The legendary Maurice Thorez’ reign nearly coincided with that of Stalin and 
the PCF was greatly influenced by Thorez’ connections with both the Soviet Union and its 
great leader.  
 
Georges Marchais – though in many aspects a hardcore Stalinist – was a man of the Brezhnev 
era, moulded in the same image as the Soviet apparatchiks. He was an uncompromising 
leader, dedicated to democratic centralism and to his friendship with Brezhnev, arrogant in 
public debate; he was surrounded by loyal comrades of the same convictions. In reading the 
PCF’s documents covering the late 1970s and early 1980s, a picture emerges of a near 
untouchable leader. Marchais – whose ascent to power remains clouded in mystery, but 
according to Courtois and Lazar was a result of direct Soviet influence and happened at 
Brezhnev’s instigation245 – was an old-school communist, an orthodox Stalinist whose reign 
was described by Tiersky as “erratic” and the main reason for the PCF’s eventual downfall, 
according to Robrieux, Courtois, and Lazar, amongst others.
246
   
 
Several aspects of the PCF’s actions and reactions illustrate the position Marchais held within 
the party, and the importance with which he came to be regarded by his own members, as well 
as by the French public as head of the PCF. When the personal attacks on Marchais were at 
their most violent, in early 1980, the PCF leader was fiercely defended by his comrades in the 
PCF leadership. Having nevertheless been forced to publically denounce the wildest 
accusations, Plissonnier took the opportunity at a Central Committee meeting to remind his 
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comrades of Marchais’ personal integrity, saying of his leader; “As to his personal life, it is 
that of millions of Frenchmen: simple, just, [and] honest. (…) His life is quite simply that of a 
communist: absolutely clair.”247 His words were echoed by one of his comrades, Mireille 
Bertrand, when she declared; “...all the members of the Central Committee hold in high 
esteem and greatly appreciate the General Secretary of the Party.”248 Marchais was the face of 
the PCF, he was its presidential candidate and its policy personified. When he was subjected 
to heavy criticisms in 1980, instead of asking whether Marchais’ actions may have 
contributed to the situation the party found itself in, whether he had in fact damaged the party, 
messages of support and sympathy poured in from all corners of the PCF.   
 
Marchais led the PCF for 22 years. British daily The Independent summed up Marchais thus, 
upon his death in 1997;  
“The image of a working-class Parisian lad, outspoken, aggressive, cocksure, was cultivated as a style. Marchais 
was the most zealous of activists and the most verbally vigorous of his contemporaries, capable of histrionics, 
turning on floods of tears like an old-time music-hall performer. He applied the Party's line with aggression and 
agility and the turns and twists of Communist policy were executed with exemplary loyalty.”249 
 
It is important to note the influence of the rest of the leadership, too. There was Paul Laurent, 
the quiet but extremely dedicated party functionary – loyal and methodical. There was also 
Kanapa – described as the grey eminence of the PCF – the ideologue and Stalinist cadre, and 
a firm believer in the power of the professional revolutionary. There was Fiterman, the crown 
prince, and Gremetz, the young and somewhat hot-headed idealist. And then there was 
Plissonnier, the kingmaker, and the power behind the throne. Plissonnier had been by 
Marchais’ side since the latter’s ascent to power, and served as his closest advisor. Judging by 
his presence in the PCF documents, Plissonnier had a hand in practically all matters that 
passed through the leadership. He also had the daily run of the party when Marchais was 
indisposed, or abroad. For this reason, he rarely joined PCF delegations to foreign communist 
parties.  
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Finally, there was Jean Jérôme.
250
 He serves as a good illustration of the PCF as being 
somewhat different from the other political parties of France. He is mentioned only once in all 
the documents covering the PCF leadership between 1975 and 1981, and though he was a 
member of the party, he had no official position in its top leadership. A man of shadows – 
there is hardly any literature on his life – he was described by Courtois and Lazar as PCF’s 
“man of finance” from 1945 to his death.251 Marchais made a brief reference to him in 1976, 
in his speech to the newly elected Central Committee: “…in our Central Committee sessions 
the comrade Jean Jérome has participated regularly for many years, even if he is not a 
member. Thus, I propose to the Central Committee that, as in the past, Jean Jérome, for 
reasons of his work, continues to attend the sessions of the Central Committee without this 
being made public.”252 It would seem plausible that Jérôme was in charge of the money from 
Moscow, as well as financial transactions to and from other Eastern European countries. The 
respect he was offered by the PCF’s leaders would suggest that Jérôme also acted as an 
advisor to or an unofficial leader of the party. Furthermore, more or less fanciful stories 
appoint him l’œil de Moscou – the “eye of Moscow” in the PCF, or even a KGB agent. All 
these stories – however untrue they may be – illustrate the imaginings he inspired, and 
contribute to the perception of the PCF as a mysterious, cult-like party, ruled by unwritten 
laws and invisible power structures.    
 
The PCF was still in the beginning of the 1980s an example of a party whose monolithic 
structures – effectively ensuring the run of the party regardless of policy – were still 
influenced by and strengthened the authority of the leaders, as well as their systemic 
possibility to dictate policy. Marchais’ party presence and hands-on styled leadership, as well 
as the authority enjoyed by his closest advisors and comrades in the Politburo, echo the power 
of their Soviet comrades. There is, however, evidence to suggest that the PCF was marked by 
an even stronger – lingering – totalitarian tradition than the CPSU. Far from being a bold 
statement, and keeping in mind that the object of this analysis in not the decision-making 
processes of the Soviet communist party, it suffices to mention the process within the Soviet 
leadership leading up to the invasion of Afghanistan.  
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Westad described how the decision to go into Afghanistan was ultimately made by a handful 
Soviet leaders. The members of the CPSU Central Committee all signed the document 
expressing the party’s intention – but one anomaly makes its presence known. President 
Brezhnev, although no doubt aware of the topic of discussion, and its most likely outcome, 
was not present at this crucial meeting. His illness gave good grounds for excuse, but his most 
natural substitute, however – Soviet premier Kosygin – was not there, either. It would seem as 
though the Soviet Union effectively declared war without its top leaders! Taking into 
consideration the personal involvement of Marchais in all important decisions of the PCF, and 
his hold over the party leadership, it seems safe to conclude that – given a comparable 
situation – a similar scenario would have been unthinkable. Marchais still evoked the young 
rather than the ageing Brezhnev. The totalitarian tradition of PCF rule, reminiscent of Stalin 
rather than the immovable system of the Soviet bureaucrats, is excellently summed up by 
Robrieux in his description of party power; “Tout passe par Georges Marchais.”253 
Marxist-Leninist theory and the cult of Stalin 
Towards the end of the 1970s, the PCF stayed true to the basic doctrines of Marxist-Leninism 
whilst simultaneously proclaiming its right to amend these doctrines according to the needs 
and interests of the PCF and its electorate. Ultimately, the dedication to this expression of 
ideological independence proved somewhat ephemeral. The structural reasons – steeped in 
unchangeable Stalinism – have been outlined above. Another reason is, paradoxically, linked 
to Stalin himself. 
 
It’s perhaps too bold a statement to say that the admiration for Stalin was still an aspect of the 
PCF. But the respect was still there, even as the 1980s drew closer. Stalin, many communists 
believed, was despite his flaws, his brutality and his crimes, a great leader – who had shown 
strength in the face of dissidents, Trotskyites, Nazis and Americans – and who had presided 
over the Soviet Union at its most powerful and awe-inspiring. A communist simply had to 
relate to Stalin and his influence – and the PCF seemed for a long time unwilling to challenge 
the man, for fear of destroying the myth. This was much due to the PCF leaders. Lazar points 
out the revealing paradox that the PCF’s first real disagreement with the CPSU was directly 
linked to de-Stalinization; the vast majority of the Thorez-led PCF delegation at the CPSU 
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20
th
 Congress in 1956 disapproved of Khrushchev’s attempts at denouncing Stalin’s crimes.254 
Boujut relates an anecdote in which soon after the Congress, it was discussed by Jean Kanapa 
and a comrade, Arthur Kriegel: “We performed terrorism, because we judged that it was 
necessary. We have still not reached communism because of it!” remarked Kriegel. Kanapa 
watches him coolly: “Speak for yourself!”...”255  
 
Kanapa’s attitude echoed the core of communism’s perceived legitimacy. He truly believed in 
communism, and he equally believed that the policy championed by the PCF was communism 
in its practical application. This evokes the presence of Stalin in a profound way. When the 
Soviet archives in Moscow were opened to historians, many of them were surprised to find 
that Stalin, despite having corrupted the revolutionary ideas of Marxist-Leninism into a 
monolithic colossus of reactionary bureaucratism, was a convinced communist.
256
 The 
obvious question of course was what kind of communism – the communism also shared by 
the PCF – did he believe in? The answer is equally obvious; he believed in the Soviet Union – 
communism’s first, real, and defining political and social experiment. This poignant 
observation echoes the true depth of Stalin’s legacy within the PCF. It was not just the system 
he left behind – a system that the PCF had incorporated and stayed loyal to since its founding 
– it was also a historical bond in which were tied up the beliefs, the history, and the 
friendships of the PCF, its efforts and its aspirations, as well as its ability to change, reform, 
and see itself in relation to other communist parties and to French society.  
 
In analyzing the PCF’s quest for a more democratic organization, it is easy to assume that that 
was what its leadership wanted. But democracy was in its essence seen as a bourgeois 
invention, ineffective against capitalism and supportive of the follies of the masses. Its 
leaders’ almost scornful remarks on issues such as consensus and total democratization would 
suggest that they may not have been prepared to see the “...political cultural renaissance” 
through to the end. Not necessarily only out of fear, as Tiersky argued, but because they 
simply did not regard it as of vital interest to the party.
257
 In 1978, historian and PCF member 
Jean Ellenstein summed up the PCF’s historical dilemma by declaring that the French 
Communist Party “…will have to own up to its past mistakes more openly and recognize that 
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it is having problems doing this.” He went on to pose a hypothetical question: “Why hasn’t it 
[the PCF] clearly admitted the influence of Stalinism in the PCF’s history, the consequences 
of the unconditional defence of the Soviet Union and the membership of the Comintern?”258  
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Chapter 8. Conclusion 
 
It is clear that the PCF between 1976 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December, 
1979, went through a process of gradually seeking ideological independence from the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union – its long-time ally and friend within the international 
communist movement. The process started a conflict between the two parties, and their 
relations deteriorated. The reason for the conflict was the PCF’s wish for the CPSU’s 
recognition of divergence – i.e. acceptance of ideological differences between communist 
parties. To this effect, the PCF was inspired by the Eurocommunist project – whose 
aspirations for liberalization and democratization of the Western European communist parties 
were echoed by the PCF’s own beliefs, as was demonstrated by the doctrinal changes made 
by the PCF at its 22
nd
 Congress in 1976. The PCF, experiencing a strengthening of its position 
in this time – both domestically due to its collaboration with the French Socialist Party, and 
within the Eurocommunist movement – also used the Eurocommunist project as leverage 
against the CPSU to assert its bargaining position vis-à-vis the Soviet comrades.  
 
However, events did not unfold as anticipated – or hoped for. The PCF’s domestic position 
worsened as the collaboration with the socialists collapsed before the elections in 1978, and 
the profound differences of opinion between the PCF and the leader party of the 
Eurocommunists, the Italian Communist Party, were not easily overlooked when outlining 
strategies for a common policy. It also became clear that the very structures of the PCF itself, 
its leadership, decision-making processes and organization, were still of a Stalinist nature – 
undemocratic, monolithic, and practically immune to change. Parallel to these events, PCF-
CPSU relations gradually began to mend. A month before a high-level meeting between the 
two parties, the PCF succeeded in its quest for recognition of divergence – effectively an 
acceptance of ideological differences – leaving the PCF to more freely interpret communist 
doctrine whilst still retaining its political bonds with the CPSU. As this would leave the PCF 
free to distance itself from decisions made by the CPSU that the PCF found to be in breach 
with its own interpretation of communist thought – and given the commitment to democracy 
expressed by the PCF since the 22
nd
 Congress – one would suppose the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan to be a prime opportunity for the PCF to make a decision faithful to these 
considerations. It did not. The simple reason was, I have argued, that the PCF chose to 
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support the Soviet Union not because it approved of the invasion, but because it chose to 
stand by an ally in what it deemed to be a single, isolated political decision.  
 
The PCF’s decision to support the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, therefore, was a political 
decision, an expression of the PCF’s own sense of realpolitik. Ideologically, the PCF was 
clearly against the invasion – it violated the communist principle of pacifism and made a 
mockery of the principal Marxist idea that aggressive warfare is an imperialist act, committed 
only by capitalist or feudal states. Afghanistan was an extremely delicate issue for the PCF – 
the deliberations of the leadership reveal it. The Politburo hesitated, revealing the conflict 
between ideological principle and political consideration. The PCF foresaw the controversies 
that would arise should the party choose to stand by the Soviet Union in this matter, and it 
tried to distance itself from the invasion once it had made its decision. It also sought to 
convey a very basic truth – namely that the PCF itself had nothing to do with the invasion. 
The PCF gained nothing from giving its support to the CPSU, on the contrary, it lost the party 
support and votes, and it was ultimately discredited by the affair. The PCF found itself on the 
receiving end of criticisms levelled at it from all corners of society, from socialists and 
conservatives alike, from the peace movements and the patriots. Argued as one of the key 
events that marked the beginning of the end of the PCF as an important political party in 
France, the party never quite recovered from the turmoil following in the wake of the 
Afghanistan affair. For the vast majority of the French people, Afghanistan strengthened a 
widespread belief; that the PCF’s allegiance was, and always had been, to the Soviet Union. 
Even the Eurocommunist collaboration, which for a few brief years seemed to be successful, 
could not persuade the PCF to abandon the CPSU and its sphere of influence.  
 
Eurocommunism failed, in almost all aspects, in recommending itself to the PCF. It was 
deemed by the PCF to go contrary to its alliance with the CPSU – with one of the expressed 
goals of Eurocommunism being to diminish Soviet influence within the international 
movement; this could easily be seen as a betrayal of or a belittlement of the First Socialist 
Country. Furthermore, the Eurocommunist project demanded a level of democracy within 
each collaborating party’s organization – as the overall goal of the project was, in effect, 
democracy in harmony with communist ideology. The PCF simply could not meet with the 
required level of openness – any wish for ideological change was effectively stopped by the 
Stalinist structures of the PCF, by its very party system, which was immune to the structural 
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changes necessary to implement ideological and political change. There was a genuine wish 
for democratic change in the PCF which echoed the aspirations of the Eurocommunist. 
Ultimately, however, it did not triumph. But there were other aspects of Eurocommunism that 
appealed to the PCF. The party felt important when it was part of the movement, as a large 
party it had a great deal of impetus, its participation in the collaboration was wanted, and its 
significance was not lost on the PCF leaders. Furthermore, the Eurocommunists provided the 
PCF with needed courage and sanctuary at a time when the conflict with the CPSU was at its 
most intense and disagreeable. Viewed from another angle, the PCF may also simply have 
wished not to be left out. As one of the great communist parties of Europe, it presumably felt 
it had to participate in the international projects of the movement, so as to influence decisions 
and be part of the decision-making processes.  
 
Most importantly, however, as I have argued in this thesis, was the PCF’s use of the 
Eurocommunist collaboration as leverage against the CPSU in its ideological conflict with the 
Soviet comrades. The conflict was primarily the result of the PCF’s wish for greater 
ideological autonomy vis-à-vis the CPSU. This was a consideration based on the PCF’s 
recognition of a necessary change in its approach to democratic and liberal rights. However, 
the PCF had no wish to break with the CPSU. The alliance between the PCF and the CPSU 
was a political one, based as much on realpolitik as any bilateral alliance. Though the ties 
between the CPSU and the PCF were originally made in honour of solidarity and ideological 
fraternity between communists, they had through the decades become cemented in an 
altogether different fabric. The history shared by the two parties, the political and structural 
development they had in common, had created a bond neither was willing to sever. The 
conflict between them, therefore, was marked by a basic misunderstanding. The CPSU feared 
a split between the two parties, whereas the PCF sought recognition for the differences that 
did exist between them – and this recognition was important to the PCF because it would 
allow the relationship with the CPSU to continue. It wished for it to continue.  
 
From this conclusion emerges another: The decision to support the invasion of Afghanistan 
honoured the alliance between the PCF and the CPSU. The PCF leaders may very well have 
thought that one cannot presume to always agree with an ally, but that does not mean that one 
should abandon him if he asks for help or support. The alliance had ideological roots, and an 
interpretation of Marxist-Leninist doctrines were used to justify the invasion but, in essence, 
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the PCF acted in the spirit of realpolitik, understanding that the decision would cause political 
controversy, and be ideologically controversial as it violated basic communist principles, but 
still made its decision, and stood by it. Two distinctions are important to make here, in order 
to clarify the picture. First, one must differ between an ideological alignment between the 
PCF and the CPSU – which I don’t believe took place, as the PCF expressed ambiguity and 
disapproval of the invasion – indicating its awareness that the invasion was a violation of 
communist principles – and a political alignment – which did take place, as a political 
alignment between the two parties was already in place. Secondly, one must also differ 
between the PCF’s decision on Afghanistan and that of PCF leader Marchais. The PCF’s 
decision, following debate and hesitation within the leadership – in Marchais’ absence! – was 
marked by the ideological and moral scruples the PCF experienced with regards to the 
situation it faced. Marchais’ public statement on the invasion – especially his appearance on 
Soviet television – reveals the power of the Stalinist structures within the PCF that the party 
could not break free from, in this instance personified and illustrated by a leader whose 
authority was ultimately proved to be above that of the PCF Politburo, and whose own 
personal statement regarding the Afghanistan issue drowned out the more cautious approach 
adopted by the PCF Politburo and Central Committee.   
 
Marchais’ performance most likely contributed greatly to trigger what can be viewed as the 
PCF’s biggest mistake. Once it had decided to support the Soviet Union, and Marchais had 
left nobody in doubt as to the sincerity of the PCF’s commitment to the CPSU, the party 
mobilized the press in order to try to convince its own electorate and the French public that 
the invasion was legitimate, and justifiable. In so doing, the PCF failed to demonstrate the 
required measure of distance between itself and the unhappy event, and it gave the party’s 
critics more ammunition to use against it, when they claimed that the PCF had realigned with 
Soviet foreign policy. It is revealing that the PCF’s prime reason for supporting the invasion – 
adhering to the right of any people to call upon an ally for military aid – far from being a 
communist doctrine is a basic principle in foreign policy; indeed the very raison d’être of an 
organization so disagreeable to the PCF as NATO. The PCF’s actions following the invasion 
illustrate how vital it was to the party to justify its decisions ideologically, by finding a 
Marxist-Leninist doctrine which made the act legitimate. Its declaration – that it supported all 
people in struggle against an oppressor – was certainly in the spirit of communist solidarity, 
but it was an ambiguous statement at best. Its emphasis on the feudal character of the Afghan 
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society, and the reactionary attitudes championed by the rebel forces, was regarded as an 
irrelevant sidetrack from the issue at hand – namely the general legitimacy of military 
operations like the Soviet invasion. The PCF had won its greatest ideological victories vis-à-
vis the CPSU less than a month before the invasion, with the latter’s acknowledgment of the 
existence of ideological divergences between communist sister parties. The PCF, however, 
did not use this historical opportunity to evoke the possibility of expressing its disagreement 
with the CPSU on this matter. That could only mean that the PCF agreed with the invasion – 
which it clearly did not – or that the PCF did not consider its support for the invasion an 
ideological matter. The PCF’s attempt at using ideology to justify its position, ultimately 
served only to confuse the electorate, and muddle the distinction between ideology and 
politics that the PCF fervently tried to convey to the French public in the weeks and months 
after the Soviet invasion.  
 
This distinction follows my argument in the thesis, that despite the PCF’s own commitment to 
let ideology guide political decisions, this was not always the case. As with any other political 
party, the PCF also made decisions which undermined or ran contrary to Marxist-Leninist 
thought. This distinction, though real to the PCF, was not seen by the French public. They did 
not see what the PCF still clearly believed – that communism, as it was an ideal, could not be 
corrupted. There are at least two reasons why this distinction was not visible to outsiders. The 
first is that, ultimately, it may have been an artificial distinction – in communism, ideology 
and politics had always been intimately connected, as had ends and means – and that the PCF 
in championing this difference was fooling itself to believe it enjoyed greater independence 
vis-à-vis the Soviets than it in reality did. Secondly, the PCF never let outsiders see that it 
occasionally made decisions that discarded communist considerations. Ideology was put 
forward – sometimes as a smokescreen – to legitimize all PCF policy, regardless of the 
mockery some of these policies made of true communism.  
 
Finally, the support for the invasion can also in part be attributed to the PCF’s Stalinist 
structures. The bond to the Soviet Union was incorporated into the PCF’s own decision-
making processes, the alliance was perpetuated and assured by the inner workings of a party 
that could not – and dared not? – challenge its own foundations. There was no democracy in 
the party’s higher circles of power, once elected or promoted to the Central Committee or the 
Politburo, only exclusion or ill health could prevent a member from retaining his or her seat 
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until death. The personal authority of the leader contributed to make the PCF a profoundly 
undemocratic organization. And Marchais was an old-school Stalinist, whose ascendancy to 
power had been at the instigation of the Soviets. His and the party’s dedication to the principle 
of democratic centralism effectively prevented the PCF leadership from challenging the 
authority of Marchais, as well as being challenged by the lower ranks of the party. One can 
also question the PCF’s apparent willingness to change its principles if it did not acknowledge 
the influence of Stalinism on its own party apparatus. Stalinism, whose essence is the 
subjection of ideology to form, and substance to structures, had shaped the PCF’s dedication 
to the CPSU to such an extent that one may be justified in claiming that the PCF’s political 
decisions were structurally inherent in its own party organization, only occasionally 
influenced by leaders whose authority could challenge or cement those structures.       
 
On the founding congress of the PCF, in December 1920, socialist leader Léon Blum had 
proved himself as something of a prophet, when he, during the debate over the 21 Conditions, 
said to the communists who were in favour of the Comintern:  
“Votre dictature n’est plus la dictature temporaire qui vous permettra d’aménager les derniers travaux 
d’édification de votre societé. Elle est un systéme de gouvernement stable, presque régulier dans votre esprit, et à 
l’abri duquel vous voulez faire tout le travail. C’est cela le systéme de Moscou. (…) Cela est si vrai que, pour la 
première fois dans toute l’histoire socialiste, vous concevez le terrorisme, non pas seulement comme le recours 
de dernière heure, non pas comme l’extrême mesure de salut publique que vous imposerez aux résistances 
bourgeoises, non pas comme une nécessité vitale pour la Révolution, mais comme un moyen de 
gouvernement.”259 
The system of the PCF had always echoed the system of Moscow. The PCF was defined by 
its alliance with and dedication to the Soviet Union and its communist party. In its essence 
that never changed. In its essence, the PCF was still a totalitarian structure. Herein lies at least 
part of the explanation as to why the party supported an invasion it was against, and stood by 
a regime that had long since fallen from the purer, communist faith.  
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Appendix I. Georges Marchais’ speech to the Central 
Committee, 25/26.06.81 – excerpts  
 
I. a - French transcription 
“Je pense (…) à certaines de nos prises de position relatives aux évènements internationaux, 
comme ceux d’Afghanistan. Je rappelle à ce propos que nous avons déterminé notre position 
face à ce dernier problème en prenant en considération d’une part le droit des peuples à 
disposer d’eux-mêmes, sans ingérence extérieure, et, d’autre part, le droit de chaque pays à 
conclure des traités et, en cas de besoin, à faire appel à l’aide d’un pays allié. C’est à partir de 
ces principes que nous avons pris position, sans naturellement prétendre juger du détail des 
évènements. Je rapelle également qu’il s’est trouvé que le moment où nous avons été 
confrontés à ce problème a pratiquement coincidé avec la rencontre au plus haut niveau que 
nous avons eue avec le Parti communiste de l’Union soviétique. Le résultat de cette rencontre, 
dont la tenue avait été rendue possible après de longues discussions entre nos deux partis, fut 
éminemment positif. Pour la première fois dans l’histoire du mouvement communiste 
international, le Parti communiste de l’Union soviétique signa un communiqué reconnaissant 
sans ambiguité l’existence de divergences avec un autre parti communiste.  
(...) 
Ces entretiens, et le texte sur lequel ils débouchèrent, permirent de rendre possible le 
développement des rapports entre nos deux partis sur des bases nouvelles, inédites.  
On voit mieux, avec le recul, combien la proximité des évènements d’Afghanistan et de la 
tenue de cette rencontre rendirent possible tout à la fois une manipulation de notre position sur 
l’Afghanistan et la présentation de notre rencontre avec le P.C.U.S comme le signe d’un 
réalignement total de notre parti sur les positions soviétiques, ce qui est exactement le 
contraire du sens du communiqué commun.” 
(...) 
“On le voit, pendant toute cette période qui sépare le 20ème Congrès du P.C.U.S en 1956 du 
22ème Congrès de notre parti en 1976, notre parti s’est trouvé placé devant une exigence de 
plus en plus impérative d’apporter les réponses nouvelles aux problèmes nouveaux qui se sont 
peu à peu trouvés posés. Dans ce vingt années, le monde a beaucoup changé. La France 
d’abord. (…) Et ce qui changea également, ce fut aussi, peu à peu, la situation, la réalité des 
pays socialistes.” 
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“…notre parti n’a pas tiré, dès ce moment-là tous les enseignements nécessaires du 20ème 
Congrès du P.C.U.S.” 
“…nous sommes partisans de construire le socialisme en France dans le pluralisme politique, 
dans la coopération entre les Partis. Cette voie est du même coup la voie de l’activité 
indépendante du parti révolutionnaire, la voie de renforcement de l’audience, de 
l’organisation, de la capacité d’initiative du Parti communiste français.”  
I. b - English translation 
“I think (...) of certain of our decisions made relating to international events, like those of 
Afghanistan. I remember to this effect that we decided our position faced with this last 
problem taking into consideration partly the right of peoples to rule themselves, without 
outside interference, and partly the right of every country to conclude treaties and in case of 
need, appeal to an allied country for aid. It was based on these principles that we made a 
decision, naturally without pretending to judge the details of the events. I also remind [you] 
that the moment when we were confronted with this problem practically coincided with the 
highest level meeting we had ever had with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The 
result of this meeting, made possible after long discussions between our two parties, was 
eminently positive. For the first time in the history of the international communist movement, 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union signed a communiqué recognizing without 
ambiguity the existence of divergences with another communist party.  
(...) 
These discussions and the text from which they stem, permit to make possible a development 
of relations between our two parties on a new and unprecedented basis. We see better, with 
the setback, how the proximity of the events in Afghanistan and this meeting served both as a  
manipulation of our position on Afghanistan and the presentation of our meeting with the 
CPSU as a sign of our party’s total realignment with the Soviet position, which is exactly 
contrary to the meaning of the common communiqué.” 
(...) 
“We see it, during this whole period between the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956 and the 
22
nd
 Congress of our party in 1976, [that] our party has found itself facing more and more 
important demands of bringing forth new answers to new problems, increasingly posed.  In 
these twenty years, the world has changed a lot. First and foremost France. (…) And what has 
equally changed, too, little by little, [is] the situation, the reality of the socialist countries.” 
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“...our party has not drawn, from that moment, the necessary lessons of the 20th Congress of 
the CPSU.”  
“We are partisans of constructing socialism in France by political pluralism, in cooperation 
between the parties. This path is at the same time the path of independent activity of the 
revolutionary party, the path of strengthening the audience, the organization [and] the 
capacity for initiative of the French Communist Party.” 
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Appendix II. List of persons 
 
Amin, Hafizullah (1929-79): Became president of Afghanistan in 1979 upon the removal of 
his predecessor Taraki in September. Killed following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 
December. Belonged to the Khalq faction of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan. 
Andropov, Yuri (1914-84): Chairman of the KGB, 1967-82. General Secretary of the Soviet 
Union from 1982 until his death. 
Berlinguer, Enrico (1922-84): Leader of the Italian Communist Party – the PCI – from 1972 
until his death.  
Brezhnev, Leonid (1906-82): President of the Soviet Union from 1964 until his death. 
Carrillo, Santiago (1915- ): Leader of the Spanish Communist Party – the PCE – between 
1960 and 1982. 
Carter, Jimmy (1924- ): President of the United States of America between 1977 and 1981. 
Chervonenko, Stepan (1915-2003): Soviet ambassador to France, 1973-83. Ambassador to 
Czechoslovakia, 1965-73, and known for his role in the suppression of the Prague Spring in 
1968.  
Duclos, Jacques (1896-1975): Leader of the French Communist Party – the PCF – during the 
German occupation of France, and during Thorez’ illness, the 1950-53 interim.One of the 
party’s leading politicians for half a century.  
Fiszbin, Henri (1930-90): Leader of the Paris section of the PCF, 1973-1979. Officially 
excluded from the party in 1981, following a two-year conflict with the PCF leadership.  
Fiterman, Charles (1933- ): Member of the PCF Central Committee, and Transport minister 
in Pierre Mauroy’s 2nd and 3rd socialist governments, 1981-1984. Left the PCF in 1991. 
Giscard d’Estaing, Valéry (1926- ): President of France, 1974-1981. Centre-right politician.  
Gremetz, Maxime (1940- ): Member of the PCF Politburo in 1976, and the Central 
Committee in 1973. Excluded from the party in 2006.  
Gromyko, Andrei (1909-89): Soviet minister of Foreign Affairs from 1957 to 1985, when he 
was promoted to the Chairmanship of the Supreme Soviet.  
Jérôme, Jean (1906-90): Member of the PCF, in charge of the party’s finances from 1945 
until his death. 
Kanapa, Kean (1921-78): Member of the PCF Politburo and Central Committee from 1964 
until his death. One of the party’s chief ideologues.  
Karmal, Babrak (1929-96): President of Afghanistan, 1979-86. Belonged to the Parcham 
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faction of the PDPA. 
Khrushchev, Nikita (1894-1971): General Secretary of the Soviet Union, 1953-64. 
Succeeded by Brezhnev. 
Kirilenko, Andrei (1906-90): Member of the CPSU Politburo, 1965-82. One of Brezhnev’s 
closest allies within the party.   
Kosygin, Alexei (1904-80): Soviet Prime Minister, 1964-80. 
Laurent, Paul (1925-90): Member of the PCF Politburo, 1956-1990, and Central Committee, 
1964-1990. 
Marchais, Georges (1920-97): Joint leader of the PCF together with Rochet, 1969-1972. 
Leader of the PCF, 1972-1994.  
Mitterrand, François (1916-96): Leader of the French Socialist Party – the PS – between 
1971 and 1981. President of France, 1981-1995.  
Napolitano, Giorgio (1925- ): Italian politician. Former member of the PCI, as of 2006 
president of Italy.   
Plissonnier, Gaston (1913-95): Member of the PCF Politburo, 1964-90, and Central 
Committee, 1950-90. One of the party’s most powerful and longest-serving leaders.  
Ponomarev, Boris (1905-95): Head of the Foreign Affairs Section in the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union – the CPSU – 1955-1986. Party ideologue and one of the most powerful 
leaders of the international communist movement.  
Rochet, Waldeck (1905-83): Leader of the PCF, 1964-1972, Honorary General Secretary, 
1972-1979. Member of the PCF Central Committee, 1936-1983. 
Suslov, Mikhail (1902-82): Second secretary of the CPSU, 1965-1982. One of the most 
important party ideologues and last remaining Stalinists in the Soviet top leadership. 
Taraki, Nur Muhammed (1917-1979)
260: President of Afghanistan from 1978 until Amin’s 
coup in September, 1979. Killed shortly after. Belonged to the Khalq faction of the PDPA. 
Thorez, Maurice (1900-64): Leader of the PCF from 1930 until his death.  
Ustinov, Dmitri (1908-84): Soviet minister of Defence from 1876 until his death. Succeeded 
by Marshal Sergei Sokolov.  
                                                          
260
 Taraki’s birth date is disputed. Encyclopaedia Britannica lists 1917 as year of birth, Westad in (ed) Westad 
lists 1921. Further sources list 1913. 
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